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Art. 1.—METTERNICH AND THE *ENTENTE CORDIALE*.

BEFORE proceeding to the main business of this article, which is to publish and comment on a hitherto unknown dispatch of Metternich's concerning the *Entente Cordiale* between France and Great Britain, a few prefatory remarks are desirable. When, in these days, we have occasion to mention the *Entente Cordiale*, we too often overlook certain striking facts. One is that it can pride itself on having had Talleyrand as godfather; the other, that in a little more than a dozen years it will be a century old. Its birth, indeed, dates back to the period when, from 1830 to 1834, the erstwhile Minister for Foreign Affairs under the Directory represented in London the Government of July.

'J'y arrivais,' he wrote on Sept. 24, 1830, 'quelques heures après avoir débarqué à Douvres, animé de l'espoir, du désir surtout, d'établir enfin cette alliance que j'ai toujours considérée comme la garantie la plus solide du bonheur des deux Nations et de la paix du monde.'

Such was, summed up in a few words, the programme which Talleyrand had laid down; a programme which Louis Philippe and his ministry had, moreover, accepted without changing a syllable.

This declaration of principles remains to-day of such capital importance that it will be of interest to quote the few phrases which the Duc de Broglie devotes, in his preface to the 'Memoirs' of Talleyrand, to the genesis of the *Entente Cordiale*.

'Son plan [Talleyrand's] est fait,' he writes. 'A la coalition des Monarchies du Continent que toute révolution effraye, il
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opposera l'alliance de deux monarchies libérales fondées l'une et l'autre sur un choix national ; et, dans le discours qu'il adresse au Roi d'Angleterre la première fois qu'il est reçu en audience solennelle, il ne craint pas d'offrir à l'Héritier de la Maison de Brunswick l'amitié du Roi des Français au nom d'une communauté de principes et d'une fraternité d'origine.

'A partir de ce moment, sa marche est assurée ; l'avènement d'un ministère anglais pris dans le Parti libéral, dont il a pressenti la venue, ne fera qu'aplanir devant lui tous les obstacles. Il a pris en main le levier qu'il peut faire mouvoir. *La coalition menaçante est tuée dans son germe dès que l'Angleterre s'en retire.* L'alliance anglaise devient même le pivot de la longue négociation qui aboutira à substituer sur notre frontière une neutralité amicale à un voisinage d'une hostilité incommode, en consacrant à Bruxelles une royauté de plus, issue comme celle de France, d'un choix populaire.'

The *Entente Cordiale* was hardly born when it found itself left to make its way in the world alone. Talleyrand, discouraged because he had not been able to secure for it the application that would have given it more strength and vitality—because he had not succeeded in transforming it forthwith into a defensive alliance between the two powers—threw up his embassy and left London, abandoning his godchild to its fate. Fortune scarcely smiled on it at this period, for Lord Aberdeen, who had shown a certain amount of sympathy for Talleyrand's plan, had been replaced by Lord Palmerston. This new guardian, who had not much love for his ward, hardly troubled himself to guide it, and still less to protect it against the snares that were being constantly laid for it by Metternich, who, fearing to see it grow up, had resolved from the day of its birth that he would leave no stone unturned to destroy it.

Skilfully making the most of the prejudices and the ill-will of his English colleague, the Austrian Chancellor played his cards so well that on Aug. 11, 1840, the Comte de Sambuy, the Sardinian minister at Vienna,* was able to write to his government:

* Count Victor Amédée Balbo Bertone de Sambuy (1793-1846) was one of Napoleon's officers who entered the Sardinian army after the Restoration. Later on Charles Albert sent him as minister to Munich, and in 1835 he was entrusted with the difficult and important post of minister to Vienna which he retained down to his death in February 1846.

'On me dit qu'il [Metternich] se montre extrêmement satisfait de la conclusion du Traité du 15 Juillet [the Convention of London] et d'être parvenu par là à détacher l'Angleterre de la France et d'avoir rompu l'alliance qui existait entre ces deux États constitutionnels, laquelle pouvait être regardée comme menaçante pour les anciennes Monarchies.' *

But the *Entente Cordiale* was tenacious of life. It had already passed through some severe trials, during the ten years that followed its birth, when Guizot, on the morrow of the re-entry of France into the Concert of Europe (1841), bethought himself of it and, in agreement with Aberdeen, secured for it some years of tranquil existence, which resulted in certain arrangements of benefit to both countries.

From that time onward the Entente continued to exist without too much difficulty until the day when Louis Philippe's government, crushed under the burden of the grave anxieties arising from the internal situation of France, was compelled to ignore it just at the moment when there was most reason to make it more intimate and to use it in order to avoid the consequences which the question of the Spanish Marriages had raised between its guardians in London and Paris. Then the *Entente Cordiale* once more vanished, and did not appear again until—but this time in the form of an alliance—the eve of the Crimean war. Subsequently forgotten for nearly half a century, it emerged no more from the shades until—but this time definitely—the day when a great king took steps to revive it, and established it on an impregnable foundation for the well-being and the greatness of two countries and the salvation of humanity and civilisation.

I regret having been unable to procure access to the private letter that Guizot wrote to Count Flahaut, the French ambassador at Vienna, for it would have singularly facilitated my present task; first, because this letter was the determining cause of a manifestation that was a little surprising on the part of a statesman like Metternich, of that kind of confession, or at least profession of faith, which he was seldom accustomed to

* Count de Sambuy to Count Solaro della Margharita (Vienna, Aug. 11, 1840; 'Carteggio Sambuy,' published by Count Mario degli Alberti, 'Biblioteca di Storia Italiana Recente,' vi, 323).

make; and further, because it would have thrown light upon several somewhat nebulous points of the reasoning of the Austrian chancellor. But, unfortunately, no minute of this dispatch is to be found in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.

The moment chosen by the two statesmen for this exchange of views and considerations was a serious one. As Count Sambuy remarked about a year later, on his arrival at Turin, 'Metternich *décline lentement*.' And it was in the most sombre colours that the Piedmontese diplomatist depicted to Charles-Albert the situation of Austria, and the crisis through which the monarchy of the Hapsburgs would pass when deprived of both pilot and of guidance at the moment when the Chancellor should disappear from the scene. Infatuated with his work as he was, Metternich nevertheless began to realise how frail was the edifice which he had taken such trouble to raise. He watched with as much attention as anxiety the incessant labour that was being accomplished in Italy, the agitation going on in Switzerland, the progress of ideas in Germany, and especially the struggle that Guizot was carrying on in France against the attacks of the Liberal Opposition. From this moment he realised the necessity for seeking and preparing a basis of support. He came by degrees to this conclusion: that this support France must be fully disposed to give him, because the government of July had, like himself, every interest to forestall, to restrain, to combat, in agreement with himself, the progress of liberal ideas, which was, from his point of view, synonymous with the spirit of anarchy. He knew, or at least believed that he knew, that Guizot was on the whole opposed to all reform, inasmuch as his programme tended solely in the direction of maintaining order at home and peace abroad. He had already recognised that Louis Philippe's minister had contented himself with giving to his government the appearances of a parliamentary régime. Although, probably in order to support his argument, he had affirmed, in his letter of April 19, which Apponyi, the Austrian ambassador in Paris,* was directed to read to Guizot, that 'l'Entente

* Antoine Rodolphe, Count d'Apponyi (1782-1853), who was one of Metternich's most intimate confidants, had been previously accredited to Florence, Rome, and London, and did not leave Paris until after the Revolution of 1848.

Cordiale ne lui a jamais donné un instant de souci,' the re-entry of France into the European Concert had given him some uneasy moments. Master as he generally was of his words, he did not attempt to conceal, and in any case did not succeed in concealing, the vexation and disappointment he felt on account of what, in his dispatch to Apponyi of Jan. 20, 1844, he termed 'la monstrueuse jonction de la France et de l'Angleterre.'

This combination pre-occupied and irritated him so strongly that in this same dispatch he could not prevent himself 'de s'étonner et de s'indigner de la stupidité avec laquelle le Cabinet de Londres se laissait jouer par celui de Paris.' He even went so far as to criticise the choice made by Guizot, in describing his relations with England, of the words 'Cordial Understanding'—those two words which express only a sentiment. 'Il eût mieux fait,' he writes, 'de prendre position sur le terrain de l'intérêt réciproque qu'ont ces États de vivre en paix et dès lors en bonne harmonie.'

The efforts of the two Courts of London and Paris to revive the Franco-British Entente—unfortunately did not result in the re-establishment of an agreement, notwithstanding its desirability from every point of view. The task was beyond their strength, owing to the fact that popular susceptibilities on both sides of the Channel were too tender, too deeply-rooted, to permit of a complete reconciliation, of a real *rapprochement*. Metternich must have known this better than anybody. Nevertheless, although the honeymoon enjoyed by the two Governments was this time again of very short duration, it seriously alarmed the Chancellor.

To convince ourselves of this it will be sufficient to compare the terms which he thought fit to employ in his dispatch to Apponyi on April 19 with those which he made use of in the one that he addressed to him on Aug. 29. At that moment he had just received his reports of Aug. 9-12: 'Le sujet dont ils traitent m'a grandement préoccupé dans le cours des derniers temps,' he writes. 'J'entends parler par là des relations entre la France et l'Angleterre. . . .' But, as if he regretted this admission, as if he feared to leave Apponyi under such an impression, he could think of nothing better than to conclude by advising his ambassador not to lose

sight of a maxim that one hardly would expect to find coming from his pen, and which, at all events, very rarely inspired his policy: 'Rien de ce qui pêche par le fond ne se soutient, et, pour les affaires, il ne peut y avoir qu'une base solide, celle de la vérité.'

It appears, then, that the *Entente Cordiale*, fragile and ephemeral as it was, had so deeply impressed Metternich that he had decided, from this moment, to leave no stone unturned to prevent it from being re-established. And it was for this reason that, seeing the edifice which he had spent all his life in erecting beginning to show signs of collapse, he came to the decision to retrace his steps and throw himself again on the side of France. He multiplied his advances to Guizot, overwhelmed him with attentions, praises, and flatteries, to which he had good reason to believe the French statesman was not insensible. Wishing at any cost to win Guizot's confidence, Metternich foreshadowed the course that he wished to follow when, in the last lines of his dispatch of April 19, he reached what appeared to him to be a very reassuring conclusion for himself: 'C'est qu'au fond, entre la marche de l'esprit de M. Guizot et celle du mien, il n'existe aucune différence essentielle.'

Although Metternich continued, and always continued, to be on his guard against France, his resolve was firmly taken, his plan of campaign well thought out. He had laid down a programme whose realisation he prosecuted in spite of all obstacles; and the unpublished dispatch which follows is, if I am not mistaken, one of the first manifestations, and not the least curious, of that political evolution which Debidour has so justly called 'Le dernier effort de Metternich.'

Prince Metternich to Count Apponyi.

'Vienne, 19 avril 1844.*

'M. le comte de Flahaut m'a lu, en extrait, la lettre particulière de M. Guizot du contenu de laquelle Votre Excellence a eu connaissance par M. le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères lui-même. Cette lettre a vivement excité mon intérêt, et l'impression qui m'en est restée est que, dans tous

* 'Arch. des Aff. Étrang. Austria,' vol. 431, pp. 221-7. Copy of a dispatch from Prince Metternich to Count Apponyi, transmitted to Guizot by Count Flahaut.

les points essentiels, je suis de l'avis de son auteur, et je pourrais me borner à ce peu de mots si une manifestation aussi franche de la part d'un homme d'État de la valeur de M. Guizot ne méritait une réponse conçue en des termes moins laconiques.

'M. Guizot établit, en thèse, qu'entre les grands États il n'y a aujourd'hui point de rivalité réelle, point de sérieux conflits d'intérêts, point de vraie lutte d'influence. Il ne reconnaît en Europe qu'une affaire qui est la même pour tout le monde : "Réprimer l'esprit anarchique et, pour cela, maintenir la paix." Telle est aussi ma conviction. Je puis dire avec vérité que depuis un grand nombre d'années, elle a été la base de la marche politique de notre Cour ; et l'impartiale histoire devra nous rendre le témoignage que, sans la constance de nos efforts, bien des malheurs, dont le Corps social durant cette longue période a été menacé, se fussent accomplis.

'Ma vie politique, M. l'Ambassadeur, embrasse deux époques distinctes. Elle commence avec le siècle, dont la première moitié sera bientôt écoulée. Pendant la première époque, c'est-à-dire entre les années 1801 et 1814, mes regards sont restés immuablement fixés sur la grande figure de l'Homme qui avait résumé en lui les produits de la Révolution sociale en France. Lorsque cet immense pouvoir a croulé, j'ai pris congé de la politique proprement dite, et j'ai reporté mes soins personnels sur le terrain que cette chute a dû préparer et que M. Guizot caractérise avec autant de raison que de vérité. Toutefois, dans les affaires humaines rien n'étant absolu, il en est de même à l'égard des thèses, et je n'ai certes pas besoin de faire remarquer à M. Guizot que tous les hommes chargés de la direction des Affaires publiques ne saisissent pas également bien des vérités dont, lui et moi, nous sommes convaincus.

'L'esprit qui préside à la marche de notre Cour, M. le comte, est d'une parfaite évidence. Nous ne cherchons dans les choses que ce qui s'y trouve. Or, ce qui prédomine aujourd'hui dans le Corps social, c'est, dans les masses, le sentiment du besoin de repos, et, dans les partis, celui du mouvement. Cette lutte amène tout naturellement une absence de questions strictement politiques, mais en même temps elle pousse les chefs de partis à faire naître des questions qui, au fond, n'existent pas, uniquement dans le but de les faire servir à leurs vues particulières. Nous vouons tous nos soins à ne pas être dupes de cette tactique, et c'est pour cela que nous faisons, aussi souvent que l'occasion s'en présente, des appels aux Cabinets dont nous avons le sentiment d'être compris.

‘C’est une tâche qui n’est pas à envier ; c’est même un rôle ingrat, considéré sous le point de vue des satisfactions que l’amour-propre fournit à ceux qui sont assez faibles pour subordonner aux impressions d’un sentiment la voix de leur conscience. Comme j’ambitionne peu les jouissances de ce genre, rien ne peut me faire dévier de la ligne que je poursuis, et je regarde comme un accident heureux toute occasion dans laquelle je puis me livrer au sentiment d’être compris.

‘M. Guizot reconnaît que l’esprit anarchique menace la *Monarchie Constitutionnelle* comme la *Monarchie Pure*. Il a parfaitement raison, et je crois qu’on peut en dire autant de la République. Ma religion repose sur le symbole de la *Conservation*. Ce symbole est applicable à toutes les formes gouvernementales et, dans son application, il offre une différence. Il ne faut la chercher que dans le plus ou moins de forces de résistance que renferment les formes de l’ensemble des conditions sous lesquelles est placé un État. Je me permets ici une remarque que je regarde comme essentielle, vu qu’elle exerce une influence directe sur mon jugement.

‘M. Guizot met en regard la *Monarchie Constitutionnelle* et la *Monarchie Pure*. Je crois devoir substituer l’expression : “*Régime Représentatif*” à celle de “*Régime Constitutionnel*,” car toutes les formules gouvernementales reposent sur une base, laquelle a la valeur d’une *Constitution*. Aussi, M. l’Ambassadeur, n’est-ce pas là que les partis du mouvement trouvent de l’étoffe pour remuer la Société ? Les factions puisent leurs ressources dans l’opposition qu’elles établissent entre le “*Système Représentatif moderne et les Régimes Constitutionnels anciens*,” lesquels admettent la représentation plus ou moins étendue partout où l’“*Aristocratie*” ne forme pas les points de départ et d’arrivée de la Constitution d’un État. Si, pour rendre cette remarque intelligible, il me fallait citer un exemple, j’en trouverais de tout prêts dans notre propre Empire. Il n’offre pas un point qui ne soit soumis à un “*Régime Constitutionnel*,” quelles que puissent être leurs différences. Or, ce sont ces régimes contre lesquels se meuvent les factions révolutionnaires, soit afin d’introduire le système de la “*Monarchie Représentative moderne*,” soit pour y substituer la “*République Fédérative*” ou la “*République Une et Indivisible*.”

‘Je demande pardon aux lecteurs de la présente dépêche des corollaires qui peuvent résulter de ces remarques ; mais je tiens à ma définition, car c’est tout juste sur ce terrain qu’il faut chercher la source de bien des erreurs, dont tous les partis savent faire leur profit. Deux Écoles, si je puis me servir de cette expression, renferment aujourd’hui les éléments

de perturbation les plus actifs : l'une, c'est l' "*École Anglaise*," l'autre, l' "*École Américaine*."

'Personne, plus que moi, n'est dans le cas de saisir d'avantage cette vérité, et cela, par la raison que ma conscience gouvernementale est éminemment "*Constitutionnelle*" et que, par cela même, je suis journellement dans le cas de combattre les influences des deux Écoles que je viens de vous signaler.

'Ceci établi, je n'hésite pas à abonder dans le sens de M. Guizot: Que, sans se perdre dans un examen minutieux des avantages qu'un régime peut avoir sur un autre, tous ont un besoin égal du triomphe de l'esprit de conservation sur celui de l'anarchie,* quelle que soit la couleur que celui-ci arbore; et cet aveu renferme à la fois la clef de ma politique. Cette marche n'a certes rien de commun avec l'idée de la "*séparation des Monarchies en deux camps politiques*"; et ceux qui, à cet égard, mettraient en doute notre pensée, non-seulement ne la comprendraient pas, mais prouveraient qu'ils sont aveugles.

"*L'Entente Cordiale*" ne nous a jamais causé un instant de souci. Prise au point de vue "*politique*," je lui trouve un avantage négatif, parce qu'elle fait taire des rivalités qui, autrement, risqueraient de s'entrechoquer. Sous le point de vue "*moral*," cette Entente renferme un élément de paix, et, n'est-ce pas cet élément qui gêne le plus les factions? Moi, qui non seulement ne suis pas opposé à cet élément de paix, mais qui suis moi-même établi sur ce terrain, j'ai donc la conscience tranquille et je désire que celle du Chef du Cabinet français le soit à un égal degré, quant à l'application que nous faisons de l' "*Entente Cordiale*" à l'égard de tous ceux qui savent comprendre. Parfaitement d'accord avec les deux premières conditions de la vie sociale, ce ne saurait être que sur des questions de détail qu'une divergence pourrait s'élever entre M. Guizot et moi. Eh bien, M. l'Ambassadeur, je ne crois pas courir le risque de me tromper en admettant que tel n'est pas en réalité le cas.

* Albert Sorel justly says ('Essais d'histoire et de critique, Metternich,' p. 19): 'Il [Metternich] condamnait avec une même sévérité et un égal dédain les hommes qui provoquaient l'anarchie et ceux qui s'efforçaient de diriger la Révolution, ne faisant guère de différence, au point de vue des principes, entre la Constitution de 1793 et la Constitution anglaise, détestant le système parlementaire plus peut-être que les *Carbonari*, et déclarant la politique des doctrinaires de Paris plus dangereuse que le radicalisme.' And in support of this judgment Sorel adds the following note, which he borrows from Metternich himself: 'J'aurais préféré Robespierre à l'abbé de Pradt, disait-il. Il trouvait qu'au début de son règne Charles X penchait dangereusement du "côté gauche," et il écrivait en 1828: "La France et l'Angleterre peuvent être regardées comme n'ayant pas de gouvernement."'

'Passant rapidement en revue les questions spéciales à l'égard desquelles, tout en étant d'accord quant aux "*vues*" et aux "*vœux*," nos "*impressions*" pourraient néanmoins différer. M. Guizot fait en premier lieu mention des positions espagnoles. Il admet que je puisse regarder le parti Carlisle comme plus fort en Espagne qu'on ne le juge à Paris, et il comprend que nous placions notre pivot politique dans ce parti, tandis que la France le cherche ailleurs, tout en voulant aussi fortement que nous la fin de l'état révolutionnaire. Le jugement que nous portons sur la situation des partis en Espagne, a besoin de quelques développements. Ce n'est pas le parti Carlisle, en autant qu'il soit lié à la personne de don Carlos, que nous avons jamais regardé, et qu'aujourd'hui moins que jamais nous serions disposés à regarder, comme le plus fort. C'est le parti Royaliste, coupé en deux fractions, que nous regardons comme le plus fort, si l'on parvient à faire cesser le schisme et si la force réunie de ces deux fractions est mise en opposition avec la force du parti Radical.

'L'Espagne est royaliste; et le Carlisme, si tant est que don Carlos ait personnellement encore des partisans, est une fraction du parti Royaliste. Telle était indubitablement la disposition d'esprit de la nation espagnole; nos vœux et nos efforts n'ont cessé de tendre, dans l'intérêt de la pacification de ce malheureux royaume, à amener la fusion des deux partis royalistes. Notre position n'a pas changé, et l'avenir, nous en nourrissons le sentiment intime, ne nous donnera pas tort. Le seul moyen calculable de rétablir la paix en Espagne se trouve dans l'union de la fille de Ferdinand VII avec le fils de don Carlos. Tout ce qui se fera en dehors de ce moyen perpétuera les troubles ou les fera revivre à la première occasion opportune, même dans le cas où on croirait pouvoir se flatter d'avoir assis la paix sur une autre base.

'L'Autriche n'a aucun intérêt, à elle propre, à se faire valoir dans la Péninsule Ibérique. Notre unique désir, c'est que le repos intérieur s'y rétablisse et que ce Pays cesse d'être une cause d'irritation perpétuelle pour les États que leur position géographique met en contact plus particulier avec lui. Toute la correspondance du Cabinet de Vienne fait foi que jamais nous n'avons entendu prendre en considération les Affaires d'Espagne sous un point de vue de personnes. Ce point de vue est, à notre avis, du domaine du pays lui-même, tandis que l'Étranger n'a à s'occuper que des conditions de paix intérieures autant qu'à la longue elles sont inséparables de celles de la paix politique. Nous resterons fidèles à cette religion.

'Quant à l'Italie, je nourris la pleine conviction qu'entre

les deux Cabinets il n'existe pas de différence dans les sentiments. On dit vouloir à Paris ce que nous voulons à Vienne, c'est-à-dire ni plus ni moins que le maintien de l'indépendance des divers États qui composent la Péninsule, indépendance qui ne peut être assurée que par la tranquillité intérieure de ces États. Ce qui est arrivé à la suite des premières ouvertures que nous avons naguère adressées à Paris a constaté la justesse de nos convictions à ce sujet.

'Comme il saute aux yeux que des bouleversements en Italie rejaillissent nécessairement sur les deux grandes Puissances voisines, il est évident que deux Cabinets qui réfléchissent n'iront pas compromettre tant de graves intérêts pour complaire à une bande d'expulsés, d'émigrés volontaires à l'intérieur ou à l'extérieur, d'idéologues ou de coureurs d'aventures. Ce n'est pas en Italie qu'il faut de nos jours chercher l'art de gouverner. Le courage nécessaire pour attaquer n'y existe pas davantage. Les Puissances bien avisées doivent se borner à remédier, suivant leurs facultés, aux maux existants. La faute, la plus grande que pourraient commettre ces Puissances, serait de puiser ces remèdes dans des vues fausses à leur essence et dont l'effet serait désastreux.

'En résumant ce long travail j'arrive à une conclusion bien rassurante : c'est, qu'au fond, entre la marche de l'esprit de M. Guizot et celle du mien, il n'existe aucune différence essentielle. Nous partons des mêmes principes, nous visons au même but, et, si quelque divergence devait se montrer sur des termes intermédiaires entre le point de départ et celui de l'arrivée, il ne saurait être difficile pour nous de nous entendre. M. Guizot n'est pas un propagandiste ; moi, de mon côté, je n'appartiens pas à cette classe d'esprits étroits qui ne savent pas porter leurs regards au delà des limites restreintes d'une idée qui, pour être fixe, n'en est que plus privée de toute application pratique. Je suis toujours prêt à faire la part aux positions données. Que M. Guizot nous attende toujours là où il est sûr de nous trouver et qu'il soit bien convaincu, qu'à mon tour je saurai le rencontrer.*

* When he penned these lines, Metternich certainly did not imagine that, within four years, he would meet Guizot in person, although involuntarily. Flying before the Revolution, the Austrian Chancellor and the minister of Louis Philippe both found themselves as refugees in London. But, as Albert Sorel remarks (*op. cit.*, p. 6 : 'Ni l'abdication du souverain dont il avait été le guide, ni sa propre chute, ni son exil ne parvinrent à troubler un instant l'impassable suffisance du prince. . . . En 1848, raconte Guizot, pendant notre retraite commune à Londres, il me dit avec un demi-sourire qui semblait excuser d'avance ses paroles : "*L'erreur n'a jamais approché de mon esprit.*" Ces mots prononcés sur une pareille scène, cette déclaration et ce jeu de physionomie, ce fond inébranlable d'orgueil et ce

'Veuillez lui donner lecture de la présente dépêche et le prier, de ma part, de me pardonner le temps que lui coûtera cette lecture. Si tout ne me trompe, elle ne fera que lui confirmer ce qu'il sait déjà.

'Veuillez, etc., etc.

'METTERNICH.'

The year 1844 and the earlier months of 1845 passed without any cloud arising to disturb the harmony between the two courts, or any serious controversy occurring to disturb the amicable relations that existed between the two great statesmen who were at the head respectively of the cabinets of Vienna and the Tuileries. For all this, however, neither had ceased to follow the line of policy he had laid down for himself in regard to Spain, or to continue the campaign he was leading, in connexion with the Spanish Marriages, in favour of the candidate on whom his choice was fixed. They were, moreover, still far from seeing eye to eye in regard to Swiss affairs, or from attributing to them the same degree of gravity. In all this, however, there was nothing of a nature to bring about, still less to justify, the communication, as brutal as it was unexpected, that Metternich thought fit to make to Charles Albert, or to excuse the haughty language, full of bitterness and perfidy, but above all hostile to France, to which Count Mortier, the French ambassador at Turin, had every reason, in his dispatch of July 15, 1845, to call the attention of his minister. The step taken by the old Marshal de la Tour, at the instigation of Metternich, must, indeed, have been all the more surprising to M. Guizot and the French Government from the fact that there had been nothing in the reports that had been received from Vienna by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to lead any one to anticipate any development of this kind or such a violent explosion of bad temper. Count Mortier's dispatch to Guizot runs as follows:

'Turin, le 15 juillet 1845.*

'Monsieur,

'Je vous ai entretenu dans ma correspondance de la composition du personnel de la Légation d'Autriche. Je

sourire, concession dédaigneuse, politesse ironique à l'évidence des faits et au bon sens vulgaire—voilà bien Metternich tel qu'il fut dans la réalité et tel qu'il se présente lui-même à l'histoire.'

* 'Turin,' vol. 313, 'Direction Politique,' No. 53, fo. 66-9.

vous ai dit que le comte de Buol, qui était revêtu du titre d'Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire, servait plutôt au Cabinet de Vienne pour la représentation que pour les affaires. M. de Metternich confie au baron de Meysemburg,* Conseiller de la Légation Autrichienne, celles qui, par leur nature, sont délicates et difficiles à traiter. Je viens d'en acquérir la certitude par un fait qui a quelque intérêt pour nous et que je vais rapporter à Votre Excellence.

'Vous savez le rôle considérable que M. le Maréchal Comte de la Tour a joué en Piémont lors du mouvement révolutionnaire de 1821. La manière dont il l'a combattu lui a valu de devenir le personnage le plus important de la Monarchie Sarde. Chose étrange, mais qui s'explique cependant assez par la conversion du Prince de Carignan devenu Roi, M. de la Tour est resté très influent sous le règne de S. M. Charles-Albert. Bien que son âge l'eût forcé à se retirer des Affaires, il est encore consulté aujourd'hui sur toutes celles qui ont de l'intérêt, même lorsqu'elles ne sont point discutées en Conseil d'État dont il est Président. Il est aussi le seul personnage qui, chaque jour et à toute heure, puisse entrer chez le Roi. D'ordinaire, il passe chaque matin une heure ou deux chez son Souverain, qu'il a l'habitude d'entretenir d'affaires de toute nature. Les événements de 1821 ont mis M. de la Tour dans des relations suivies avec le Chancelier autrichien, et depuis que le maréchal piémontais, par sa propre volonté, a quitté le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, M. de Metternich, qui n'ignore pas qu'il a conservé une grande influence, lui fait lire de temps à autre par ses Agents de ces longs factums dont il est si prodigue pour maintenir ses amis et ses partisans dans ce qu'il appelle "la ligne des bons principes."

'Je ne sais si dernièrement le Chancelier autrichien a eu des craintes de voir diminuer son influence sur le Cabinet de Turin ou s'il a trouvé qu'il se montrait disposé à s'écarter de cette ligne de quasi-hostilité qu'il avait adoptée vis-à-vis de nous en 1830 et dont il s'est peu éloigné jusqu'à présent; toujours est-il que M. de Metternich—je tiens ce renseignement de bonne source—a adressé, il y a environ trois semaines, un Mémoire à M. de Meysemburg avec ordre d'en donner lecture à M. le Maréchal de La Tour, afin que celui-ci voulût bien faire une démarche vis-à-vis du Roi Charles-Albert dans le sens des conclusions du Chancelier autrichien. Le but de sa longue

* Meysemburg had been for some years one of Metternich's confidential men. At the period, indeed, when the Chancellor sent Count Edward Woyna to St Petersburg, he wrote to the latter, on July 10, 1841: 'Vous vous entendrez sur toutes choses avec M. de Meysemburg, qui est un homme de grand sens et qui connaît la Russie, et vous irez bien ensemble.'

phraséologie était de prouver que : " La Politique de la France n'avait aucune consistance, qu'on ne devait pas s'y fier, que tout, chez nous, était éphémère et passager, en un mot, que les Puissances, situées et organisées comme la Sardaigne, devaient scrupuleusement s'attacher à éviter de se lier avec un Gouvernement, dont la base et les principes étaient révolutionnaires."

'Ce langage était calculé pour faire impression sur le vieux maréchal. C'est un homme modéré par caractère et appréciant très bien une situation politique, surtout celle qu'a acquise la France, sous le point de vue de la stabilité, depuis 1830. Cependant il est souvent entraîné à conclure contre nous par l'habitude qu'il a eu pendant nombre d'années de nous combattre dans les armées autrichienne et anglaise.

'Quoiqu'il en soit, M. de La Tour a fait auprès du Roi Charles-Albert la démarche désirée, et je crois être très certain que Sa Majesté Sarde s'en est montrée peu satisfaite et s'est refusé à prendre des demi-engagements contre nous. Elle a laissé entendre dans sa réponse qu'Elle voulait conserver Son entière indépendance et ne subordonner Sa politique qu'aux convenances et aux intérêts de Son Pays.

'Si ce que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de faire connaître à Votre Excellence n'a rapport à aucun fait particulier, je n'en ai pas moins cru devoir informer le Gouvernement du Roi, car la démarche du Chef du Cabinet autrichien me semble prouver deux choses : la première, qu'il est effrayé du terrain et de l'ascendant que nous pouvons reprendre en Europe ; la seconde, que " la calomnie et les moyens détournés sont bons pour M. de Metternich lorsqu'il s'agit de combattre ceux que, dans le même moment, il caresse probablement. '*

The manoeuvre had been skilfully planned, for nobody, as Count Mortier had so justly remarked, had more influence on the mind of Charles Albert, or enjoyed more consideration on his part, than the old Piedmontese Marshal. Nevertheless, the scheme failed ; and it failed because the Austrian chancellor, notwithstanding all his *finesse*, had not succeeded in deciphering the character, so complex, so engaging and so enigmatical, of the monarch who was still 'il Re Tentenna.' Metternich had perceived that the King had two defects—ambition and weakness ; but he had not remarked that in Charles Albert distrust had become second nature. The earnest communication that had been sent to him consequently

* In the margin the following words are written in pencil : 'M. de Metternich fait ici son rôle d'intrigant.'

had the effect of putting the King on his guard against the projects with which his uneasy and suspicious mind had already credited Austria. It is important, moreover, to observe that Metternich, wishing to have as many trumps as possible in his hand, and forgetting—at least for the time being—the profound dissatisfaction which the attitude of France had given him in connexion with the negotiations concerning the Spanish Marriages, did not overlook the importance of guarding himself from the rear, of putting Guizot on a false scent and of reassuring himself as to his intentions. Refined hypocrite that he was, he took advantage of the first occasion that offered—which he had no difficulty in himself providing—to fascinate and blind Guizot by his protests of friendship and admiration.

After beginning, in the dispatch which he addressed on July 19, 1845, to Apponyi, by criticising, even somewhat severely, certain passages in the letter from Guizot to Eugène Périer, *chargé d'affaires* at Vienna* (which Marescalchi was ordered to read to him), he took special care to terminate his instructions with the following very characteristic recommendation: 'Veuillez donner connaissance à M. Guizot de cette explication de ma pensée. J'aime beaucoup à lui parler, car il sait comprendre, ce qui n'est pas le cas de tout le monde.' 'Safe bind, safe find'; and Metternich knew this better than anybody. We may also permit ourselves to believe that, not having the slightest shadow of a doubt as to the impression that would be produced on the cabinet of the Tuileries by the reply and the attitude of Charles Albert, he hoped in this way to forestall any demand for explanations, which could not have failed to be annoying to him, and, by flattering and reassuring Guizot, to lead him to relinquish the idea of entering into, or continuing, any intimate conversation with Turin.

'J'ai remarqué,' he wrote to Mortier from Paris on July 31, 1845,† in reply to his dispatch of the 15th of the same month,

* Périer had fallen ill, and had, in consequence, entrusted to Count Marescalchi, then secretary of legation, the duty of communicating to the Chancellor the note he had received from the department.

† 'Turin,' vol. 318, Dispatch No. 36 (in cipher), fo. 83.

'ce que vous me mandez au sujet de la communication que le Prince de Metternich a cru devoir faire au roi Charles-Albert par le canal du comte de La Tour sur les craintes que, selon lui, la situation de la France serait de nature à inspirer à l'Europe. L'accueil fait par Sa Majesté Sarde à cette communication semble indiquer qu'Elle a su l'apprécier à sa juste valeur. J'aime à espérer qu'Elle continuera de repousser avec la même sagesse toutes les insinuations malveillantes qu'on lui adressera contre nous. . . .'

Skilled politician as he was—'homme d'expédients plutôt qu'homme de principes'—Metternich had meanwhile recognised that he had taken the wrong path, and felt that he was greatly in danger of finding the ground on which he had advanced sink from under him. It was necessary to hush up the matter, in order to prevent it from rankling and assuming such proportions that it might become dangerous. More than a past-master in the art of adapting his conduct and his language to the needs of the moment, he renounced the brutal method, which had not given him the results he desired, and changed his tone. Friendly counsels and recommendations took the place of what had appeared severe in his orders. He thus tried to minimise the consequences his communication might have, and to take away the aggressive and comminatory character it had in reality.

'Depuis ce que j'ai mandé au Gouvernement du Roi relativement à la communication que M. de Metternich a cru devoir faire au Roi Charles-Albert par le canal du Comte de La Tour (wrote Mortier to Guizot on Aug. 13, 1845),* j'ai appris de la même source que la communication du Chancelier d'Autriche avait surtout pour but d'engager le Cabinet de Turin à ne point adopter les propositions que nous pourrions lui faire directement, ou que nous chercherions à faire écouter d'ailleurs, relativement à la situation de la Suisse. Je ne crois pas inutile d'ajouter ce renseignement à ceux que j'ai déjà transmis à Votre Excellence.'

Incontestably useful at the time when Mortier transmitted it to Paris, this information is far from having lost any of its value to-day. Thanks to these few lines, we have, in reality, one more proof of the extraordinary facility with which Metternich decided to change front,

* 'Turin,' vol. 318, No. 60, fo. 90.

and of the remarkable suppleness with which he knew how to bring the manifestations of his ideas and the aims of his policy into line with the progress of events and the exigencies of the moment. I would not, certainly, go so far as to assert that Metternich's attention had not been closely directed to the turn taken by events in Switzerland at that period, to the emotion that they had caused in Turin, to the attitude adopted by the cabinet of the Tuileries in regard to Spain and in the question of the Spanish Marriages, even to the situation of France and the state of mind there; but I none the less persist in thinking, basing my opinion in this regard on the correspondence and the 'Memoirs' of the Austrian chancellor, that he acted as the result of quite other preoccupations; and that it was due to political considerations of a very different nature, although at least as serious, that he was driven to denounce France at Turin and to recommend King Charles Albert not to 'se lier avec un Gouvernement dont la base et les principes étaient révolutionnaires.'

He pursued, in reality, quite another object when he invited Marshal de La Tour to act as his spokesman. He feared above everything to see the conclusion between France and Sardinia of a *pendant* to the 'monstrueuse jonction' which had already—momentarily, it is true, but twice in succession—brought together the cabinets of the Tuileries and St James. His acts were inspired, his ideas were haunted, by the danger that might be caused to the realisation of his projects by what I may call 'la Contagion de l'*Entente Cordiale*.' It disquieted him to such an extent, this '*Entente Cordiale*,' that from the month of August 1844, until the end of October 1845, he returned time after time to this question of an accord which, if it came to be established on solid and lasting foundations,* would deal a terrible blow, perhaps a

* 'Il n'est pas douteux,' wrote Talleyrand a long time previously, in the dispatch which he addressed to the Duc de Broglie from London, on Feb. 11, 1833, 'qu'on cherche par tous les moyens de désunir la France et l'Angleterre. . . . Il ne faut voir dans tout ceci [the intrigues of the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin against the British government] que ce qui y est vraiment, c'est-à-dire l'humeur qu'on éprouve à Pétersbourg, à Vienne et à Berlin de ce que s'affermît chaque jour davantage une alliance qui place la France et l'Angleterre à la tête de l'Europe et qui, en assurant le maintien de la paix générale, ôte tout espoir de former des coalitions.'

mortal one, to the policy he had always practised, to that policy which nothing characterises better than those three words, which have become in some sort the real motto of Austria: 'Divide et impera.'

'Politiquement parlant,' he writes to Apponyi on May 20, 1845—more than a year, therefore, after having recommended to him to read to Guizot his dispatch of April 19, 1844—

'on se repaît bien souvent de chimères à Paris; et, à la tête de ces chimères, se trouve celle que la paix de l'Europe repose sur le gage de la *Cordiale Entente* entre la France et l'Angleterre. Ni l'une ni l'autre de ces Puissances n'est disposée en faveur de la paix par un sentiment d'amour réciproque ou par des sympathies individuelles, mais bien parce qu'elles ont un intérêt direct et évident à ne point se lancer dans la guerre. . . . And he adds: 'Si Louis Philippe dit qu'il est pacifique, il dit vrai. S'il cherche dans cette disposition un mérite, tel qu'il peut s'en trouver aux actions libres et absolument volontaires, il fait du charlatanisme. Or, celui-ci ne nous touche pas. Nous continuons notre chemin sans tourner la tête. Comme nous suivons la ligne droite, ceux qui prennent une autre direction doivent nécessairement parfois se rencontrer avec nous et parfois nous croiser. Telle est la vérité historique, et, dès lors, la vraie vérité.'

Metternich, who had long ago forgotten the Secret Treaty of Defensive Alliance of Jan. 3, 1815, to which he had placed his signature by the side of those of Talleyrand and Castlereagh, did not stop at this. Some months later, on Oct. 26, 1845, in language of a vehemence which was rarely found flowing from his pen, under which he thought perhaps to conceal the fears that he could not succeed in shaking off, he gave free expression to the indignation to which this accursed *Entente Cordiale* inspired him.

'Si jamais,' he wrote, 'la vérité a été faussée avec impudence, c'est au moyen de la fantasmagorie qui se couvre du nom de *Cordiale Entente*. . . . L'*Entente Cordiale*, pour pouvoir être définie, doit être saisie dans le sens de la peur que les deux Cabinets ont de tout ce qui dérangerait le mouvement industriel qui, de son côté, repose sur une base de rivalité entre les deux Pays. . . . Quelle sera la fin de ce leurre? Je l'ignore, mais ce qui est dans la nature des choses devra

arriver tôt ou tard, et la crise sera incalculable dans sa marche et ses résultats. . . .'

After reading these lines one might and even ought to ask oneself what kind of language Metternich would have used if he had not thought fit to affect, with regard to the *Entente Cordiale*, an indifference which almost amounted to disdain? On the other hand, we cannot, I think, insist too much on the fact that already, towards the middle of last century, the most authoritative representative of that policy of domination, which was one day to become that of the Central Empires, perceived that the only real obstacle to the realisation of his programme lay in the establishment of the *Entente Cordiale* between France and England. In 1845, as we have seen, Metternich laboured to destroy it for the second time, and, as we know, in this he succeeded. In August 1914, Austria hurled herself upon Serbia, and Germany did not hesitate to violate the neutrality of Belgium and to throw down that frightful challenge to the civilised world because, taking up on their own account the words and the appreciations of the great stage-manager of the Congress of Vienna, these two Empires persisted in believing that 'l'Entente Cordiale n'est qu'une fantasmagorie,' and refused, in spite of all evidence, to admit of the existence and the solidity of the 'monstrueuse jonction' between the United Kingdom and the French Republic. Metternich, as we have seen, foresaw the danger without succeeding in averting it. He could hardly have believed that he was speaking the truth when, in inditing his *Mémoire autobiographique* in 1852, he wrote: 'Je suis l'homme de ce qui était.'

Commandant WEIL.

Art. 2.—THE CONTRIBUTION OF RUSSIA TO
LEARNING.*

I HAVE little doubt that most of your previous lecturers on Russia began by pointing out how little is known in this country about the subject. I also feel impelled to begin my lecture on Russian learning in rather the same way. I am sure that most of you know something about the wonderful achievements of Russia in literature—about Pushkin, Turgenieff, Dostoiefsky and Tolstoi. You have no doubt from time to time enjoyed the musical creations of great Russian composers, such as Glinka, Tchaikovsky, Mussorgsky, Borodin, Rimsky-Korsakoff, Glazunoff. Perhaps you have also seen reproductions of pictures by our most important painters, Repin, Vereshchagin, Seroff, Somoff, Bakst. I am, however, almost certain that few people in England are aware that the Russian nation is not only the creator of a great Art, but has also opened up a vast field of learning of world-wide importance, a learning which, though still in its youth, has revealed fresh horizons and enriched mankind with many precious gifts. Let me begin by acquainting you with the series of Institutes, where year after year systematic and indefatigable enquiries in the sphere of learning are being carried on. After this I will tell you briefly what results have thus been achieved in certain branches of knowledge. I will finish by citing statements made by one or two of your leading English authorities relative to some of our best Russian *savants*.

Russian learning grew up and developed in close conjunction with one of the most important but least known institutions of Peter the Great—the Russian Academy of Science. This Academy laid the foundation of systematic learned enquiry and created higher Russian education. It still remains the central point of the vast and complicated network of institutions having a purely scientific object. I will not speak of the history of the Academy of Science, for such a digression would take up too much time. I will confine myself to remarking that, after a number of years when the members were exclusively foreigners, chiefly Germans, the Academy

* Lecture delivered in the University of Manchester on April 25, 1910.

became purely Russian as regards its membership as well as its methods of learned work. Let me describe to you the constitution of the Academy. There are in it three departments: first, the department of Mathematics and Physics; secondly, the department of Russian Language and Literature; and thirdly, the department of History and Philology. Each of these departments is divided into a series of 'chairs,' which are sometimes held jointly by several specialists. These 'chairs' form groups called divisions, e.g. that of Oriental Language and Literature, that of Classical Philology and Archæology, that of History, etc.

All the members of the Academy are employed by the State, receive salaries, and devote themselves to learned work. Several of them are at the head of some learned Institution or other, itself concerned with similar learned work. Many of these institutions have a world-wide reputation; for instance, the famous Observatory of Petrograd in Pulkovo; the Meteorological Institute, combined with a seismological Institute having many branches in the country; a splendid Zoological and Palæontological Museum, one of the best in the world; a Museum of Ethnography and Anthropology; an Asiatic Museum containing a unique collection of Oriental MSS., etc., etc. You may judge of the productiveness of the Academy by the number of its publications. It would weary you were I to enumerate the titles of the periodical and other publications issued by it. I will merely point out that the Academy has the exclusive use of a large printing-house which employs some hundreds of workmen; but even this establishment is unable to deal with the whole of the material supplied by the members. All the contributions and books printed by the Academy are subjected to a vigorous censorship by the Academy itself, which determines their scientific value; and they are only printed after they have been accepted at the General Meeting of the Department.

Nor is the work of the eleven Universities of Russia (Moscow, Petrograd, Kazan, Kieff, Odessa, Harkoff, Perm, Saratof, Tomsk, Warsaw (now Voronezh), Juriëff (Dorpat)) less productive. As regards their constitution, these universities most closely resemble the German model, but they have their own peculiarities which are

chiefly due to their local position and their history. The General Boards of Professors which govern the universities do their best not only to transmit knowledge to the students, but also to make the universities so many laboratories in which learned enquiry can be pursued. The academic qualifications demanded of a professor are of a more stringent nature than is customary in Western Europe or in America. On leaving the University, every candidate for a professorship is obliged to pass a severe and complicated examination in his special subject. He is further obliged to write, print and defend two original learned theses at a public meeting of his faculty. He thus becomes possessed, one after the other, of the degrees of Master and Doctor. The standard demanded in these theses becomes higher every year. Only Doctors of the corresponding branches are entitled to Chairs in the University. It is the aim of the University to create as many learned workers as possible. The most capable students remain attached to the University in some permanent way. They receive bursaries and are sent abroad so that they may embark upon original work of their own. Every attempt is made to secure the best possible libraries, laboratories and clinics in every university. Excellent work is done in the medical faculties. The Institute of Experimental Medicine in Petrograd, the Military Medical Academy in the same city, the clinics of Moscow and Odessa, have always been, and are now, true seminaries of scientific knowledge. Good work is done in the fostering of scholarship among the students by the so-called 'Seminaria,' which possess special libraries. In each seminary the students form a group round the professor, and are engaged on advanced studies.

The line of development which characterises the universities hitherto open to men only is also to be observed in the courses of higher study open to women. Although of no very ancient standing—the oldest of them, that of Moscow, being only 150 years old—these universities have been no less active in the solving of learned problems than has been the Academy itself. To these universities we are indebted not only for a series of wonderful discoveries, but also for the deepening and broadening of our knowledge of Russia itself. We also

owe to them the fact that the highly qualified scholars of Russia may now be numbered, not by tens, but by hundreds and perhaps by thousands.

A very prominent part in the development of Russian learning has been taken by private learned societies and by certain official State organisations having some learned purpose in view. The great work lately done for the study of the geography and ethnography of Russia was done almost entirely by the Russian Geographical Society. Most of our knowledge of the Archæology of Russia is due to the great Archæological Societies in Petrograd, Moscow and Odessa, to the State Archæological Commission, and to the periodical Archæological Congresses. The study of the geology of Russia has lately been concentrated in the hands of the State Geological Committee. The work of collecting, classifying and studying the extensive records of Russian History is chiefly done by the States Archæographic Commission and by many private societies, both in Moscow and Petrograd. The private societies of Kieff, Odessa and other towns and many provincial Record Commissions, as well as the archives of certain State Institutions, have taken an important part in this work.

These facts, scanty as they are, suffice to show how the interest in learning and learned work has spread over the whole of Russia during the last few decades, and also how great has been the increase of persons gradually drawn into the vortex of scholarly achievement. An attempt made by the Academy to enumerate the learned forces of Russia gave quite unexpected results. The Russian 'Minerva,' an annual publication, now to be printed by the Academy, will form an imposing volume of many hundreds of pages.

In addition to these Institutes, I must also mention the Russian Museums. The Hermitage at Petrograd is known to all, by name at any rate. Every one has heard of the great historic and artistic treasures contained in that Museum. Its creation was a great scientific achievement, which we owe to the Emperor Nicholas I. The Hermitage was and is an important centre of learning; its publications have earned for it an honoured name in the scientific world. Nor does this museum stand alone in Russia. In Petrograd itself we have two splendid

Ethnographical Museums, one of which is combined with a Museum of Russian art. In Moscow there is a beautiful Historical Museum and one of the best museums of casts as yet in existence. In Odessa there is a rich Archæological Museum. The number of museums, that is to say of centres of learned life in Russia, grows from year to year. Every provincial town in Russia now possesses a complete museum, or at any rate the nucleus of one, containing good scientific or artistic collections.

Finally, Russia is rich in splendid libraries. The Public Library of Petrograd, the Rumiantzeff Library and the Library of the Historical Museum in Moscow, the Library of the Holy Synod, also in Moscow, many monastic libraries scattered all over Russia, the libraries of the Universities and other centres of higher education, are second to none of the libraries of Western Europe.

Such is Russian learning viewed from the outside. I now pass on to enquire what is the nature of the work done in these many learned institutions. Thanks to their age-long labours, we now know Russia. It would be possible for foreigners also to know Russia if they were willing to become acquainted with the language and to study Russian scientific literature. It is not our fault that they have not done so up to the present time. Of course the enormous task of investigating Russia is far from being concluded, but we must remember what the Russian Empire is, and how difficult are the problems which it presents to investigators. Part of its territory borders on the Carpathians and the Baltic Sea; the other reaches the Himalayas and the Pacific Ocean. One part surrounds a portion of the Black Sea, and another borders on the Arctic Ocean. It is a land in which high mountains alternate with rich plains, vast forests, uncultivated steppes, northern tundras and southern deserts; a land in which there exist side by side hundreds of nations and peoples of Finnish, Mongolian, Caucasian and Indo-European extraction. Such a land presents in itself a very difficult and very important scientific problem, the complexity of which can only be understood by persons who have worked at its elucidation. Much has, however, been done to solve this problem. Let me adduce a few examples.

The geographical survey of the country, of its mountains and waterways, is carried out year by year systematically and without respite. Frequent corrections are made in the map, and new maps are brought out yearly. Side by side with this geographical work, we have a study of the country from the point of view of ethnography in connexion with the scientific study of the dialects and phonetics of the Great Russian language and of other Indo-European, Finnish, Turkish and Caucasian languages. The work done in this domain is very important. Russian scholarship has produced many standard works on the history of the Russian language, for example the works of Sobolevsky, Shakhmatoff and others, and also of some monumental works on dialectology. A big volume has been devoted by the Academy to the enumeration of the many different publications on this subject; and this volume is only the first of a projected series, which when finished would give a complete idea of the stupendous development of linguistic studies in Russia in the domain of the Slavonic languages.*

In order to give some idea of the type of men working in Russia on this subject I will cite the words of one of the best specialists on the history of the Russian language, Olaf Broch, a Professor in Christiania. In a letter addressed to myself he gives the following description of the work of Alexis Shakhmatoff, Professor and Fellow of the Russian Academy:

'The solution of such complicated and refined questions as the Slavonic accent (*accent tonique*) in its primitive features and historical development, the explanation of such important historical facts as the movement of the population on the enormous plains of Eastern Europe in ancient times, the enquiry into the foundation and development of the primitive historical literature of ancient Russia, the study and classification of the linguistic life of contemporary Russia, of her dialects and phraseology—in which some use is made, for purposes of comparison, of non-Slavonic, Indo-European languages—the enquiry into the question of the origin and growth of the different features of Russian literary language, the investigation both of the Russian and of

* See vol. I of the Encyclopædia of Slavonic Philology published by the Academy, St Petersburg, 1910.

other Slavonic languages from the phonetic, morphologic and syntactic point of view, essays and publications about the evolution of Russian thought and Russian literature—all this and much more has found in Shakhmatoff an indefatigable, first-class investigator. . . . His energy is invincible. Even now, under the most tragic conditions, he pursues his work, though weakened by physical inanition and broken in spirit by the sad occurrences in his country, but proudly conscious of his duty towards his beloved work and towards the eternal values of humanity as a whole.'

A very high standard is reached in Russia in the systematic study of Oriental and Caucasian languages. Two of the Russian Universities, Petrograd and Kazan, have special Oriental Faculties, which can boast of many students and an ever-increasing number of 'chairs.' In Moscow and Vladivostock there are special institutes for the promotion of Oriental Studies. Lately the energy of Prof. Nicholas Marr, a member of the Academy, created a Caucasian Historic and Archæological Institute. We can say with certainty that, in the matter of studying the East, Russia takes one of the first places, and in some domains she plays even a leading and determinative part. A splendid page in the history of Oriental learning is represented by the study of Siberia. The work begun in the 18th century and carried on in our own time by Potanin, Mikluchá-Maklai, Radloff, Przevalskij and others, gave us for the first time an idea of the amazing riches and variety of the archæological and ethnological treasures of Siberia. At the same time the work of Zoologists, Palæontologists, Geologists, Botanists and Mineralogists has made us acquainted with its natural conditions and its inexhaustible riches. One of the results of this great work is that lately the Academy of Science and the Geographical Society have been able to put in hand an ethnographical map of Russia. The Bolshevik revolution has, however, arrested the progress of this undertaking.

Let me now speak a little more in detail about those aspects of the study of Russia with which I am most familiar; I refer to the study of the prehistoric, proto-historic and historic past of Russia. The historical evolution of that country is exceedingly complicated

and difficult to analyse. The study of Russian history is closely connected with that of the development of the national psychology. It presents problems more difficult and more complicated than any to be found in the history of the Western European peoples. First of all you must take into consideration that the Slavs, as a nation, have well-defined peculiarities and are quite different from the other branches of the Indo-European family. Besides this, you must always remember that the evolution of the Russian part of the Slavonic people is closely connected with the cultural development of the lands in which the Slavs settled and remained, both in the pre-Slavonic and in the Slavonic period of their history. Russia was always a bridge between the great Oriental or Eastern and the great Western civilisations. She was imbued with both influences, absorbed them both, and, thanks to the creative genius of her inhabitants, transformed these elements into a new, original and quite independent form of culture. At the same time the Eastern and Western centres of culture bordering on Russia were the cradles of powerful and warlike States for which Russia was ever an attractive prey, owing to the fact that she was not separated from them by any natural barriers. The defence of her own independence, on this account a very difficult task, was further complicated by the mixture of races in a land which was geographically and economically predestined to form one State.

The economic life of Russia is also very complicated. Russia tends on the one side towards the Baltic, on another towards the White Sea, and on a third towards the Euxine. Great commercial highways, whether by land or water, radiate through the country in all directions. At the same time it is important to point out that Russia forms one whole with the very peculiar world of Northern and Central Asia. These facts add to the complexity of the tasks before the historian and archæologist of Russia. The archæological materials are enormous and remarkably divergent in character. Their ordering can only be achieved by scholars who are entirely familiar with the archæology of the West as well as with that of the East, and especially with the archæology of Central and Farther Asia, a country still very little explored. Not less rich and various are the

literary documents. Through Lithuania and Poland, Russia has always been in touch with Western Europe, chiefly with Germany, and through the Black Sea with Byzantium and afterwards with Turkey. Moreover, the southern steppes of Russia cannot be separated from Iranian and Turco-Mongolian portions of Central Asia, which in their turn are closely connected with India and China.

Thus it is that the task of studying Russia historically is an enormous one. Nevertheless Russian scholars, though aware of the complexity of the task, boldly and patiently set themselves to solve it. The archaeological study of Russia is not more than a hundred years old, but a huge mass of material has already been collected, and many difficult problems have been solved. Year by year, excavations are made in Russia, and step by step her prehistoric and proto-historic destinies are being elucidated. The very rich barrows of South Russia have shown how closely the northern slopes of the Caucasus and the northern shore of the Black Sea were connected with the great Oriental civilisation—with Mesopotamia, Elam and Iran. We clearly see now how old and how rich this civilisation was. From the third millennium B.C. onwards the South of Russia was one of the most interesting centres of civilisation. During the neolithic period, there dwelt on the banks of the Dnieper and the Bug an agricultural population which produced uncommonly artistic painted pottery of the same type as the oldest painted pottery of Elam. In the copper age the river Kuban in North Caucasus was one of the chief centres of the civilisation which afterwards impregnated Europe. During the early and late iron age, that is to say, at the time when the great Assyrian Kingdom and later that of Persia arose in the East, and the great City States flourished in the West, the steppes of South Russia formed the centre of a mighty State closely connected on the one side with Iran and on the other with Greece. This State imbibed simultaneously the cultural elements of West and East, and, thus nourished, created an independent civilisation.

During the Roman period these cultural ties became stronger; and, beginning with the third century A.D., the civilisation of South Russia became fused with the

German civilisation from the North and thus renewed and enriched the civilisation of Western Europe. The rich cultural life of the South influenced Northern and Central Russia, and created there, chiefly in the East, on the river Kama, very important and opulent centres of civilisation which were closely connected with the shores of the Baltic and the steppes of Siberia. This prehistoric civilisation became, as it grew, the basis of the culture of the Slavonic peoples, and formed the background against which the historical life of the Russian State developed.

It is natural that Russian learning should have devoted its best energies to the study of Russian history. One of the peculiarities of this history in the early period is that it cannot be separated from the history of the Greek world. The old ties between them became even closer. This connexion with the Greek world, and chiefly with Byzantium, was at once understood and rightly valued by Russian scholars. The history of the Byzantine Church and Byzantine religious dogma were from the earliest times studied in Russia by the representatives of theological learning. In the 19th century began a systematic study of the history of Byzantine literature, and of the political, economical, social and artistic evolution of Byzantium. Fresh sources of Byzantine history have been published one after another. They have chiefly been taken from the libraries of Russian monasteries and from those of the Orthodox East, especially from Mount Athos and Sinai. Much help has been given to the historians by the Orientalists, i.e. the Arabic and Armenian scholars and the specialists in the Georgian and Coptic languages. The study of Byzantium forms one with the study of the East. At the same time close attention has been paid to the political and social history of Byzantium. Here, too, the Orientalists joined forces with the Hellenists. We can affirm that to Vassilievskij and his school Europe is indebted for the foundations of its knowledge of Byzantine history; and that to Kondakoff and his school it owes its comprehension and right appreciation of Byzantine art.

It is most difficult in a short lecture to follow the gradual evolution of the Russian people from the time

of the creation of a Russian State. Here, too, the foundation was laid by the publication and study of the documentary sources. This work is of course still unfinished, but we must remember that Western Europe is in the same position. Still we can say that the most important of these documents have been elucidated and published. The Russian Annals, for example, have been studied in a masterly manner by Shakhmatoff, who investigated them from the point of view of criticism and language and elucidated the history of their growth as well as the character of the different versions.

Russian scholars have furnished us with many works picturing the evolution of Russian life. Each of these contains not only a synopsis of our knowledge of the facts, but reflects at the same time the influence of the most important philosophical ideas prevalent in the author's day. Karamsin is the historian of the Russian Tsars; Solovieff the historian of the Russian people. Slavophiles and Westerns, mystics and realists, idealists and economic materialists in turn coloured the facts of Russian history under the influence of their general ideas. But every surrender to natural bias and every exaggeration were combined with a fresh and ever deeper appreciation of the facts brought about by the discovery and elucidation of new sides of Russian life. At this moment Russian historical learning can boast of having found its Macaulay in the person of a man who understood and appreciated the peculiarities of the evolution of Russia and her close connexion with Western Europe. I speak of the classical works of Klucevsky and his school, and especially of his best pupil Miliukoff. Let me describe their work by reading to you the words of one of the best scholars in Russian history, the late member of the Russian Academy, Lappo-Danilevsky. This learned man, who was an Honorary Doctor of the University of Cambridge, lately died of starvation in Petrograd.

'Klucevsky (he says) elaborated his own "sociological" conception of Russian history. He was not inclined to accept the theory of Solovyeff and particularly the modifications of it which he introduced in the later volumes of his history. Klucevsky attached much more importance to material than to moral forces, which he appreciated in so far as they

manifested themselves in social phenomena ; besides, he could not content himself, as Chicherin has done, with the study of institutions considered merely as mechanisms bound to develop in a certain way. He was interested in the real "social stuff," of which they were made, and with the "vital forces" which put them in motion; he investigated the social and economic evolution of different classes, their enslavement and emancipation, and their influence on political institutions. Yet, agreeing to some extent with the Slavophil doctrine, Klucevsky insisted on the "originality" of Russian history and explained the part that the Russian nation had played, particularly the Great Russians, whom he characterised in a very vivid manner; and he tried to represent, in a genetic way, the "real" historical evolution of this nation and not the dialectical scheme of a series of mental concepts, only logically connected with one another. According to these views, Klucevsky held that the Russian nation had passed through different stages of evolution. Ancient Russia, situated on the Dnieper, was characterised by urban life and trade; mediæval Russia, settled on the middle Volga, by feudal principalities (differing, however, in some respects, from the Western type) and by free agriculture; "Great" Russia, formed at a later date, by the national State of Moscow, with the Tsar and the boyars at its head, by military and agricultural institutions; and the Russian Empire, attaining its natural limits, under the autocratic regime, by the ascendancy of the nobles, and enslaved agriculture and industry. Klucevsky presented this scheme in a brilliant picture of our evolution down to the 18th century, and formed a school of Russian historians. In a similar realistic and "sociological" spirit, Miliukoff explained the evolution of Russian culture, arranged in a homogeneous series, and, with Kisewetter, Bogoslovsky, Platonov and others, entered upon definite investigations concerning the history of certain Russian institutions.'

The study of Russian history, which made enormous progress in the 19th century, owes this progress in a large measure to the fact that Russian scholars were at the same time actively concerned with questions of philosophy and law as well as social and economic problems regarded from the comparative point of view. Careful attention was also being paid to the solution of the problems of universal history in their widest aspects. Let me describe to you what is being done in Russia in this department by citing the words of one of the

greatest authorities on general history, a man who combines the qualities of a profound jurist and of an acute historical enquirer—Sir Paul Vinogradoff, a professor formerly of Moscow and now of Oxford, and member of the Russian and British Academies.

‘All the great nations of Europe (he says) have come to realise in the course of the 19th century to what extent their political, economic and cultural life are products of historical factors; but no nation has been led by conditions and events to so keen a consciousness of this fundamental truth as the Russian people. Apart from the evolution of self-government and the contrasts of economic classes, the problems of orientation towards the West have made Russian scholars especially interested and open-minded in connexion with the scientific study of general history. In the forties and fifties, at the height of the militarist regime of Nicholas I, Granovsky, a professor in Moscow, gave eloquent expression to the best aspirations of French and German scholarship in explaining the progress of the civilised world. His famous lectures on Alexander the Great, Timur, Saint Louis, and Bacon, marked the stages in the road from material domination to spiritual achievement.

‘The holders of the chair of History in Moscow remained true to the tradition started by Granovsky, and set before their students and the public at large the historical landmarks of Western civilisation as manifestations of the human struggle for freedom and knowledge. Kudriavtzeff, in his “Destinies of Italy,” treated the transition from the ancient to the modern world in its general political aspect—a task which Gibbon, Bury and Hodgkin have undertaken with such success in England. Guerrier turned with indefatigable industry and insight to the leaders of religious thought—St Augustin, Bernard III of Clairvaux, Innocent III. Kareieff presented an encyclopædic survey of the general course of Modern History, besides making a special study of certain aspects of the French Revolution. Vinogradoff investigated the origins of social structure and social functioning in the mediæval past of England, Wales and Italy. His pupil, A. Savine, has made remarkable contributions to the social history of England in the 15th century. M. Karelin made a thorough study at first-hand of the political and cultural ideas of the Italian Renaissance. Boris Tchichérin, a Hegelian philosopher of remarkable learning and analytical power, summarised in four volumes the development of political theory from the Greeks to the Germans of the 19th century.

Maxim Kovalevsky, who, beginning his career in Harkoff, taught in Moscow and Paris and concluded his eventful life in Petrograd, made a masterly contribution to comparative jurisprudence by his work on the customary law of Caucasian tribes, besides surveying the general course of economic development in Europe and investigating the influence of economic conditions and political theories on the French Revolution.'

I am of course far from having exhausted, in these short remarks, the material I could and ought to use in an attempt to describe the state of scientific enquiry in Russia. But I think that I have said enough to show you the direction which humane learning has taken in Russia, and the results which it has achieved.

Not being a specialist, I have no right to speak of what has been done by Russian scholars in the domain of Mathematics and of Natural Science. But, like every educated man, I know the great names of the renowned Russian mathematicians, Lobachevsky and Chebysheff; of the physicists and chemists, Lomonossoff, Mendeleieff, and Lebedieff; and of the physiologists and physicians, Pirogoff, Metchnikoff, Pavloff, and others. I cannot undertake to describe what they have done, but I will venture to bring before you the testimony of some of your own most eminent specialists regarding them. The number of such tributes could be multiplied at will. This is what one of the most distinguished scholars of the age, Sir Joseph Thomson, writes to Prof. Sir P. Vinogradoff about the late Prof. Lebedieff of Moscow:

'I think Lebedieff's investigations on the pressure of light, involving as they did the measurement of extraordinarily minute effects, are among the most striking triumphs of Experimental Physics. The results he arrived at are of first-rate importance in the general theory of radiation.'

It is to the kindness of one of the most eminent contemporary physiologists, Prof. C. S. Sherrington of Oxford, that I owe the following testimony to the works and personality of the two stars of Russian Physiology—Metchnikoff, who was first a professor in Odessa and then Director of the Pasteur Institute in Paris; and Pavloff, formerly Director of the Institute of Experimental

Medicine in Petrograd, and now Professor in the Medical Academy and member of the Academy of Science.

'So far as I, as a biologist, am competent to judge of the achievements of the great contemporary figures E. Metchnikoff and Ivan Pavloff, I venture to say that, though individually very different, both have striking traits in common, especially a certain transcendent daring and penetration of spirit. I will treat Metchnikoff as a contemporary, although he has recently passed away, because his thoughts and their influence are still as living forces as ever in the biology of to-day. By training a zoologist, he presents the unusual history of a master in one discipline turning from the field in which his earlier laurels were won to enter another—Pathology, to which, as it seemed then to ordinary minds, his own was but remotely related. In Pathology he rapidly opened a whole new region of theoretical and practical discovery. The scope of his work there may be indicated by saying that the new era which Pasteur had initiated from the chemical side obtained a complementary development on the "cell-theory" side at the hands of Metchnikoff. Metchnikoff showed an elemental factor in bacterial disease to be the defensive reactions and powers of the individual structural life-units, the cells composing the attacked animal organism. In short, he brought the cell-theory into relation with Pasteur's bacteriology, and, thus and in so far, he founded the scientific Pathology of the present time. The present generation of pathologists are his exponents.

'In Ivan Pavloff one meets a similarly bold and penetrative spirit, applied, however, to another biological field, namely the physiology of healthy animal life. His earliest work attacked the then obscure problem of the nervous control of the body by actions of "arrest," as complementary to actions of "incitement." His genius turned next to the study of digestive processes. He revealed their hitherto unrecognised delicacy of adjustment and the fitting of the successive organ-secretions to the varying requirements of the altering diet of animals and man. Such regulation he showed to be largely nervous in its mechanism and, though mainly unconscious in its operation, yet influenced by nervous reactions to which conscious, especially emotional, attributes attach. His work in this domain made his name a household word wherever physiology is studied.

'His genius has been attracted more recently to investigation of the nexus between unconscious reflex nervous action, with its invariable and therefore predictable results, and

those most complex nervous acts called "willed," where stimuli evoke end-effects so variable as to be largely unpredictable. Between these end-terms of the series there lay, prior to Pavloff, a "no-man's-land," hardly ventured upon either by physiology or psychology. From this limbo he rescued, by study from the purely mechanistic standpoint, the reactions which he has called "conditional reflexes," eschewing methodically from his descriptions of them the psyche of animals, but, unlike Descartes, not denying its existence, though leaving it unpredicated. He had begun to fill a new Institute, specially erected for such work by the Government in Petrograd, with further extensions of this line of research, when the war came. His mode of experimentation and observation and the great results achieved by them had already attracted universal attention and enlisted followers in all civilised countries, especially, perhaps, in the laboratories of North America. The two names of Metchnikoff and Pavloff exhibit eminently the inalienable share of Russia in the Biology of our time, and the capital and indispensable importance of its co-operation in the progress of theory not less than of practical result.

I think these remarks will suffice to show how high is the standard of Russian work in the domain of scholarship. I hope that, although my sketch is neither exhaustive nor comprehensive, it will be successful in convincing you that Russian learning has done and is doing its share in building up our common treasury of culture. It remains for me to express a hope that, in these sad times, Russian scholars will, in spite of their dreadful sufferings, retain faith in themselves, in learning, and in the future of civilisation.

M. ROSTOVTZEFF.

Art. 3.—SOME ASPECTS OF THE ITALIAN SETTECENTO.

1. *Collezione Settecentesca*. Edited by Salvatore di Giacomo. *Cagliostro nella Storia e nella Leggenda*, by Enzo Petraccone; *Aneddoti e Profili Settecenteschi*, by Benedetto Croce; *Epistolari Veneziani del Secolo XVIII*, edited by P. Molmenti; *Carteggi Casanoviani*, edited by P. Molmenti. Milan: Sandron, 1914, etc.
 2. *Il Giorno*. By Giuseppe Parini. Edited by Paolo Bellezza. Milan: Cogliati, 1917.
 3. *Studies of the Eighteenth Century in Italy*. By Vernon Lee. Second Edition. Fisher Unwin, 1907.
 4. *La Storia di Venezia nella Vita Privata*. By P. Molmenti. Bergamo: Istituto Italiano d'Arte Grafica, 1908.
 5. *Venice in the Eighteenth Century*. By Philippe Monnier. Chatto & Windus, 1910.
- And other works.

THE 'Settecento' (18th century) in Italy was long the Cinderella among the centuries. Its more fortunate sisters, basking in the smiles of popular favour at home and abroad, were hardly even expected to acknowledge it as a member of the family. So long as all her energies were absorbed by the national movement, Italy could not afford to dwell upon a period when she was considered to have reached the lowest depths of degradation, political and moral. Even the 17th century, when Spain dominated the peninsula, was redeemed by an air of masculine vigour, in spite of its brutality and violence, combined with intellectual servility. But now that Italy has vindicated her place among the nations, and all that went before has passed beyond the sphere of active controversy, the fairy godmother, Fashion, has touched the 'Settecento' with her wand and sent it to the ball, where it not only holds its own, but outstrips more than one of its rivals in general favour.

The war has helped to bring home to many of us the truth of Carducci's beautiful lines :—

'L'ora presente è invano, non fa che percuotere e fugge;
Sol nel passato è il bello, sol nella morte è il vero.'

Not a few English readers have learnt to seek relief among the cool shades of our own unemotional age of reason who had never suspected the soothing influence it possessed, long though this had been appreciated by its genuine devotees. The tide turned in favour of the 'Settecento' some years ago, as was proved by the growing number of books that were published concerning it; and the war seems, if anything, to have stimulated the growing interest. All the volumes of the valuable 'Collezione Settecentesca' have been published since 1914.

Nor is this surprising when we remember how much that is most characteristic in the life of that age was deliberately planned by those who had the misfortune to live in the first half of the century, as a refuge from the miseries of the world around them. Before the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, Italy, parcelled out among a number of foreign rulers, was the scene of a succession of dynastic wars with which she had no concern, though she experienced to the full the horrors of the fighting. The marching and countermarching of the armies was regarded by the Italians with the most complete detachment. Goldoni thoroughly enjoyed the spectacle of a battle between the troops of Savoy and the Austrians as 'a sight which few persons can boast of having witnessed,' though there were twenty-five thousand dead to be buried on the morrow. But his enjoyment was marred by some deserters, who plundered him of his baggage; and the Austrians subsequently captured the whole of his own and his wife's slender property, which, however, he was fortunate enough to recover.

Economically things were not much better. Trade was everywhere decaying. Spanish influence had taught the upper classes to look down upon it as derogatory, even in Venice. The free port of Leghorn was used almost entirely by foreigners. Genoa alone remained true to the old merchant traditions and grew rich accordingly. Agriculture was equally neglected. Estates were rarely visited by their owners, who regarded them merely as sources of revenue to be spent in the towns, and left them almost entirely to the care of their stewards. One remembers the horror of Gaspere Gozzi

or Antonio Longo at the prospect of being forced to remain behind in the country after their gay friends, who had come for the *villeggiatura*, had returned to town. An economic revival was out of the question till more settled conditions prevailed; and the general stagnation of public life gave no outlet for the energy of the inhabitants of the peninsula in other directions.

Hence the period found its fullest scope in the Arcadian Academy, founded under the auspices of Queen Christina of Sweden, which still continues to exist in its old headquarters on the Janiculum. Italy has always been the home of academies, but hitherto their influence had rarely extended beyond the walls of the town that gave them birth. This one, however, soon gathered within its fold virtually the whole cultivated society of the peninsula. Branches sprang up in every town of importance, even in remote Gorizia. Its very artificiality harmonised completely with the needs of the day.

Rhyming is easy in Italian; and the ability to turn a sonnet was almost as necessary an accomplishment for a gentleman as was some knowledge of fencing to his more virile ancestors. The dainty volumes with the laurel wreath round the Pan pipes and 'Gli Arcadi,' that contain the results of the Olympic Games in which the members displayed their intellectual nimbleness in honour of some illustrious patron in Rome, seldom rise above the level of the contributions to the Batheaston vase, which owed its origin, as Horace Walpole saw, to Lady Miller's travels in Italy. Great literature could not be produced in an atmosphere so hopelessly divorced from all that constitutes life as we understand it. Arcadia reached its zenith in Metastasio, whose 'Ode to Nice' may be called the love poem of the 18th century. The feeling it expresses is perfectly genuine, shallow though it sounds to us now after the storms of the Romantic movement; and Carducci does well to remind us that the 'settecento' had every right to serve up its 'dear heart' as it pleased. The ode was translated into all the languages of Europe; every one with the most elementary knowledge of Italian could repeat it in the original; and it is praised even by Baretti, the sworn foe of Arcadia. With it stands Rolli's gentle, melancholy

'Solitario bosco ombroso,' which the boy Goethe learnt from hearing his mother sing it, long before he understood a word of Italian.

But Metastasio was Cæsarean poet at the court of Vienna; and the great work of his life was the perfection of the melodrama. In his hands the libretto touched high-water mark. The score was little more than an accessory; and his 'Didone Abbandonata' or his 'Adriano in Siria' might be set to music by a dozen masters. Yet it is easy to see that Metastasio's contemporaries were wrong in their estimate of the relative importance of the two arts, though it was not till the end of the century that Casti wrote his clever 'Prima la musica, poi le parole,' in which he gave vent to his indignation at being asked to provide the words for a finished score by Salieri. The very exuberance of this great creative impulse brought with it its own nemesis. 'In the rapid rush forward of Italian music, in the tremendous vortex of new compositions, the work even of an eminent composer was rarely performed more than one season in the same place,' when it was discarded 'like last year's almanack,' and was therefore rarely thought worth printing. So much Vernon Lee tells us; and the pages describing the musical life are perhaps the best in her 'Studies of the Eighteenth Century in Italy,' which is now a work of such authority in the peninsula that it is read even by a heroine of the latest war-novel. Many of Metastasio's beautiful phrases have not yet lost their magic; but who could dissociate from Pergolesi's setting what is perhaps the most beautiful of them all:

'Nei giorni tuoi felici
Ricordati di me'?

Venice, with his four conservatories, its great church festivals and its nightly serenades on the canals, was the real home of Italian music. Naples was its only rival. From the city of the lagoons or from Naples came all the great singers. At Venice music seemed to be part of the very air men breathed. 'They sing in the squares, in the streets and on the canals,' says Goldoni. 'The shopkeepers sing as they set out their wares, the workmen sing as they leave their work, the gondoliers sing while they are waiting for their masters.' Even to-day

one hears more singing in the canals of Venice than one does in any other large town in Italy. The marriage of the stern old patrician Marcello, the acknowledged leader of the musical world, to Rosanna, a girl of the people, whose magnificent voice he chanced to hear as she passed in a gondola along the canal, is as truly symbolical of 18th-century Venice as was the wedding of the sea by the Doge in the great days of old, though the ceremony lingered on to the last year of the Republic.

But, apart from its music, what is the secret of the spell which the 'Settecento' undoubtedly casts upon many people to-day? It lies, we imagine, as in the case of the 18th century almost everywhere else in Europe, in the charm of its social life. France, of course, led the way. The tragedy-writing *abate* turned to Voltaire or Corneille for inspiration as instinctively as the Venetian *zentildonna* on her way to the promenade of the *liston* looked to the doll in the Merceria to instruct her in the latest Paris fashions. But Italian life was nevertheless as individual as was our own in England. Cut off both by upbringing and by circumstances from all that we are in the habit of regarding as the serious business of life, the men and women of the leisured classes could devote all their energies to the pursuit of pleasure and to their social duties. Art and literature were useful in so far as they served to decorate and amuse. But music formed the most effective setting for a world which had lost the habit of thinking; and the music of the period charms and soothes us to-day by its very lack of passion. Life was essentially feminine, for woman rules in the drawing-room. The ideal shepherd of Arcadia is the clever, superficial, polished *abate*, a thorough man of the world, who has dabbled in everything, can turn a neat verse or a complimentary letter on any conceivable subject, and is welcome in every capital in Europe. 'I will not meddle with the "Spectator,"' wrote Swift to Stella; 'let him fair-sex it to the end.' And the 'Spectator' became the fashion for a season or two, especially in Venice, the home of Gaspare Gozzi, its most successful Italian imitator.

There was another side of life in which Venice held a unique supremacy. She was the Mecca of the man

of pleasure. Though visibly aging, she remained Italian to the core. Her gaiety had lost its spontaneity and had taken on something of a professional tone. It was a mask put on for the amusement and exploitation of the foreigner, not the irrepressible outburst of a heart bubbling over with merriment. Its very frenzy suggests that those who were leading it were afraid to stop lest they should begin to think. Yet the carnival of Venice was a thing unique in Europe. No gambler had completed his education till he had tried conclusions with the suave patricians who alone were deemed worthy to make the banks at the faro tables or to appear unmasked within the sacred precincts of the Ridotto at San Moisè. It is not for the sake of their vanished splendour that our eyes linger upon the ruins of the villas which once lined the banks of the Brenta canal, and of which Strà is the one noble survival, but for the gorgeous entertainments of which they were the scene and the jolly parties that gathered in their beautiful formal gardens for the *villeggiatura*. We try in vain to recapture the indefinable glamour of those last years of the old régime, of which little more than the dust and ashes remain in the collections of the Museo Carrer at Venice, with its Longhi and its Goldoni room, its fading costumes and the puppets for performing Goldoni's plays—a glamour as elusive as the charm of one of Longhi's own beauties in hoop and wig and patch, the brilliant red of her lips almost clashing with the dead white of her complexion.

Antonio Longo tells us of a masquerade which he organised at La Mira. All the masks appeared at his villa about two hours before midday, where a couple of barges were awaiting them on the Brenta. In one of these were a dozen musicians dressed as Moors, in the other twenty-four countrymen masked as Quakers. The whole company went on board and started for Dolo, where a large crowd had gathered, which was kept back by the Quakers drawn up in two lines. After a meal the barges were illuminated and started back for the Casino dei Nobili, which would correspond to the Assembly Rooms in an English town of the day. On the way they passed the villa of the Senator Giambattista Corner. To their surprise the windows were lit up with wax candles, while the statues, the gardens, and the

grounds were illuminated with pitch flares. Their band struck up and was answered by a full orchestra which had been brought from Venice. They landed and were met by the Senator and a large body of friends. Dancing was kept up till midnight. They were all invited to dinner for the next day, when the dessert represented the figures of their own masquerade. As several pheasants were untouched, Corner signed to a servant to keep them for the morrow. Marco Gradenigo, also a Senator, remarked that it was a mean thing to do. Corner retorted that Gradenigo was always dining out, but never himself gave any one so much as a drink of water from a bucket. Gradenigo, who was famed for his hospitality, instantly invited all those present to dine with him on the morrow, and promised that no food that was left over should ever appear at his table again. In the end each of these Senators entertained the party at no less than six dinners.

These last years of the old order in Italy attract us not a little by the limitations that seem to raise them above the cares of everyday life. But they are altogether lacking in the solid qualities which we associate with the age of our own great Doctor. Even Horace Walpole's letters possess a manly vigour for which we look in vain in a typical Italian letter-writer of the period. This deficiency is largely due to the society they reflect, for no one would have made a more perfect drawing-room *abate*, or a more punctilious and devoted *cicisbeo*, than Horace Walpole, had he been born south of the Alps. Italy can offer us nothing so satisfying as the life that centred round Swift and Pope and Addison, or round Johnson and his friends. Arcadia is a garden where one may while away an afternoon pleasantly and even profitably, but it would hardly tempt one to make a long stay.

Yet under all this artificiality and frivolity good work was being done in more than one field. The names of Volta and Galvani are known to every student of science, while Benedetto Croce has revived interest in Giambattista Vico. But the 18th century is, above all, the age of the great archivists, when the masses of material concerning the Middle Ages that lay buried in the Italian libraries were first sifted and arranged. This is a realm

in which Muratori has long held undisputed sway. Tiraboschi, with his *History of Italian literature*, was the other great scholar of the age, which was erudite rather than critical. And these two men were only the leaders of a host of lesser workers in the same field. The positive scientific spirit which inspired these pioneers gradually leavened Arcadia itself and brought literature once more into touch with reality.

After the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle Arcadia ceased to be a necessity. With the exception of Lombardy and the Duchy of Mantua, Italy was free from foreign rule. She could turn her back on shams and think of setting her house in order, though a complete reform was impossible till the old edifice had been overthrown by Napoleon. Hence those to whom the 'Settecento' means the beginning of the new rather than the end of the old prefer to dwell upon its second half.

In literature no poet of the first rank found full scope within the sheepfolds of Arcadia except Metastasio; and even he wrote a treatise denouncing the absurd tyranny of Aristotle's so-called rules as interpreted by his modern imitators, though the melodrama, being of recent origin, was not held to be subject to them. Every other writer of importance either broke into Arcadia or broke out of it. But, with the possible exception of Alfieri, there is not a single poet of note who altogether escaped its influence till well into the 19th century.

One day, in Pisa, Goldoni noticed a number of people disappearing through a large gateway.

'I looked in and saw a great courtyard with a garden beyond where there was a considerable gathering of guests seated under an arbour. I drew closer and observed a man in livery, who had, however, the air and bearing of a person of importance. I asked him who was the master of the house and why so many people were assembled. It proved to be a meeting of the *Colonia Alfea*, a colony of the Roman Arcadia. . . . I asked whether I might look on. "Certainly," says the porter. He went with me to the entrance of the garden and passed me on to one of the footmen of the Academy, who placed me in the circle. I listen; I hear good and bad and applaud both alike. Every one was staring at me and seemed curious to know who I was, and I was seized with a desire to satisfy their curiosity. The man who found me a seat was

not far from my chair. I summoned him and requested him to ask the President of the Academy whether a stranger might express in verse the pleasure he had just experienced. The President repeated my request aloud and the assembly assented. I had a sonnet in my head, which I had written for a similar occasion in my youth. I quickly altered a few lines to suit present surroundings. . . . The sonnet might have been composed on the spot and was loudly applauded. I do not know whether the meeting ought to have lasted longer, but all present rose and came crowding round me.'

This anecdote exactly illustrates Goldoni's relations with Arcadia. He was never on more than bowing terms with it. And it was he who breathed new life into Italian comedy by drawing his inspiration from the world around him. He belonged to the bourgeois class that was beginning to come into prominence; and his plays and memoirs contain a more truthful and varied picture of the life of the day than those of any other writer. Now Goldoni describes himself as an adventurer—an '*avventuriere onorato*,' but still an adventurer; and the adventurer is a prominent figure in the Italy of his day. As readers of the '*Promessi Sposi*' will remember, Spanish rule had, in the previous century, given ample encouragement to the spirit of restless energy that produced these adventurers. But there was no room for them on this side respectability in the tame, Arcadia-ridden '*Settecento*.' As one would expect, most of them either came from Venice or gravitated to it as their natural home. The perfect adventurer stands alone, unhampered by family or other ties, without ideals or scruples, ready to seize any chance for a little notoriety or a little money. He readily availed himself of the opportunities which the decay of faith and the growth of superstition threw in his way at this time. Had he lived in Lucian's day, Cagliostro would have founded an oracle and managed it as successfully as Alexander managed his shrine of *Æsculapius* in Paphlagonia. The world of Casanova is a little more refined, but hardly less corrupt than that of Apuleius or Petronius. In our own day such men would have reaped golden harvests in the shadier paths of finance.

Filippo Mazzei found the sphere where the more reputable members of the tribe might have succeeded.

After doing well in business in London, he emigrated to America on the advice of Franklin and Thomas Adams, and bought land adjoining Thomas Jefferson's estate. He was intimate with the leaders of the American revolution and was entrusted by them with important missions. His last duty, undertaken after his retirement to Pisa, was to find sculptors for the statue of Liberty at Washington. What an empire-builder was lost in Gorani, who believed himself to be descended from a mythical king of Scotland, and spent much of his life in seeking the crown which his nurse had prophesied for him in his cradle! Voltaire actually recommended him to Catharine the Great when she was looking for a leader to rouse the Greeks against the Turks.

Most of these adventurers were of a milder type, knights of the pen rather than of the sword, who owed their adventures to the force of circumstances rather than to any seeking on their part. Some were to be found in the very heart of Arcadia, like Francesco Algarotti, who captivated Frederick the Great by his polish and charm. He was ready to write pleasantly of Newton's Optics for the ladies—his dialogues were translated into English by Dr Johnson's friend, Elizabeth Carter—or to act as Voltaire's mouthpiece in denouncing the monstrosities of Shakespeare's 'Julius Cæsar.' And of course he was in complete sympathy with the Gallo-mania of the day, which, in the sphere of literature, had reduced Italy to the position of a mere province of France.

More interesting is Giuseppe Baretti, who ruined his prospects of preferment at home by his attacks on the trivialities that passed for scholarship in Turin. After a residence of nine years in England, where the friendship of Johnson and his circle only strengthened his robust independence, he returned to Venice and began publishing the 'Frusta Letteraria,' modelled on the 'Spectator' or rather the 'Rambler.' Baretti insisted that a poet must have something to say when he writes, and generally played such havoc among the trim gardens of Arcadia and its outraged shepherds that the authorities were called in to muzzle the dangerous intruder. So he returned to England, where, in spite of his violence, his

sterling qualities made him welcome in the best literary society.

With all their faults, these adventurers prove that the vigour of the race was still unimpaired and was ready to assert itself at the first opportunity. They have more to tell than their stay-at-home brethren; and the most readable memoirs of the century come from their ready pens. Goldoni and Casanova are the best known, since they wrote in French. Baretti's letters are classics in their way. Antonio Longo had no need to go beyond the Veneto for his adventures. Relapses into virtue merely indicate periods of convalescence in his natural extravagance; consequently he gives us a highly entertaining picture of the life of an idle young man of the day. But Lorenzo Da Ponte has left us the most complete and certainly the most charming picture of Bohemian life in 18th-century Venice.

If the spirit that carried the Lion of St Mark through the Mediterranean asserts itself, even in its decadence, in these adventurers, Milan, which was then, as now, the intellectual and industrial capital of Italy, soon took the lead in the movement that was to give birth to the new order; for at that time Austrian rule was the most enlightened in the peninsula. It was in Milan that the brothers Alessandro and Pietro Verri and Cesare Beccaria founded the 'Accademia dei Pugni' and produced the 'Caffè,' the first Italian imitation of the 'Spectator,' advocating, among other reforms, a greater freedom for the language and urging its readers solemnly to forswear the *Crusca* dictionary before a notary. And here it was that Beccaria wrote his 'Dei Delitti e delle Pene,' which was immediately read throughout Europe and resulted in the abolition of torture in Austria and elsewhere. Their ideas were largely derived from the Encyclopædists. They are disciples of Reason; and the rationalism of the Encyclopædia, combined with the scientific spirit which originated with Galileo, was to be the foundation of the new literature.

Hence it is not surprising to find the Gallomania of the period bringing with it as an antidote the Anglomania that was then so prevalent in France. It took various forms. In literature it awakened interest in contemporary writers like Pope and Gray, Young and 'Ossian'

Macpherson. The Verris were confirmed Anglomaniacs. When Alessandro, telling his brother Pietro of his visit to London, complained that a Thames waterman had nearly run his boat down and, instead of apologising, had merely remarked that there was little harm in drowning a French dog, Pietro replied that, as the English are markedly superior to the rest of the continent of Europe, they are right to treat foreigners as slaves. In later years Alessandro amused himself by translating Shakespeare. Pietro's Anglomania showed itself chiefly in his championship of the claims of trade against those of agriculture. His denunciation of the method of farming the taxes in Lombardy so impressed Kaunitz in Vienna and Firmian, the liberal plenipotentiary in Milan, that he was made a member of the committee for the reform of the taxes, and thus saw a number of his suggestions put into practice. Peace and the reforms introduced into the administration at this time laid the foundation of the prosperity of modern Lombardy.

From that province came Giuseppe Parini,

'the first poet of the new literature who is a man,' as De Sanctis calls him, 'that is, who has within himself a spirit (*contenuto*) living and passionate, religious, political and moral. His upright character is free from all ostentation and all exaggeration. . . . The man and the artist are one. His idea is not a thesis to be proved, or an aspiration to be attained only after a struggle. It impresses us as something that is known to us all and makes its way quietly and harmoniously.'

'He was a man,' writes Leopardi, 'of singular blamelessness, charity towards the unfortunate and love for his country, loyalty to his friends, highmindedness and constancy in the face of the bodily afflictions and the buffets of fortune which distressed the whole of his unhappy and humble life until death rescued him from obscurity.'

This calm, self-contained *abate*, who had been a tutor in the house of a great Milanese family and had lost his post because he had taken the part of a young girl unjustly bullied by her mistress, set himself, in his best-known poem, 'Il Giorno,' to describe the life of a young man of fashion of the day. Parini's purpose was moral. He wished to awaken the upper classes in Lombardy

to a sense of their duties. Hence the appearance of the first part, 'Il Mattino,' was warmly welcomed by the Austrian government. Irony is the weapon he employs. He shows us the 'giovin signore' rising in the morning, taking his cup of coffee or chocolate, conversing with his dancing-master, his French teacher or his barber, and then setting out to attend on 'l'altrui fida consorte a lui si cara.' And he contrasts with the futile existence of his hero the healthy, hard-working life of the country which he himself, a man of the people, had learnt to love in his youth.

The whole structure of society was at this time based on the *cavaliere servente* or *cicisbeo*. Ugo Foscolo describes him as made up of negatives. He is neither friend nor lover nor valet, yet he partakes of the character of all three. 'It is commonly believed in Italy that husbands know not how to make love,' wrote Carlo Gozzi. 'And he wrote the truth,' comments M. Monnier, who has caught the very spirit of the city of pleasure in his 'Venice in the Eighteenth Century.'

'No husband understands those little courtesies and delicate attentions that a woman's happiness continually demands. And if he understands them, he would still be hindered from performing them, first, because he exists for his own sake; and secondly, because it is supremely ludicrous, woefully *bourgeois*, and the quintessence of vulgarity to be perpetually dangling at one's wife's petticoats. Accordingly the *cicisbeo* takes his place. . . . He supports her with his arm in walking, assists her with his hand in mounting or alighting, carries her gloves, her sunshade, her *scaldino*, and her poodle. . . . In return he receives most notable prerogatives. He visits her when she is abed or newly arisen, at her toilet, in her morning-gown. He receives all her confidences and knows all her secrets. . . . The husband would not be such a sovereign fool as to be jealous. . . . The *cicisbeo* is entitled to those little privileges which are as half-surrenders, and which are without doubt perhaps sweeter and more lasting than a complete surrender.'

Such is his scorn for the decay of virility and the increase of over-refined sensuality implied by such an institution that Parini even throws off for a moment the habitual restraint of his manner.

Though an ardent reformer, Parini was no revolutionary. His hatred of oppression made all violence

abhorrent to him. When some one raised the cry, 'Viva la Repubblica! Death to tyrants!' at the theatre, he got up and shouted, 'Viva la Repubblica! Death to no one!' And he was removed from his place on the Municipal Council of Milan for his opposition to the extremists. He despised the sciolism which the Encyclopædia had made fashionable in polite society. The ladies dabbled in Newton, as we have seen; and the 'giovin signor' toys with a beautifully-bound volume of Rousseau or of Voltaire, 'the Proteus of many minds, the master of those who make pretence to knowledge,' that has been smuggled past the censor at enormous cost. He will uphold their views on sexual morality at dinner for the delectation of his lady, passing over in discreet silence a doctrine so subversive as that of universal equality.

Prof. Bellezza complains that the 'Giorno' is little read. Parini is remembered by his odes and by a few purple patches in his longer poem, such as the description of the descent of Pleasure upon earth. Many of the abuses which he attacks are widely prevalent to-day. Prof. Bellezza adduces ample evidence to prove that the pampering of lapdogs in England and America is carried to lengths undreamt-of by the mistress of Parini's *cuccia*. But the 'Giorno' is a satire aimed at a particular order of society, and it therefore ceases to be of vital interest with the disappearance of the object of its attack. Parini realised this. He refused to finish his poem, declaring that to publish a satire upon a state of society already undergoing dissolution was as cowardly as to insult the dead. The 'Vespro' and the 'Notte' appeared only after the poet's death. The 'giovin signor' has long ceased to be a danger to any one. To us he has become an object of antiquarian interest; and we readily turn to the 'Giorno' for the light it throws upon the social life of the age. The very illustrations with which this well-printed edition is so lavishly provided only serve to emphasise our changed outlook. These delightful pictures of 'Settecento' life clash hopelessly with Parini's vaticinations. They would be more in keeping with the playful and sympathetic irony of the 'Rape of the Lock'; for they bring home to us irresistibly the delicate charm of the period.

Though Parini's 'Messaggio' bears rather surprising

witness to his susceptibility to the graciousness of the high-born ladies of Milan, we must turn once more to Venice if we would see the influence of woman at its highest. Here the mask, worn for at least half the year, gave her a freedom such as she enjoyed nowhere else in Europe. The *zentildonna* is as much her own mistress as the courtesan of an earlier age. Moreover, she possesses a vivacity and a restless activity that amply compensate for her lack of education or of classic regularity of feature, in addition to 'great sweetness of disposition without that insipidity which is sometimes met with it,' as Arthur Young assures us. Hence the *casini* where the famous *salonières* entertain their friends are visited as religiously as St Mark's or the Ridotto by the sightseer of distinction.

Caterina Dolfin Tron, 'that true daughter of Venice and of her century,' as Prof. Molmenti calls her, was the most popular among them. Even the caustic Carlo Gozzi has nothing but good to say of her; and it was to her generosity that his brother, Gaspare—her father, as she called him—owed his freedom from want during his old age. She could be no less generous to her own sex. When there was some hesitation about introducing a lady of more than doubtful reputation to Venetian society, she readily undertook the task. 'Here is the Principessa Gonzago,' said she in a crowded assembly. 'She belongs to a distinguished family; for that I can answer. As for the rest, I will answer neither for her, nor for you, nor for myself.' These Italian hostesses are no brilliant correspondents like Madame Du Deffand or Mademoiselle Lespinasse or even like Mrs Piozzi. Yet Caterina Tron welcomed the new ideas in her salon, when such subjects were the fashion. And the Sere-nissima in its wisdom made them an excuse for closing her *casino* as a possible source of danger.

Very different is that other popular hostess, Cecilia Zen Tron, with whom she is often confused.

'Brava la Trona,
La vende el palco
Più cara della persona,'

sang the gondoliers, when they heard the price at which she had sold her box for a gala performance. 'You

are right,' answered she. 'Perchè questa, al caso, la dono.'

The tradition of the salon lingered at Venice after the Revolution. Giustina Renier Michiel abandoned her wig and patches, but her *casino* remained a favourite meeting-place for the men of letters till well into the new century. So did that of the gentle, beautiful, and witty Isabella Teotocchi Albrizzi, whose smile has something of the sweetness of Emma Hamilton's. Her visiting-card, with the engraving of a *bragozzo* in full sail across the lagoon, is among the prettiest that remain of a period when such a card might be designed by a Rosalba.

If Parini symbolises the overthrow of the old order, Alfieri stands for the beginning of the new. He came from Piedmont, with its 'dynasty of saints and warriors,' where the austere virtues and strength of character that foreshadowed her future destiny were comparatively unimpaired.

'Venne quel grande, come il grande augello
Ond'ebbe nome; e a l'umile paese
Sopra volando, fulvo, irrequieto,
—Italia, Italia—
Egli gridava a' dissueti orecchi,
Ai pigri cuori, a gli animi giacenti:
—Italia, Italia—rispondeano l'urne
d'Arquà e Ravenna.'

He is not of the 'settecento' as we know it. We are back in a work-a-day world, learning to fit itself for action under Napoleon's stern discipline, a world too closely in touch with our own for us to be able to take it otherwise than seriously.

LACY COLLISON-MORLEY.

Art. 4.—VENEREAL DISEASE DURING THE WAR.

IN a general survey of the Medicine and Surgery of the war, much ground is traversed in which nothing but the highest praise is deserved. Taken as a whole, sanitation, medical care and surgical treatment have all, in response to the goad of international strife, attained to a pitch of wonderful proficiency. But in the midst of all this there is one barren and arid area, and that is the poison-tract of Venereal Disease. Our purpose here is to deal with this neither small nor unimportant aspect of the medical situation during the war. It is to inquire into the importance and prevalence of venereal disease; to examine the means taken to combat it; to consider whether these means have been adequate or not; and to try to draw some conclusions which may not only be helpful in future wars, but may be applicable to ordinary peace-time civil life.

It has come to be recognised even by the most amateur of strategists that, given approximate equality in other things, victory lies most nearly within the reach of that belligerent who possesses the greater reserve of healthy manhood. This may be accepted as an axiom, and, if ever proof were needed, the result of the great war has proved it conclusively. The work of the Medical Services of armies is primarily directed towards this end. The function of the army doctor is to maintain the numbers in the field by preventing or curing disease. When sickness and wounds occur, it is his aim to get those affected well again so that they can once more take their places in the ranks.

Health is the most essential component of that most powerful factor without which victory is impossible—morale. An unhealthy army will inevitably lose its morale; and for such an army defeat is imminent. Morale is required not only by the man in the trenches but also by the man in the street. The confidence in one's ability and efficiency is of vital importance in ordinary civil life. The morale of the nation is the sum of these convictions in the individuals composing it; and a high morale is in direct proportion to the health standard. Eminence—commercially, intellectually, and morally—falls to that nation which numbers the greatest proportion of healthy

people among its inhabitants. An attack of indigestion may equally cause a tactical opportunity to be missed in the field or a fortune to be lost on the Stock Exchange. In battle certain precautions are taken to minimise the occurrence of wounds and death, although these are inevitable in warfare. They are the means used to attain the end in view, namely, the reduction of one's opponent to such a state that he is incapable of further resistance. Victory is secured by that belligerent who can inflict sufficient wounds, death, and suffering upon his enemy. The destruction of the opponent's morale is the prelude to his defeat.

In the army, just as in civil life, disease is bound to occur to a greater or less extent. But, while wounds are inevitable, disease is in some degree accidental. It can with proper care and organisation be minimised so as to be almost negligible. It is the prevention of this unnecessary wastage of man-power by disease that has such a direct bearing upon the maintenance of morale. Specially far-seeing and thorough measures have to be taken to prevent disease during warfare, for the conditions under which the troops live are particularly prone to cause ill-health. Any disease occurring in an army is important; and its importance varies directly with its incidence. If it is a preventible malady and at the same time a common one, and if sufferers from it are rendered non-effective for a considerable time, then, as a factor predisposing to loss of morale and to defeat, it is very powerful. Any such disease afflicting an army must be tackled vigorously. Special efforts must be directed against it; and the Medical Service must be enthusiastic and energetic in its work. Furthermore, strong support—moral, legislative, and financial—must be forthcoming from the Government.

Some time must elapse before full figures are available concerning the prevalence of venereal disease in the army during the whole of the war. In the mean time, however, an indication of the state of affairs may be gleaned from the following statistics, which refer to British troops in France alone during one year—1917 :—

| | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|
| Number of cases of gonorrhœa . . . | 71,000 |
| Number of cases of syphilis . . . | 21,000 |
| Number of cases of soft chancre . . . | 6,000 |
| | <hr/> 98,000 |

The importance and seriousness of this total scarcely requires comment. It must be borne in mind that all these diseases are entirely preventible. In face of such a total for one year it would be vain to claim that the measures taken to combat the venereal menace were remarkably successful. It were equally vain to surmise what would have been the total had no measures been adopted.

The question now arises as to how such a figure can be accounted for. Granted the existence of a certain amount of venereal disease in the community, what are the conditions which give rise to its increase? A full consideration of these would involve the use of more space than is at one's disposal; but, in a word, they are those things which, acting together or separately, cause a proportion of the population greater than normal to expose themselves to infection. The arsenal from which fresh stores of the disease are drawn already exists in the civil community. Any increase of the normal amount of promiscuous sexual connexion—that is, if more individuals indulge in it—will be followed by a corresponding increase in the amount of venereal disease. Those things, therefore, which conspire to produce an increased desire among an increased number of people for sexual gratification—and, from the exigencies of communal life, this is usually non-marital—are the chief predisposing causes of venereal disease. Any increase in the facilities for obtaining such gratification will also predispose. There is no mystery as to why venereal disease increases during war. It is a series of well-defined and recognisable causes which combine to produce this effect.

The things which act as stimuli to illicit and promiscuous intercourse are many and can only be stated briefly. It is a fact that the accompaniment of any communal excitement or emotionalism lowers the threshold of sexual morality. The national excitement at the commencement of a great war and during its course has the undoubted effect of relaxing the moral standards which have been erected during more peaceful days. It is a phase of this excitement which results in men flocking to join the colours. The soldier starts off on his military life in a frame of mind very different from his

normal one during the humdrum days of peace. He is affected to a certain extent by the national war hysteria; and his moral equilibrium, which is a product of peaceful environment, is somewhat out of gear and is more susceptible to disturbing influences. The separation from home life and the loss of the conventions and refinements of civilisation; the change of scene to a foreign country; the hard work, the discomforts, the danger, all conspire in no small measure to direct his thoughts, when on leave or in billets outside the battle area, to 'having a good time.' The orchestra is played *fortissimo*; the loud pedal is pressed down hard; and the theme of the symphony is too often Alcohol and Venery. This is a perfectly natural and comprehensible sequence of events. It is the usual and normal response elicited upon the application of certain stimuli. In war-time the stimuli are stronger than normal, and the conditions are such that the response is more easily evoked.

To the soldier a series of such stimuli are applied; and he is an individual whose powers of resistance are weakened and the barriers of whose normal temperance of conduct have been lowered. The worship of the warrior—the hero—by the female is not confined to any one species. It is just as strong in the human as in the lower grades of animal life. The desire of the soldier to shine in the eyes of the opposite sex is by no means uncommon. The surroundings are often such that female companionship is only available in the form of the prostitute, regular or clandestine. Moreover, that particular element of femininity has, in order to secure custom, to tout for trade. This necessarily takes the form of the application of sexual stimuli to the male. A vicious circle is established.

In brief, then, during war there are increased incentives to sensuality and likewise increased opportunities to indulge in it. These incentives are always present in peace-time civil life; in war-time they are more powerful, and they act upon the soldier with especial force. The soldier is thus, from the very nature of his conditions of life, apt to place himself in the environment most likely to result in venereal infection. These considerations account in some measure for the prevalence of venereal disease among troops; they show why troops

are specially liable to become infected. They are predisposing causes.

The view put forward here is that the principal cause of the high figures quoted above is that the anti-venereal measures taken were inadequate, and that this inadequacy is the result of the non-appreciation of the problem. It is consequent upon the failure to grasp the fact that powerful mental processes and emotions are the mainsprings of venereal propagation. The mental and psychological factor enters into the question of venereal disease to a greater extent than, and in a different fashion from, what is generally realised. The emotional element dominates it. The majority of other diseases are of the nature of accidents; no mental state is responsible for the infection of a man with measles. Other diseases are merely physical disorders; and nothing but physical conditions predispose to their acquirement. Venereal disease is different. True, it is in itself a physical disorder, but certain psychological conditions predispose to it, principally an intemperate desire for sexual intercourse. This is an essential point which is seldom grasped. Thus it is that methods which are successful in combating the propagation and spread of other maladies entirely fail when applied to venereal disease. In the latter case we have the powerful driving force of the most intense and deeply rooted human emotion, acting in circumstances forcing the individual into the zone of infection. Only to a very slight extent can this emotion be controlled or inhibited; but the too frequent consequences of giving way to it are not inevitable. They are accidental and can assuredly be prevented.

To a certain extent it has been realised that there are two aspects to the problem—one sanitary, the other moral. Two schools, narrow-minded and fanatical, have arisen; and a vast amount of unnecessary antagonism has been created. It is only by a proper co-ordination of the two that progress can be ensured. The measures adopted during the war were partly those advocated by one school and partly those advocated by the other. The great fault has been that the advocates of each have placed implicit reliance upon their own particular panacea, and have derided or regarded as

unnecessary the measures suggested by the other. The cleric was obsessed by the great moral predisposing causes, and, in his efforts to counteract their influence, was averse in some degree from giving any support to the dissemination of knowledge, especially along the lines of prophylaxis. His slogan was 'Perfect morality will banish venereal disease.' The adherent of the purely sanitary school was inclined to regard his clerical colleague as being an incompetent muddler, and seldom sought his advice and support.

The measures adopted during the war for dealing with venereal disease were various. In the first place, an attempt was made to spread knowledge regarding sexual matters and disease. This was done by means of lectures and pamphlets. The whole proceeding, however, was characterised by lack of enthusiasm and driving power. The National Council for the Combating of Venereal Disease did its utmost; and what it did was extremely valuable. The great majority of other propagandists—regimental medical officers and chaplains—failed to realise the seriousness of the matter, and they neither appreciated the power of the weapons lying ready to their hands nor understood the manner of their employment. The authorities were equally in the dark regarding the gravity of the situation. The tremendous loss of man-power that ensued was apparently unforeseen. Anti-venereal measures were looked upon as merely a 'side-show' of the Medical Service. Treatment of the disease, when it did occur, was regarded as being of much more moment. The delivery of mails to the troops was no doubt of great importance, but not so great as the keeping of them free from venereal disease. Had half the organisation, support, and money expended on the Army Postal Service been given to an Anti-Venereal Service, it would have been a very profitable national investment.

While admitting to the very fullest degree that the raising of the standard of morality is the ideal solution and one which must be striven for strenuously and continuously, yet it must in common-sense be pointed out that the millennium of complete morality is a long way off. After nearly two thousand years of the inculcation of Christian ethics, we find the venereal

problem still facing us and presenting a more formidable front than ever before. To have relied upon moral suasion alone, and to have expected any great result in four years, during which time all the incentives to sexual indulgence were strongly reinforced, would have been unreasonable. The loss of home life and the lack of rest, recreation, and entertainment were partly compensated by the invaluable Y.M.C.A. Huts, Church Army Huts, and Soldiers' Clubs. A patchy effort was made to teach the men that sexual incontinence was unnecessary, and that self-restraint was desirable, attainable, and by no means the sign of the milksop. Such enlightenment was, and still is, ardently desired by the men. It is their right to know that, by acquiring venereal disease, they run the great risk of passing on the infection to their present or future wives and children. This part of the work, however, was but casually done; it was, indeed, left to voluntary effort. It was never believed that anti-venereal lectures were just as important as physical exercise parades, and should be equally compulsory. To a certain extent prophylaxis has been introduced, but it was carried out in a half-hearted manner. The proper foundation of knowledge and training has not yet been laid upon which to erect a proper prophylactic scheme. At present the whole structure is jerry-built.

The authorities guaranteed treatment to the venereal patient; it was impossible to do less. It was to the interest of the country that the infected man should as soon as possible again take up his place in the firing line. The measures taken by the military authorities embraced the following: (1) punishment for concealing the disease; (2) stopping a certain amount of pay from men admitted to hospital with venereal disease; (3) stopping leave and promotion for venereal patients; (4) putting brothels out of bounds. In some armies such houses were licensed and the inmates medically inspected.

It will be seen that the first three measures are punitive. The value of punishment for the concealment of venereal disease is infinitesimal. The incentives to the concealment of venereal disease are ignorance and the fear of punishment for having acquired the disease. The power to dispel ignorance lies in the hands of the authorities. Were there no punishment, there would be

no more concealment than there is at present. The men, when they are infected, naturally want to be cured; and, since treatment is free in the army, they, in the vast majority of cases, report sick at once without any thought of concealment or the punishment it entails. In any case, whenever a man with venereal disease does report, he is penalised by stoppages of pay, leave, and promotion. The fear of punishment in a few cases has the effect that a man in whom gonorrhœa develops takes the risk of trying to cure himself and thus avoiding all the above-mentioned penalties. The result usually is that he does himself some serious harm, either by his own hands or by those of some quack, or he becomes the possessor of a chronic gleet and is thus a continual source of danger to others. Experience has proved the utter futility of such punitive measures.

At the present time there is no justification for the infliction of punishment upon a man who has venereal disease. If the army authorities had decided that a man must not indulge in illicit sexual intercourse, then punishment would be justifiable for any breach of that regulation, irrespective of whether he acquired venereal disease or not. But the army authorities have not so decided. At present the man is punished for having the disease, even if he acquired it from his own wife when on leave—which is not an unheard-of occurrence. If a village near a camp is put out of bounds on account of an epidemic of scarlet fever among its inhabitants, no one could justify the punishment of every man in camp who got the fever. There would, however, be justification for punishing any man found in the village, whether he developed the disease or not. He would be punished for having broken orders by entering a forbidden area. Regarding venereal disease, the attitude of the authorities is: 'Thou shalt not have syphilis or gonorrhœa.' This is as absurd as saying: 'Thou shalt not have measles or scarlet fever.' It would be rational to say: 'Thou shalt not put thyself in the way of acquiring venereal infection,' and to punish all who did so; just as it would be rational and proper to say: 'Thou shalt not enter the village X. on account of an epidemic of scarlet fever,' and to punish any man who disobeyed this order. But this is not even attempted, unless the

putting of brothels out of bounds has this end in view.

Experience has demonstrated that the putting of brothels out of bounds is futile, for it in no way limits the incidence of the disease. There is little indeed to be said for the brothel, but in most brothels there is some attempt at cleanliness and prophylaxis. With the clandestine and amateur prostitute there is none. Besides diverting trade towards the irregular prostitute, the closing of these houses of ill-fame is simply offering a salve to the consciences of the powers that be, showing that something has been done. It is very doubtful if any good whatever is accomplished. There is neither sense nor value in instituting any repressive measures half-heartedly. The only thing to do in that way is to deport the whole female population from the area occupied by the troops. That would undoubtedly get rid of the occasional prostitute and the accommodating young woman, who are the most frequent sources of infection. The only way in which to deal with prostitution of any kind is to institute penalties so severe and to apply them with such ruthlessness to both sexes that illicit sexual intercourse will not be worth while.

The licensing of brothels and the medical examination of the inmates possess not the slightest value. This has been fully proved wherever it has been tried. In spite of medical examination, it is quite impossible to guarantee that any public woman is free from infection. Regulation gives a false sense of security, and makes the authorities directly responsible for any infection that may result. It implies that the licensing body can give an assurance to all clients that venereal disease will not ensue from connexion with any of these women. This assurance is impossible. There is, moreover, a tendency for the average man to seek a more private object for his temporary amour and to neglect the sexual banquet provided by the State. For these reasons alone, the licensed and regulated brothel stands condemned as being not only useless and expensive but also dangerous.

If the preventive measures already taken had been carried out thoroughly and completely, then the results would be extremely disheartening; but, when it is realised that the work has not been done efficiently,

then, from such results as appear, one is justified in being optimistic as to the effect that will be produced under proper organisation and by scientifically directed efforts. It is clear that the means hitherto taken to combat the venereal menace have resulted in utter and complete failure. What then remains to be done? No amount of pious hopes will cure this national canker; no trifling with the enemy and sitting down to trench warfare is of any avail. What is needed and what alone will bring success is an energetic offensive. The combative spirit must be cultivated, and a well-thought-out, well-balanced and scientific attack launched.

In the army all existing penalties should be abolished. It should be an order, with which all officers and men are familiar, that any person subject to military law who has sexual intercourse outside the married state must report to his medical officer or to a military hospital and apply for prophylactic treatment within twelve hours after exposure to infection. Each medical officer dispensing such treatment would keep a confidential 'prophylaxis register,' in which he would enter the man's name, number, unit, and date, also the nature of the treatment administered. The man would then receive a card bearing his serial number in the register. On this card would be eight ruled spaces for the medical officer's initials and the date. Instructions would be printed on the card directing the man to report to the medical officer for seven consecutive days, inclusive of the first day on which he applied for treatment, and then once again twenty-eight days after first reporting. The medical officer would, after each visit of the patient, place his initials and the date in the special space provided. In this way the incubation periods of syphilis, gonorrhoea, and soft chancre would be covered and the first sign of disease detected.

Experience has shown that prophylactic treatment properly carried out within twelve hours of exposure will prevent the appearance of any venereal disease. Any man, then, in the army who developed such a disorder would be charged with disobedience of an order, namely, 'after exposure to infection failing to report himself for preventive treatment.' If he stated that he did apply for treatment, the production of his

card bearing the medical officer's signature would constitute a complete defence. The presence of disease would show one of two things: (1) that the medical officer had been careless in the administration of prophylaxis; or (2) that the man had exposed himself again to infection during the observation period. The stage and appearance of the disease would make the differential diagnosis easy, and action would be taken accordingly. If the soldier was unable to produce his card, and if on inquiry it was found that his name did not appear on the prophylaxis register, he would be held to be guilty and would be heavily sentenced after his discharge from hospital. This, with a scheme of compulsory notification, could be made to apply to civil life.

A scheme of prophylaxis was adopted by me in Persia and in Baku. There was nothing official about it, but an anti-venereal campaign was started among the troops in the area, and this was enthusiastically carried out by battalion medical officers. The following results representing the observations of three months were obtained:

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Number applying for prophylaxis | 894 |
| Number of above who developed symptoms . . . | nil |
| Number of venereal cases admitted | 78 |
| Number of these who had prophylactic treatment . | 2 |

The history of these last two men was that they had not adopted any preventive measure till three days afterwards, and then they administered it themselves. The above figures are of considerable value and deserve close attention. The adoption of prophylactic measures before the act is not to be commended; it gives a false sense of safety. There is a tendency to apply it in a slipshod manner; and very often the conditions, from excitement, want of opportunity, or drunkenness are such that it is impossible.

We may now set forth six remedial measures, suggested by war-time experience and applicable to civil life:

- (1) A real effort must be made to counteract all that tends towards sexual temptation. The two greatest enemies are prostitution and drunkenness; these must be stamped out with ruthless vigour. It is only making bricks without straw

to attempt to diminish the incidence of venereal disease without doing this.

- (2) Proper surroundings must be secured. Slums, discomfort, and overcrowding drive both men and women into drink and into sexual temptation. The provision of open decent refreshment places where the working man may get his beer and where he can take his wife and family for a meal at a reasonable cost, of attractive amusements, and of adequate housing, is one of the first duties of the State towards the People.
- (3) Education in sexual and venereal matters is essential. There must be more open-mindedness and outspokenness on the part of the man in the pulpit; there must be more enthusiasm and more propaganda work on that of the man in the consulting-room. The help of the school-master must be enlisted. Not less important is the education of the medical profession in sex hygiene and in the Public Health aspects of venereal disease and prostitution.
- (4) Compulsory notification is absolutely essential, and so likewise is compulsory treatment. These can both be secret, and can be brought about without public opposition, provided first of all that the public are made acquainted with the facts. When the public know the truth, both will be demanded. The insistence upon prophylaxis cannot be too strong; and, when these things are on the statute book, penalties of the severest description should be awarded for their breach. The institution of such measures is one of the most urgent needs of the nation at the present time.
- (5) The proper place and means for free treatment must be provided. This must include the provision of free prophylaxis at hospitals. In all public lavatories the means of prophylaxis should be obtainable from automatic machines for one penny. The plan of making the Lock hospitals and the venereal wards of general hospitals, bleak, cheerless, dismal places must cease. Too often the venereal ward is tucked

away in the basement as something loathsome; and the wretched inmate is made to feel that he is not fit for the society of his fellows. This must all be changed, and considerably more humanity and kindness infused into the treatment and housing of the venereal patient.

- (6) There should be a special department in the long overdue Ministry of Health. It should be staffed by expert people, men and women who have not merely had experience in treatment and research but also have given thought and attention to the matter from the wider and more national point of view. The most fatal mistakes in the past have been narrowness and feebleness. The future must be characterised by breadth of view and bold measures.

Civilisation, since it has been saved from Teutonic barbarism, must tolerate no longer in its midst the weakening ulcer of venereal infection. The most powerful nation of the future will be that which suffers least from venereal disease, for that is undoubtedly the greatest factor in producing national weakness and decay.

E. T. BURKE.

Art. 5.—THE SERMONS OF A POET.

Donne's Sermons. Selected Passages, with an Essay, by Logan Pearsall Smith. Clarendon Press, 1919.

MANY reasons have been given for the revival of interest in Donne which has been very marked for the last twenty years or more, and still continues. But it is best explained, perhaps, by a cause which I have not seen mentioned. [Donne attracts those who are interested in literature to-day, and especially the young among them, for the simple reason that he is the most self-willed individualist of all our older poets.] We live in a generation in which all the catchwords and much of the actual spirit are social. We profess the corporate life in affairs of the Church, and socialism or collectivism in those of the State. Possibly, or probably, the [inevitable reaction] is now impending, and even in these spheres the next generation may go back to some kind of individualism.

However that may be, it already stands plain to every eye that in art and letters the dominant note of all that is youngest, loudest, and most active, whether in France or England, is now individualism, and individualism which is often carried to the stage of lawlessness and even anarchy. It would take us too far to attempt the very difficult task of discussing what has brought this about. It is not the war, for it was in progress before the war began. It may be part of the intellectual and ultra-individualistic reaction against nationalism, on the one hand, and against democracy, the Parliamentary system, and political socialism, on the other, which is exhibited in the contemptuous writings of Nietzsche and embodied in the contemptuous despotism of Lenin. Or it may be the last great wave of the tide of revolt against the classical—that is, the social and general—literature of the 17th and 18th centuries. The Romantics, speaking broadly, reasserted the claims of the particular and the concrete against the exclusiveness of the general and the abstract; they insisted that the imagination had its rights which must not be trampled upon by the intellect. But they still accepted ideals of beauty, goodness, and truth as real existences and the true goal of their

art. And this attitude remained conspicuous throughout the Victorian period. Now the extremists among our young individualists revolt against all that. Everything is to be made personal. There is no beauty but what each man likes; no law or tradition in art, but each man is to find his own way, and whatever he calls a verse or a picture is to be one. So there is no goodness or truth. A man is to follow his own will, passions, and fancies; whatever he says is to be true, at least for him, and whatever he does is to be right.

It would seem at first sight to be a long journey from anything of this kind to Walton's holy Dean of St Paul's. And so in one way it is. The Dean's ideal of life was as unlike as possible to that professed by many young writers and artists to-day. No doubt it is probable that not even the extremest of our extreme young men seriously believe in the creed of intellectual and moral anarchy; it is more talk than faith or practice, and would not perhaps even be talk if it were not found so handy a weapon in the great game of annoying and alarming the respectable.

However that may be, Donne was assuredly no anarchist. Indeed no man of real intellectual power can be. For without a belief in law ascertained or ascertainable the mind cannot work at all. It is true that Donne uses very free language about moral questions in his early poems. Not only does he declare that 'happy were our sires in ancient time Who held plurality of loves no crime'; proclaim the supremacy of the 'golden laws of nature' against 'opinion, which he makes the author of existing morality; and praise the few who, 'strong in themselves and free, Retain the seeds of ancient liberty'; but he can even make this prose lawlessness a stepping-stone to the poetry of freedom, as when he escapes from a justification of licentious loves to that splendid flight of spirit: 'change is the nursery Of music, joy, life and eternity.' But no man can have known better than he that all true freedom is within law and not outside it. The rest can only have been intellectual casuistry, in which there was no more ingenious master—a casuistry at first employed in the service of his immorality, as it was later to be employed on behalf of the faith and morals of the Church of

Christ. For the man who talked moral anarchy in his love-poems had already given his mind, though not yet his heart, to the ardent study of theology and jurisprudence, each of which is nothing else but a search for law, human or divine.

Donne, then, was no anarchist, however much he may be acclaimed by those who either are or wish to be thought anarchists. But, short of that, he was several things which naturally and even rightly attract a generation going through the inevitable reaction from Victorian moderation, morality, and patriotism. Mr Gosse, in his delightful 'Life,' says that Donne was 'before all things sincere'; that he was not an average man and did not attempt to be; that he 'lived' more than any Elizabethan poet; that he was 'in a totally new and unprecedented sense a realist'; that there was something exotic in him, something that was 'out of sympathy with insular habits of feeling'; that he showed no interest in Greek or Latin legend, to which his generation (and the Victorian age) was so devoted; and that, as Johnson said, he was determined to dazzle and excite his contemporaries by something perfectly new. Are not these just so many passports to the enthusiastic admiration of our youthful Bohemian anti-Victorians, and indeed to that of many who are neither anti-Victorian nor Bohemian nor young? We may love the classics and have no inclination to be disloyal to the great Victorians, and yet feel that the poet of Mr Gosse's description was neither echo nor coward but emphatically a man. We cannot but perceive in him one who was neither afraid to be altogether himself nor to embrace all knowledge, of whatever kind, which the world had to show him. And for our young revolutionaries the very defects of this temperament are so many added attractions. The individualism which scorns the traditional models, which even defies the intellectual world into which it is born, and is no more influenced by Spenser or Shakespeare than by Homer or Horace, is exactly to their mind. There may even be some affinity between Donne's devotion to Spanish writers, who seem to have influenced him far more than Greeks, Latins, Italians, or Englishmen, and the worship which our young artists lavish on that curious Greek painter who became

a Spaniard and retains of Greece nothing but his name, El Greco.

El Greco in fact exhibits many of the qualities that form the great modern attraction of Donne. Critics speak of his 'passionate conscious individualism'; of his 'determined effort to be original at any sacrifice'; of his genius as 'a restless refusal of limitations'; of his style as 'full of extravagance, surprises, and strange contradictions.' All these phrases might be literally applied to Donne, and they exactly explain the fascination which he so often exercises to-day. Donne accepted no limitations. He used verse, as some one has said, to invade the province of prose; there is nothing, not even the ugly and disgusting, which his verse will not say, no manner, not even the rudest, which it will not adopt to attain its almost impossible ends. Verse itself, and still more poetry, were reluctant to have anything to do either with the crude grossness, or with the prosaic literalness, or with the unbodied dialectic, one or other of which was what, at different times, Donne brought for their shaping. But over that reluctance his strong brain and violent will rode roughshod, compelling them to do his bidding. Or perhaps that was only what he thought they did. It is not easy to force poetry to obey alien laws; and those who try to do so usually pay the penalty. Donne's penalty is that, while he ranks among the greatest geniuses who have written English poetry, he does not quite rank among the greatest English poets.

It is a disputed question whether poetry or prose has the wider range. Probably prose has, because, though poetry can ascend to imaginative heights on which prose cannot breathe, still prose is at home in much of the world of imagination as well as in the worlds of mere experience or abstract intellect. Donne, therefore, with his all-including intellectual covetousness, finds fewer pitfalls in the path of his prose. Here that colloquial ease to which his poetry owes some moments of pure felicity, finds its natural home. Here his eloquence and subtlety, the immense range and fiery energy of his mind, were less likely to defeat their own purpose. They were helped by a special circumstance. Donne's chief prose work is to be found in his sermons. We do not

know how closely the sermons, as we read them, correspond to what the preacher said in the pulpit. But in any case we can see what an advantage the limitations of the pulpit were to a man like Donne. As it is, he manages to be very free in it, sometimes to his own destruction. But its restraints would obviously prevent his colloquial realism from going too far; and the presence of a congregation, whose attention had to be held, would, even in those days, warn the virtuoso of curious and subtle intellectual fugues that the patience of an audience has limits.

The limits were evidently then very wide, as the full text of the sermons shows. So long as Donne's prose remained buried there, it could hardly hope for resurrection. But it has found a deliverer. Mr Pearsall Smith has given us a most interesting volume of selections from the sermons. Such a book cannot, of course, for students, supersede the complete text. But for the ordinary reader of English prose, and, we may add, for the ordinary user of books of devotion, Donne's sermons will in future mean Mr Pearsall Smith's selection.

The book opens with an admirable introduction of some forty pages. To discuss this would be, in the main, to reproduce it. It is better to refer readers to the original, in which they will find a brief sketch of Donne's life, preceded by an illuminating critical account of the writer and the man. It is full of good things, which the reader hopes he will remember or at least assimilate. Mr Pearsall Smith considers that Donne's mastery of the means of expression was even greater in prose than in poetry. He had at his command in this field, what he had not in the other, 'all the music and splendour of the great contemporary speech.' And when to this is added his subtlety of self-analysis, his 'awareness of the workings of his own mind'; and to this, that acute sense of sin and especially of the sins of the flesh which belongs naturally to a preacher who had been 'the most sensual of all the great English poets'; and to this again, as I think Mr Smith would agree, an imagination of Time, Death, and Judgment as stupendous as that of Bossuet, and far more like a personal experience; we can guess before we begin the sermons what great things they must be. And so they are.

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But, when Mr Smith tells us that 'the subject matter of the sermon is nothing less than the whole of life' he runs a risk of arousing expectations which cannot be fulfilled. Time, Death, and Judgment are tremendous things, and the issue between sin and goodness is the greatest of all issues. But these things, even all together, are not the whole of life. It is indeed one of the greatest difficulties of the preacher that he finds himself traditionally bound to pretend that they are. Hence he often produces a sense of unreality in the mind of the hearer, who knows that a large part of life involves no moral issues at all, that to attempt to force them upon it commonly leads to morbid scrupulosity which is a disease of the mind, and that goodness itself is not the only absolute sign of a full faith. For a full faith includes two others, truth and beauty, which are independent of it and of each other, and provide experiences in the presence of which the preacher's assumption, that the issue between sin and saintliness covers the whole of life, becomes meaningless and even a little absurd.

Not even Donne, then, can give us the whole of life in his sermons. But the part which he gives is invested with such greatness in his handling, that few indeed are the men who ever attain to an experience of the whole which gives them more. If the whole of life is not here, the whole of death is—more than the whole, if that could be; and, if there are things of earth which are out of range of the light shining from the pulpit, at least it here reveals in splendour all that we can imagine of heaven, and sets in a darkness which can be felt all that we can fear of hell. And these heights and depths are kept strangely human all the while. It is a man's voice that gives them utterance—a particular man, an individual, John Donne; and he is at home as he utters them. Never, I suppose, in English prose was such ease married to such greatness. His frankness is amazing, and must have played a large part in giving him that hold on his hearers to which so many contemporaries bear witness. He is not afraid to confess that he, the preacher, is liable to be interrupted in his prayers by many bad spirits and among them by 'the spirit of fornication.' And so, speaking as and for himself, and also as the voice of every man who heard him, he breaks

out into that wonderful prayer for forgiveness which recalls one of his best poems, and is itself a perfect example of the oceanic prose of that age, wave following wave, each mingling with each, not altogether like, and not altogether unlike, each other, a mobile and liquid succession of endless variety in continuity.

'Forgive me *O Lord*, *O Lord* forgive me my sinnes, the sinnes of my youth, and my present sinnes, the sinne that my Parents cast upon me, Originall sinne, and the sinnes that I cast upon my children, in an ill example; Actuell sinnes, sinnes which are manifest to all the world, and sinnes which I have so laboured to hide from the world, as that now they are hid from mine own conscience, and mine own memory; Forgive me my crying sins, and my whispering sins, sins of uncharitable hate, and sinnes of unchaste love, sinnes against *Thee* and *Thee*, against thy Power *O Almighty Father*, against thy Wisedome, *O glorious Sonne*, against thy Goodnesse, *O blessed Spirit of God*; and sinnes against *Him* and *Him*, against Superiours and Equals, and Inferiours; and sinnes against *Me* and *Me*, against mine own soul, and against my body, which I have loved better than my soul; Forgive me *O Lord*, *O Lord* in the merits of thy *Christ* and my *Jesus*, thine Anointed, and my Saviour; Forgive me my sinnes, all my sinnes, and I will put *Christ* to no more cost, nor thee to more trouble, for any reprobation or malediction that lay upon me, otherwise then as a sinner.'

Was there ever a printed sermon in which one heard the preacher's voice more plainly than we hear it in such a passage as this? It is the very genius of oratory, all the freedom of the speech of a voluble speaker, going on and on, as each new aspect of the subject comes into his head; and yet subtly and imperceptibly, perhaps unconsciously to the preacher himself, the freedom is controlled and form imposed upon the material, and the result is art, a masterpiece of English prose. And the art in no way hides the sincerity and directness. The words are so many arrows shot by Donne at his hearers and going straight to their hearts. At this day, when Donne has been dead nearly three hundred years, few indeed are the sermons, old or new, read or heard, which awe us, as Donne's still do, with that kind of awe proper to the pulpit, the sense that we are sinners who stand, or rather who cannot stand, in the presence of

God. With Donne's voice sounding in our ears we cannot escape and we dare not sleep.

'It is thy pleasure O God, and thy pleasure shall be infallibly accomplished, that every wicked person should be his owne Executioner. He is *Spontaneus Demon*, as S. *Chrysostome* speaks, an In-mate, an in-nate Devill; a bosome devill, a selfe-Devill; That as he could be a tempter to himselfe, though there were no Devill, so he could be an Executioner to himselfe, though there were no Satan, and a Hell to himselfe, though there were no other Torment. Sometimes he staies not the Assises, but prevents the hand of Justice; he destroies himselfe before his time. But when he staies, he is evermore condemned at the Assises. Let him sleepe out as much of the morning as securely as he can; embellish, and adorne himselfe as gloriously as he can; dine as largely and as delicately as he can; weare out as much of the afternoone, in conversation, in Comedies, in pleasure, as he can; sup with as much distension, and inducement of drousesse as he can, that he may scape all remorse, by falling asleepe quickly, and fall asleepe with as much discourse, and musicke, and advantage as he can, he hath a conscience that will survive, and overwatch all the company; he hath a sorrow that shall joyne issue with him when he is alone, and both God, and the devill, who doe not meet willingly, shall meet in his case, and be in league, and be on the sorrowes side, against him. The anger of God, and the malice of the devill, shall concurre with his sorrow, to his farther vexation. No one wicked person, by any diversion or cunning, shall avoid this sorrow, for it is in the midst, and in the end of all his forced contentments; *Even in laughing, the heart is sorrowful, and the end of that mirth is heaviness.*

Or hear this in which we get the lightning without the thunder:

'We are all conceived in close Prison; in our Mothers wombes, we are close Prisoners all; when we are borne, we are borne but to the liberty of the house; Prisoners still, though within larger walls; and then all our life is but a going out to the place of Execution, to death. Now was there ever any man seen to sleep in the Cart, between New-gate, and Tyborne? between the Prison, and the place of Execution, does any man sleep? And we sleep all the way; from the womb to the grave we are never thoroughly awake; but passe on with such dreames, and imaginations as these, I may live as well, as another, and why should I dye, rather then another? but

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awake, and tell me, sayes this Text *Quis homo?* who is that other that thou talkest of? *What man is he that liveth, and shall not see death?*'

This last extract illustrates another interest of these sermons. Donne is a master of Death and Judgment, but after all he could not live in them altogether. There is in his sermons less than one would expect of the contemporary life which he had lived so fully. But there are some curious glimpses of it which are interesting to-day. This last extract gives us the frequent executions of these times, the procession from Newgate to Tyburn which was one of the sights of London till near the end of the 18th century. And another passage, which I will quote presently, opens with a curious simile which is a striking exhibition of the part played by the gallows in the life of all Europe three hundred years ago. Elsewhere we get a picture of the horrible habits of burying in those days, particularly in times of plague, and in St Paul's. Other details of Donne's time are that it was only in his predecessor's day that the Corporation of London were invited to sit in the choir of St Paul's as they still do; that men often kept their hats on in the church, a practice of which he complains more than once; that humane men in those days looked upon the discovery of gunpowder as a beneficial invention, 'by which (says Donne, unable to look forward 300 years) wars come to quicker ends than heretofore and the great expense of blood is avoided'; that the scandal of clergymen obtaining preferments by promising pensions out of their incomes to those by whose means they were obtained, was then so notorious that Donne openly rebukes it from the pulpit; that Donne had seen Henri IV interrupt the audience of an ambassador to kneel and pray at the call of a church bell; that preaching was then so much the greatest of the clergyman's duties that Donne seems to make few mentions of the others; that he who was no Low Church Puritan habitually speaks of himself, even in the days of Laud, not as Priest but as Minister or Preacher; that he has no hesitation whatever in quoting and praising Luther; that there was then frequent applause in church during sermons; and, last and best, that there was 'cheerful street music in the winter mornings' in the cities of those days, to

which Donne compares the joy administered by 'the servants of God' in the holy Sacrament, comparing himself, the preacher, to the 'sad and doleful bellman that waked you before and, though but by his noise, prepared you for their music.'

But such interest as things of this kind give is of course only incidental. The essential interest is that of the sermons themselves as sermons. I have spoken of their wonderful persistence or continuity and compared it to the never-ceasing pursuit of wave by wave in the sea. But it may perhaps be even more fitly compared to the windings of a great river which again and again seems to be losing itself or turning back towards its source, as Donne's thoughts constantly return upon and correct their predecessors; and yet, as the river in spite of his windings is all the while making sure way to the sea, so Donne, when he is really himself, never forgets the goal to which he is conducting us and never fails to set us safely there before he ends.

All this may be seen, not merely in the complete text of the sermons, but even in Mr Pearsall Smith's selected passages, especially in the longer extracts such as that entitled 'Reason and Faith.' They illustrate the extraordinary fullness of Donne's mind, quotation following upon quotation, fancy upon fancy, argument upon argument, and often, one must confess, conceit upon conceit. He sometimes makes his modern readers regret his power of visual and physical imagination, for his favourite subject for its exercise is that of the body after death.

But the greatest of the gifts which give him his high place among the masters of English prose is his sheer eloquence. There are few more splendid flights in any language than that famous outburst on Eternity which is an oasis in an otherwise dull and pedantic sermon.

'A state but of one Day, because no Night shall over-take, or determine it, but such a Day, as is not of a thousand yeares, which is the longest measure in the Scriptures, but of a thousand millions of millions of generations: *Qui nec præceditur hesterno, nec excluditur crastino*, A day that hath no *pridie*, nor *postridie*, yesterday doth not usher it in, nor to-morrow shall not drive it out. *Methusalem*, with all his hundreds of yeares, was but a MUSHROME of a nights growth, to this day, And all the foure Monarchies, with all their

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thousands of yeares, And all the powerfull Kings, and all the beautifull Queenes of this world, were but as a bed of flowers, some gathered at six, some at seaven, some at eight, All in one Morning, in respect of this Day. In all the two thousand yeares of Nature, before the Law given by *Moses*, And the two thousand yeares of Law, before the Gospel given by Christ, And the two thousand of Grace, which are running now, (of which last houre we have heard three quarters strike, more then fifteen hundred of this last two thousand spent) In all this six thousand, and in all those, which God may be pleased to adde, *In domo patris*, In this House of his Fathers, there was never heard quarter clock to strike, never seen minute glasse to turne.'

And the great passage in the sermon on the death of James I, strange as the language used about him sounds to modern ears, does not come very far behind this in beauty.

But it must not be supposed that Donne, who, like Bossuet, is greatest when he has death for his subject, treats death always and only as the destined doom of all men, the inevitable end of our business and our pleasures, the gate of judgment, the King of Terrors. If those who listen to him are most commonly filled with trembling and awe, his voice also knows the way of consolation. He is a Christian preacher, and does not forget that, awful as death must always be, to a Christian it has a forward look as well as a backward. The Collect for Easter Eve prays that 'through the grave and gate of death we may pass to our joyful resurrection'; and thousands of sermons have been preached on that thought and with those familiar words in the preacher's mind. Is there one which contains a passage more beautiful than that which is here entitled 'The Gate of Death,' and which begins with that sad and curious picture, to which I have already alluded, of the place of execution as the first thing man saw in those days as he drew close to a town? There are greater things in the book. But there is nothing which in a small space shows more of the characteristics of Donne: the beauty of his thought and also its curiousness; his mingling of the life of his day with the life of eternity; his vivid directness and actuality; the Latin sentences which he scatters about his English with such surprising felicity;

the ease and abundance of it all, which yet never affects its clarity; the note of sincerity and truth, of an individual and personal voice, which neither his art nor his learning ever long conceal. It shall be my last quotation, and I shall do best to end with it, without adding any more words of my own.

‘As he that travails weary and late towards a great City, is glad when he comes to a place of execution, because he knows that is neer the town; so when thou comest to the gate of death, glad of that, for it is but one step from that to thy *Jerusalem*. Christ hath brought us in some nearness to Salvation, as he is *vere Salvator mundi*, in that we know, that this is indeed the Christ, the Saviour of the world: and he hath brought it neerer than that, as he is *Salvator corporis sui*, in that we know, That Christ is the head of the Church, and the Saviour of that body: And neerer than that, as he is *Salvator tuus sanctus*, In that we know, *He is the Lord our God, the holy One of Israel, our Saviour*: But neerest of all, in the *Ecce Salvator tuus venit*, Behold thy Salvation commeth. It is not only promised in the Prophets, nor only writ in the Gospel, nor only seal’d in the Sacraments, nor only prepared in the visitations of the holy Ghost, but, *Ecce*, behold it, now, when thou canst behold nothing else. The sun is setting to thee, and that for ever; thy houses and furnitures, thy gardens and orchards, thy titles and offices, thy wife and children are departing from thee, and that for ever; a cloud of faintnesse is come over thine eyes, and a cloud of sorrow over all theirs; when his hand that loves thee best hangs tremblingly over thee to close thine eyes, *Ecce Salvator tuus venit*, behold then a new light, thy Saviours hand shall open thine eyes, and in his light thou shalt see light; and thus shalt see, that though in the eyes of men thou lye upon that bed, as a Statue on a Tomb, yet in the eyes of God, thou standest as a *Colossus*, one foot in one, another in another land; one foot in the grave, but the other in heaven; one hand in the womb of the earth, and the other in *Abrahams* bosome; and then *vere prope*, Salvation is truly neer thee, and neerer than when thou believedst, which is our last word.’

JOHN BAILEY.

Art. 6.—THE LEVANT COMPANY AND ITS RIVALS.

1. *State Papers: 'Turkey' and 'Levant Company' MSS.* Public Record Office.
 2. *Historical Manuscripts Commission: Ninth Report, Part II* (1884); *Thirteenth Report, Part II* (1893).
 3. *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire.* By Sir Paul Ricaut. 6th Ed., 1686.
 4. *The State of the Turkey Commerce considered from its Origin to the Present Time.* By Sir James Porter (in *Observations on the Religion, Law, Government and Manners of the Turks.* 2nd Ed., 1771).
 5. *Une Ambassade française en Orient sous Louis XV: La Mission du Marquis de Villeneuve* (1728-1741). By Albert Vandal. Paris, 1887.
 6. *Les Voyages du Marquis de Nointel* (1670-1680). By Albert Vandal. Paris, 1900.
 7. *Voyage en Syrie et en Egypte pendant les années 1783, 1784 et 1785.* By C. F. Volney. Paris, 1787.
- And other works.

THE formation of a new company for the extension of British trade in the Near East is an event welcome to those who have been lamenting the decline of our commerce with that part of the world; but it also possesses a wider interest for the student of England's history. The new 'Levant Company' represents an attempt to revive, in a modern form, one of our oldest mercantile enterprises—to link up, as it were, the 20th century with the days of Queen Elizabeth, when the original association of that name first saw the light. The birth of that association and its earlier history were related in a recent number of this Review.* Here it is proposed to sketch briefly its fortunes through the ensuing two hundred years.

The whole of the 17th century was for English commerce generally a period of steady progress; and in this development the 'Merchants of England trading into the Levant Seas' bore a leading part. Year after year their ships went forth, laden with the cloths of Worcester and

* 'The English in the Levant.' By Horatio F. Brown. 'The Quarterly Review,' October 1918.

Gloucester, kerseys of Hampshire and York, tin of Cornwall, lead—to mention only the principal articles—and returned home bringing in exchange the silks of Persia and Syria, the mohairs of Angora, the cottons and cotton yarn of Smyrna, besides many other commodities of less value. In the time of James I the trade with Turkey was described as one of the most profitable to the nation, and it grew still more important during the earlier part of Charles I's reign. It received a check from the Civil Wars, which distracted Englishmen at home and threw into confusion their 'factories' abroad, but it recovered under the Commonwealth, attaining the height of its prosperity in the years that followed the Restoration.

From the statements of contemporary writers, and even more authoritatively from the Company's own books, preserved at the Public Record Office, it is easy to trace the stages of this growth. But the best criterion is supplied by the figures of exports—especially of woollen goods, the staple commodity of England. According to an official account, in the six years 1666-1671 the total of cloths exported to the Levant amounted to 82,032 pieces; in the next six years (1672-1677) it rose to 120,451; and in a petition to Parliament dated March 27, 1678, the Merchants boasted that they had advanced the consumption of broad-cloth in Turkey from 14,000 or 15,000 to 24,000 or 25,000 pieces a year. After that date exportation fell below the annual average of 20,000 pieces; but it must be noted that now the cloths were one-fourth more in length than formerly and one-third more in value. Translated into terms of money, all the exports to Turkey in the middle of Charles II's reign represented over half a million pounds a year—a very considerable sum at a time when the whole of England's export trade was estimated at little more than two millions.

The gains accruing to the persons engaged in this trade are less easy to compute. It is said that the ordinary returns of the Levant Company at the beginning of the 17th century were three to one on the investments; but, if such a golden age ever existed, it did not last long. Towards the end of the century a Turkey Merchant was content with a profit of between 12 and 20 per cent. on his capital. However that may be, it is beyond doubt that Englishmen trading with

Turkey in those days, if their own faults did not prevent them, were almost certain to grow rich. The name of Turkey Merchant was the most highly honoured in the City of London; and the opulence of the principals was amply shared by their factors in the Levant. Of these there were some twenty-five or thirty resident in each of the chief Levantine centres, Constantinople, Smyrna, Aleppo, where they made themselves conspicuous by their luxury in dress and diet, by their boundless hospitality, and by their intemperance. Hunting, hawking, and coursing took up much of their leisure, and the rest was too often wasted in drink, gambling, and debauchery. Most of them were youths of good family, and they carried to Turkey the habits of life to which they were used at home; only they found in Turkey larger opportunities for self-indulgence.

Such was the sunny side of life in the Levant. But it had another side. Fires and earthquakes frequently destroyed the houses and warehouses of our merchants; and the Plague visited them at short intervals, carrying off thousands of Turks, Greeks, Jews, and Armenians, and bringing commerce to a standstill. When the hideous scourge made its appearance, the English, like other Frank residents, either fled into the open country or shut themselves up in their town-houses, and for three or four months lived in strict isolation from the outside world. Ships also kept at a safe distance from the infected cities; neither were the crews allowed to go ashore nor landsmen to come on board, and cargoes had to wait until the disease had run its course. Yet all these afflictions were hardly so terrible as the tyranny of the Turk. In theory the Franks who dwelt in the Sultan's dominions were safeguarded against oppression by their Capitulations; but in practice they were almost as much exposed to the insolence, cruelty, and rapacity of his officials as the native *rayahs*. The Capitulations were regarded merely as concessions which the Grand Signor had made out of his kindness and might revoke at his pleasure. In vain, therefore, did the victims appeal to those Privileges, unless they had secured the favour of the tribunal beforehand by *bakshish*.

It would not be difficult to fill a volume with the extortions and the outrages to which our factories, under

one pretext or another, were constantly subjected. Again and again we read of merchants thrown into dungeons, of ambassadors affronted, of consuls assaulted, of dragoons drubbed or even hanged. The tale of horrors reached its climax in the Grand Vizirate of Kara Mustafa (1676-1683). As greed rather than malice was the main-spring of this ferocious pasha's iniquity, the English, who were the wealthiest foreigners in his power, attracted his special attention. Some of them were loaded with chains and threatened with torture till they paid the sums demanded from them; the widow and children of a rich merchant who died at Smyrna were stripped of their inheritance; the ambassador, Sir John Finch, was refused audience until he paid 6000 dollars; the Capitulations were taken away from him and restored only on payment of 18,000 dollars; a claim was raised for the restoration by him of an immense fortune of which a Genoese pirate had despoiled the Governor of Tunis while travelling in an English ship. While this last case dragged on, Sir John barely escaped imprisonment. His successor, Lord Chandos, managed at first to have that claim dropped, and the money paid for the Capitulations refunded; but soon afterwards Kara Mustafa atoned for his momentary weakness by squeezing out of the ambassador 55,000 dollars on another claim connected with customs-duties. Lord Chandos was forced to yield by the fear of the Seven Towers and of utter ruin for all the English settlements in the Levant.

It must be confessed that our countrymen's indiscretion or misconduct sometimes supplied the Turks with an excuse for their depredations. It should also be noted that oppression was not equally severe at all times; it had its ups and downs like an intermittent fever, the intensity of the evil varying with the character of the men in office. Normally, the English bore with patience wrongs and insults which they had not the means of resenting. It was only when terrorism was pushed to extremes that they thought of breaking off relations with Turkey. But, though the suggestion was made more than once, it was never acted upon, except with regard to Egypt, whence our traders and consuls were driven, in the time of the Commonwealth, by the intolerable brutality of the local authorities.

The circumstances in Egypt were peculiar. Distance from the seat of authority and the frequent changes of governors (to which the Porte had recourse for fear of revolt) exposed English traders to exceptional harshness; nor was that all. Besides the direct commerce from England, we had some eight or ten ships engaged in carrying foreign goods from Italy to Egypt and *vice versâ*. By these voyages the English not only reaped the profit of carriage but also made 20 or 25 per cent. by lending money on the security of the cargoes. The Pashas of Egypt, however, often forced these ships to carry the Grand Signor's rice, sugar, and coffee to Constantinople at ruinous freights. Unable to resist pressure, the ship-masters sometimes compensated themselves by running away with the Grand Signor's goods. Apart from such incidents, which cost the Levant Company dear, imports had to pay a duty of 25 per cent. at Alexandria and 10 per cent. more before they reached Cairo; so that it was cheaper to furnish the Egyptian market by land from Aleppo. For all these reasons, our merchants were not unwilling to relinquish Egypt; but they clung to the rest of the Ottoman Empire tenaciously. The truth is that the Levant trade, despite all the hardships which attended it, was too lucrative to be abandoned.

This success was due, first, to the excellence of our manufactures, particularly of our woollen goods; secondly, to the capacity of our well-armed ships and the efficiency of our skilful and courageous seamen; thirdly, to organisation. The shrewd business men who constituted the Levant Company left nothing to chance. Everything was legislated for. To prevent a glut in the Turkish market and consequent depreciation of their commodities, they carefully regulated the quantity and the season of the annual shippings. As the Company was not a joint-stock company, but a society of merchants each trading on his own account, ruinous competition among its members was avoided by fixing the prices at which English goods were to be sold and Turkish goods bought. In order to obviate bad debts and lawsuits in a country where justice was so capricious, selling on credit was forbidden. The ambassador and consuls, who received their appointments from the Company,

were instructed to see that these and all other rules laid down from time to time were duly observed, and to impose specific penalties for their infraction. On the other hand, lest ambassadors and consuls should abuse their powers, they were obliged, in all matters of moment, particularly money matters, to act in consultation with the elected representatives of the 'Nation,' and on emergency with the whole 'Nation.' These assemblies carried on in the East the parliamentary traditions dear to Englishmen at home, and, though they often reproduced, in miniature, the struggle between the monarchical and the democratical principles of government which agitated England at that period, on the whole served the purpose for which they were devised.

It may be doubted, however, if our own internal strength would have been enough to secure us such success, had it not been aided by the weakness of foreign competition. Holland, the most formidable of England's commercial rivals in the 17th century, made a very poor figure in the Near East. Until 1612 the Dutch traded with the Sultan's dominions under the French or the English flag; and even after that date, though they had at times a representative of their own at Constantinople, at Aleppo they lived under the English Consul's protection; and at Smyrna, their consul being an insignificant Greek, they often had recourse to the English Consul for advice and assistance. From 1660, it is true, the Dutch factories began to assume greater prominence, but the two wars of 1664-6 and 1672-4 impeded their progress to the advantage of ours. As to France, down to 1660 her shipping and her industries were still in their infancy. We supplied the French, not only with our own cloths and kerseys, but also, in part, with the silks and cottons of Turkey; and, having few or no wares to send in exchange, they bought the rest of their imports in the Levant for cash. French enterprise was further handicapped by lack of organisation, by numerous abuses, and by violent friction between the Governments of Paris and Constantinople. So unpopular had France become, after the death of Henry IV, that her ambassadors were treated worse than those of any Christian Power not actually at war with the Sultan. Her merchants were made to pay a customs-duty of

5 per cent., while the English and the Dutch paid only 3 per cent.; and this regular imposition was indefinitely aggravated by arbitrary exactions.

A new era for French industry and trade dawned in 1661, when the great Finance Minister Colbert came on the scene with his mercantile programme. By protective tariffs, by subsidies and gratuities, by purchasing or obtaining by stealth foreign manufacturing secrets, by the imitation of foreign goods and methods, that Minister made France a commercial Power. Not the least object of his solicitude was his country's trade with Turkey. In 1666 he founded a French Levant Company on the model of ours. How closely he copied us may be seen from one feature of his creation. In England, business, far from being considered incompatible with birth, formed, together with the Church and the Law, one of the usual careers for younger sons; and the Levant Company was largely recruited from the higher ranks of society. Colbert caused, in 1669, an edict to be issued by which overseas trade was declared not derogatory to nobility, and obliged even princes of the blood to interest themselves in it. The merchants of Marseilles, following the Minister's lead, procured patterns of our cloth, set the manufacturers to imitate it, and even adopted the names by which its various kinds were known in Turkey. At the same time, the representatives of France abroad were ordered to give every assistance to French commerce; and in 1673 Louis XIV's ambassador, the Marquis de Nointel, obtained from the Grand Vizir, Ahmed Kuprili, the reduction of customs-duties to 3 per cent. But the advent of Kara Mustafa led to fresh troubles between Paris and Constantinople, and while diplomatic relations continued strained commercial enterprise could not prosper; so that the French were still unable to compete seriously with us.

Thus, from the accession of James I to the abdication of James II, English commerce in the Near East went on flourishing without interruption. The turning-point came with the Revolution. In 1689 William III, as King of England, headed the European coalition against France which he had contrived as Prince of Orange. The losses caused to English trade, chiefly through the mismanagement of our naval affairs, by the eight years'

war that ensued were enormous in every direction, but they fell with peculiar severity on the Levant Company. In 1691 all communication between England and Turkey was completely severed by the French fleet. In 1692 the defeat of France at La Hogue deprived her of the command of the sea; and the Levant Company earnestly pressed the English Government to seize the opportunity for convoying its goods to Turkey, while the enemy was still demoralised. Anxious to make up for its enforced idleness during the past year, the Company had no fewer than ten big ships laden with merchandise to the value of over a million sterling—double the usual amount—ready to sail for Aleppo, Smyrna, and Constantinople. At last, after endless delays, the English fleet set out, on May 30, 1693, escorting the Company's ten ships, together with some four hundred other merchantmen of different nationalities. A week later, when about fifty leagues off Land's End, the main body of the fleet, seeing no sign of the enemy, turned back, leaving the floating magazines under the protection of only eighteen Anglo-Dutch men-of-war. Meanwhile Louis's squadrons, having had ample time to recover from the effects of their drubbing, had left Brest and Toulon, and, eighty sail strong, lay at the mouth of the Mediterranean in wait for their prey. The ambush had been arranged with consummate skill and met with brilliant success. Our ships were surprised in the Bay of Lagos; thirty-six fell into the hands of the enemy, fifty perished under his fire, and four of the Levant Company's best vessels which had run under the Rock, on realising the hopelessness of escape, were sunk by their own crews off Gibraltar.

Undismayed by this misfortune, the Turkey Merchants went to work to rescue from the sea the remnants of their magnificent estate; and a fresh expedition, convoyed by Admiral Wheeler, set sail in January 1694. This expedition was overtaken in the Bay of Gibraltar by a great storm. Several of the Levant Company's ships, laden with cloth, tin, lead, and specie, were cast away; a considerable part of the cargoes was irretrievably lost; and of what was ultimately saved out of the wrecks much was so damaged as hardly to repay the expense of salvage. The direct loss inflicted upon the Turkey Merchants by these two calamities amounted, on a

moderate calculation, to 600,000*l*. The indirect consequences of four years' interruption of trade were not less serious. In order to defray the charges of the Embassy and Consulates in Turkey (over 10,000*l*. a year), the Company was forced to raise loans at an interest of from 12 to 18 per cent. Its credit was exhausted; the prestige of England was ruined; and, worst of all, while we were idle, our French rivals were busy. The looms of Languedoc, of Dauphiné, and of Provence, established under the auspices of Colbert thirty years before, produced woollen cloth as good as that of England, and their products now found the door into Turkey open. For French prestige at the Porte had risen in proportion as English prestige had sunk; the more so because Turkey, which had been at war with the Emperor since 1683, had, since 1689, found in France an ally while England was an ally of her enemy. Assisted by these propitious conditions, the French captured the market from which we were cut off.

During the next three years things improved somewhat, and the Peace of Ryswick (1697) came as a great boon to our merchants. By that treaty Louis abandoned the Sultan, who, unable to carry on the struggle single-handed, accepted William's good offices, and in January 1699 concluded the Peace of Carlowitz through the mediation of our ambassador Lord Paget. English exports in Turkey rose again to an annual average of 20,000 cloths; and the Levant Company, profiting by the Sultan's favour, obtained guarantees of security which enabled it to reopen the trade with Egypt also. Everything pointed to a return to the good old days, when another European conflagration—the War of the Spanish Succession—broke out and raged for twelve years.

Turkey resisted the importunities of the French ambassador Ferriol to join in the fray; nevertheless, her sympathies, for political reasons, were on the side of France. The Sultan's favour, added to the geographical proximity of Marseilles, gave French merchants an advantage of which they were not slow to avail themselves; while the English, though exempt from such overwhelming disasters as had befallen them during the last war, had good cause to complain of the difficulties they experienced at sea and of the discouragements they

lay under on land. At sea so many of the Company's ships fell into the enemy's hands that in two years (1704 and 1705) the loss sustained was estimated at more than a quarter of a million sterling. Thanks to our men-of-war, these accidents ceased in 1706; but for their immunity afloat our merchants had to pay dearly ashore. The Porte, instigated, it was thought, by the representative of France, protested against the seizure of French vessels in Turkish waters and of Turkish goods in French bottoms, and, on failing to obtain redress, had recourse to reprisals. English ships were robbed in the Sultan's ports of their French prizes. The ambassador, Sir Robert Sutton, and the factors were forcibly turned out of the country places near Constantinople to which, ever since the time of Elizabeth, they had the privilege of repairing in the summer to breathe fresh air and to escape the Plague. Many of the factors were even expelled from their ordinary habitations at Galata and Angora. The Custom House officers at Constantinople, Smyrna, and Aleppo extorted from them large sums of money under the name of duties. All the English merchants of Aleppo were imprisoned amongst thieves and cut-throats in order to be made to pay collectively the debts of some individuals who had been ruined by the injustice of the Turks. The effect of this treatment naturally was to depress English trade and to foster French enterprise, which year after year gained the ground we lost. It was not, however, until 1728 that the relative disparity became such as to excite alarm.

In the interval the Levant trade had become a vested interest of vast economic importance to France. A large portion of French industry was devoted to the production of goods for the Turkish markets; a large portion of French shipping was employed in the carriage of those goods; and the population of the southern provinces of France depended very largely on that trade for its prosperity and even for its livelihood. It was, therefore, natural that the French Government should do everything in its power to develop that trade; and that its ambassador, the Marquis de Villeneuve, should go to Constantinople equipped with a highly Turcophile programme and a rich assortment of samples of French manufactures in the form of presents to the Grand

Signor and his Ministers. But the advertisement was not an empty *réclame*. The French cloth was now finer and cheaper than the English. Moreover, French merchants did not object to selling on credit; an elaborate system of investigation and insurance minimised the risks. Lastly, the French Government was able to exercise over its subjects in the Levant a paternal, not to say despotic, supervision—prescribing their number at each port, limiting the time of their residence, and regulating their way of life—to which no Englishman would submit. All this, assisted by M. de Villeneuve's diplomacy, made the decade of his embassy stand out as the epoch from which the English Levant Company dated its decline. The coping-stone was placed on French supremacy in 1739, when Villeneuve mediated between Turkey and her enemies the Peace of Belgrade, by which the Sultan gained from Austria more territory than he lost to Russia. As a reward for his valuable services, the ambassador received from the Porte an extension of the 3 per cent. customs-duty granted in 1673 for the principal French commodities to all goods alike, and exemption from the *masderiyé* (*mezeterie* in French, *misteria* in English)—a supplementary duty of 1 per cent. levied upon all goods sold by measure and $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. upon all goods sold by weight.

Henceforth the history of the Levant Company is a monotonous chronicle of progressive decay. From 1729 to 1738 the average annual import of English cloth to Constantinople was 574 bales; from 1739 to 1748, 236; from 1749 to 1758, 209; from 1759 to 1768, 87. The records of Smyrna and Aleppo for the period tell a similar tale. Estimated in money, the whole of our export trade with Turkey now amounted to less than 55,000*l.* a year—one-tenth of what it was in the preceding century; and the difference becomes still more striking when we reflect on the proportion of these figures to the total export trade of England in the two periods. The profits on this diminished output had dwindled from 12 or even 20 per cent. to 5 or 6 per cent. Where twenty-five or thirty English factors formerly thrived, now not above six, seven, or at most ten were to be found. In Egypt no English residents were left at all; and English enterprise was represented only by a tribe

of itinerant swindlers, who came now and then from Mahon, Leghorn, or the Greek islands, stayed long enough to spoil the Egyptians, then broke and disappeared. Everywhere the French had supplanted us; and even the Dutch, though to a much inferior degree, flourished upon our decay.

French energy, guided by intelligence, was the chief cause of our discomfiture. But other causes contributed to it. Our wars with Spain and France interfered in many ways with our trade in the Mediterranean; for instance, in 1739 not a single bale of English cloth reached Constantinople, and in 1744-48 the Levant Company had to pay the Turks upwards of 10,000*l.* for depredations by English privateers. A more permanent source of mischief was the policy of the East India Company, which, since the latter part of the 17th century, persisted in exporting woollen goods to Persia. Sometimes those goods, bought by Armenian and other native traders at Bassora, were even carried to Syria and there sold at a rate at which the Aleppo factors could not afford to sell theirs. Why the East India Company should engage in a trade which could only be carried on at a loss, it is not easy to explain. According to the most plausible hypothesis, its object was to beat the Dutch out of Persia, even at the cost of hurting the English in Turkey. But, whatever the motive may have been, the result was to divert the Persian and Syrian silk, for which cloth was mostly bartered, into other channels, and to deprive the Levant merchants of a commodity which they described as the life of their business. For this reason, in 1740 and 1750, the Levant Company opposed the Bills then before Parliament, empowering the Muscovy Company to import Persian silk from Russia. These Acts, like a later Act authorising the free importation of cotton into England, were significant of the demand, which was beginning to grow imperative, that there should be no obstruction to the supply of raw materials for manufactures. The tendency of the age from which this demand sprang found another expression even more directly prejudicial to the interests of the Levant Company.

Privileged societies had never been popular in England. From the time of Queen Elizabeth the cry was heard

that trade in general, and the trade of woollen goods in particular, should be free; and it was in compliance with this cry that, under James I, the Levant Company had enlarged itself by the admission of new adventurers. About the middle of the 18th century the ancient jealousy revived. In 1744 an eminent citizen and influential politician declared in Parliament that all companies were pernicious and should be abolished. His sentiments met with loud applause in and out of Parliament; and the Turkey Merchants were selected as the first victims. The Company managed to save its Charter, but was obliged to modify its by-laws. On the ground that annual shippings restricted navigation, Parliament resolved that every member of the Company should in future be free to ship goods to Turkey at whatever season he thought proper. Ten years later, in obedience to the same clamour against 'monopolies,' Parliament enacted that, instead of being confined to citizens of London and noblemen's younger sons, the Company should be thrown open to all British subjects on payment of 20l.; and, to use the words of a contemporary zealot, that all the members should be secured from 'the tyranny of oppressive by-laws, contrived by a monopolising cabal.'

That these enactments were well-intentioned need not be disputed; that they proved ineffectual and even harmful is shown by the event. But Parliament did not stop there. As the Levant Company had now become more diffuse, it was felt that it would be less easy for it to enforce the old regulations against the Plague. Hence, there being no proper quarantine system in England, a summary law was passed, forbidding all ships from infected ports to approach our shores. The upshot was that the English were often compelled to suspend their trade with Turkey, while the French, thanks to their excellent lazaretto at Marseilles, were able to carry on theirs with perfect security. A few attempts were made to combat French ascendancy at its root by improving the quality and reducing the price of English cloth, but without success. The wool passed to the English manufacturers through so many hands, and wages were so high, that, though the article might be almost as good as the French, it cost a great deal more.

In 1768 Parliament, to prevent a total collapse, made the Levant Company a grant of 5000*l*. But the relief, inadequate at best (the Company's debt at Constantinople alone amounted to over 10,000*l*.), was neutralised by the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War. During the six years that hostilities lasted, all the Frank residents went in constant dread of massacre at the hands of a mob infuriated by defeat and insurrection. The Turks believed that the whole of Christendom was in league against them, and their animosity was particularly directed towards the English; for, not to mention other proofs of England's Russophile attitude, Britons distinguished themselves in the service of the Russian fleet, which blockaded the Ottoman coasts and took a prominent part in the destruction of the Sultan's navy at Chesmé. The Porte, it is true, anxious not to add to its enemies, heaped civilities upon the English ambassador, John Murray, granting him everything he asked for the protection of English subjects. Indeed, at moments the Porte appeared inclined to accept England's mediation; and the ambassador hoped to obtain for English goods exemption from the *misteria* duty—a concession which would have put our trade on an equal footing with the French. But it is clear from Murray's delirious despatches that the Sultan's Ministers only played with him; and the French, whose neutrality was as benevolent towards Turkey as ours was towards Russia, continued to enjoy preferential treatment.

Just then Sir James Porter, a diplomatist with wide commercial experience, who, during his embassy at Constantinople (1747-62) had studied the problem on the spot, published his 'State of the Turkey Commerce considered from its Origin to the Present Time.' The main object of this eminently instructive work was to point out the circumstances to which the French owed their superiority, and to urge upon the English the adoption of the same protective methods. But no one listened. The current had set in too strongly against protection; and those on whom depended the preservation of the Turkey trade were no longer much interested in the support of it. For the decline of English enterprise in the Levant synchronised with rapid progress elsewhere. While the French elbowed us out of the Ottoman Empire,

we annexed their Indian and American colonies. Absorbed in the exploitation of those vast areas where we were masters, our capitalists and legislators paid little attention to a part of the world where France, through her geographical vicinity, diplomatic influence, and more efficient organisation, was too powerful a rival. Thus nothing was done to arrest the decadence of the Levant Company. In 1788 our exports to the whole of the Ottoman Empire were valued at only 47,838*l.*, while those of France to Syria alone amounted to a quarter of a million.

The disorganisation of France owing to the Revolution, and the assumption by England of the rôle of Turkey's protector, did not stimulate English commerce with the Near East to such an extent as might have been expected or as is commonly imagined. In 1792 our exports to Turkey were estimated at over 273,000*l.*; but of this sum only about 99,000*l.* represented British merchandise; the rest consisted of foreign goods carried out in British ships. In 1800 also we exported nearly 167,000*l.* worth of goods, but these included such an occasional item as 170 cannon. The truth seems to be that the Levant Company was too old a body to adapt itself to new conditions. It languished on till 1825, and then succumbed to nature's law.

Its end was dignified, as became an aristocratic corporation with a pedigree two and a half centuries old. In announcing to the Turkey Merchants the decision to take away their Charter, the British Government explained that the measure 'resulted solely from considerations of public expediency, and in no degree from any disrespect or disposition to impute any blame to their past administration.' Thereupon the Turkey Merchants met for the last time, and, after making a handsome provision for their disbanded servants, surrendered their privileges and quietly dissolved themselves.

G. F. ABBOTT.

Art. 7.—WOMEN AND THE CHURCH.

1. *The Ministry of Women.* A Report by a Committee appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, with appendices and illustrations. S.P.C.K., 1919.
2. *Report of the Joint Committee on the Ministry of Women to the Convocation of Canterbury,* 1919.
3. *The Ministry of Deaconesses.* By Deaconess Cecilia Robinson. New Edition. Methuen, 1914.
4. *Women and the Church.* By R. H. Streeter and E. Picton Turbervill. Fisher Unwin, 1917.
5. *Women and Church Work.* Edited by Cyril C. B. Bardsley. Longmans, 1917.
6. *Women and the Church of England.* By A. Maude Royden. Allen and Unwin, 1917.
7. *Women in the Administration of Missions.* By M. C. Gollock. International Review of Missions, No. 4. 1912.

MANY things have combined of late years to give prominence to the work done by women for the Church, and in consequence to call for new consideration of their position in it and of the functions that may be entrusted to them. They have been given work of many different kinds, and the need for their co-operation has been increasingly felt in past years, but they have had neither place nor authority in the Councils of the Church or the parish, and their position has been considered inferior to that of the most inexperienced curate. In consequence, the highly educated university woman has not seen in church-work thus organised a sufficient sphere for her energies, and has turned to other careers which offered more responsibility and independence.

The suffrage movement, with its emphasis on the right of women to claim opportunity for the full development and free use of all their powers in the service of the State, naturally called fresh attention to their subordinate position in the Church. When the new demands made upon them by the war revealed in them latent and unexpected capacities, the restlessness of women at being restrained in any direction increased. It was not that they desired to assert themselves or to make new claims in order to satisfy new ambitions. No doubt some were actuated by personal motives, but the

great majority saw the crying need for service which they could render; they saw regulations as regards the service of the State broken down; they were called to undertake work of which beforehand no one would have thought them capable, in order to help their country in its dire need. But the Church was as unyielding as ever, and yet the Church's need of their services was and remains great and urgent. It is not only that women long to serve the Church, but that a living Church cannot in these difficult days dispense with their services. As latent and unexpected capacities were discovered in them by which they could help the State, so, if only the Church will have the courage to make a fuller use of their services, new sources of spiritual power will be opened up. The State could not do without them during the war against its enemies; can the Church afford to refuse to employ their full service in its war against the evil forces in the world?

The National Mission made much use of them both on its councils and in its actual work. They were called upon to address meetings large and small on religious subjects, in crowded schoolrooms and parish halls; but in the beautiful parish churches which stood empty near by, and which would have provided the space and the devotional atmosphere so much to be desired, their voices were not allowed to be heard. It would have seemed possible to make experiments at least during the National Mission, and some Bishops were willing to do so, but it was known that certain sections of the Church would refuse to take any part in the Mission if women were allowed to speak in consecrated buildings. Therefore it was thought better to refuse permission; and in some cases permission, once given, was withdrawn. Some of these women knew, or at least their friends knew, that they could speak as well and had as living a message as the majority of the men missionaries. Many, both men and women, believed that their co-operation was indispensable to the work of the Mission. Every one knew how short-handed the clergy were, owing to the absence of so many with the army. Here was help both ready and efficient, which was only partially used.

The majority of women, of course, submitted without questioning. Others were driven to think out the whole

matter anew. Some felt deeply rebellious; and rebels are seldom wise and moderate. Rebellion and discontent led to new thought on the subject. There were some bold enough to ask why the priesthood should be closed to women. At first they asked for nothing more than that the subject should be discussed, and adequate reasons given, if there were such, why it was impossible for women to be priests. But only to ask the question roused an outcry at its iniquity. Even those who had taken a prominent part in claiming the suffrage for women refused to discuss the question at all, apparently because they considered that the matter had once for all been settled by the immemorial custom of the Church. Such an attitude will not satisfy the eager, thinking younger generation. They see everything in a condition of flux and change; they have been led to believe in a continuous revelation and in a development of the truth to meet the needs of the age. To be checked and baffled only increased the number and claims of the rebels. We cannot be certain, but probably very few would ask or wish that the priesthood should be opened to women at present. But there are many who would wish the question to be seriously discussed; and there is an increasing number of both men and women who would like to see more opportunity given to women to use their teaching and prophetic gifts.

The desire of women for an increasing share in the administrative work of the Church has been recognised by the position given to them in parochial and other councils under the Enabling Bill. Here they have been placed on an equality with the rest of the laity. The Archbishop of Canterbury showed his understanding of the situation and his sympathy with the desire for further light on the subject, by the appointment in 1917 of a committee to report on 'the sanctions and restrictions which govern the ministrations of women in the life of the Church.' This inquiry, however, was to be purely historical in character; and the committee was not asked to make any recommendations.

The committee has brought together all that is known about the past history of the Order of Deaconesses, but their work and position in the Early Church does not throw much light on the present situation. We learn

that there is no clear evidence as to their existence in the first centuries after the apostolic age, though it has been generally accepted that the Phœbe of the Epistle to the Romans was a deaconess and that she and other women shared in the work of 'serving tables.' Bishop Lightfoot has said that Phœbe 'is as much a deaconess as Stephen or Philip is a deacon.' But this does not really go far, since the exact functions of a deacon at that time are not known. Besides deaconesses there were in the Early Church 'widows and virgins' specially appointed to care for the sick and poor belonging to the congregation. In the Eastern Church there was a revival of the order of deaconesses in the third century, their special work being to assist at the baptism of women. In the sixth century they are heard of in the West, but they do not appear to have ever been as numerous there as in the East. It seems clear that they were specially ordained to their office, but neither in the East nor the West was their position identical with that of the deacon; only among the Nestorians were they allowed to assume the functions of deacons in assemblies of women where no deacon was present. During the Middle Ages they lapsed altogether, and the desire of those women who wished to lead a consecrated life found fuller satisfaction in the religious communities. The great abbesses were certainly more important and influential persons than any deaconess had ever been.

The teaching of St Paul with regard to women has been and still is by many considered decisive as regards their ministry. But even St Paul's position is not so clear as is generally assumed; and, in what he writes about women, he seems sometimes to contradict himself. He says, 'Let the women keep silence in the churches'; but in the same Epistle he gives directions that the women who pray or prophesy should cover their heads, thus recognising the fact that they do pray and prophesy without condemning it. It is indeed difficult to see how, writing at that time and to people living under such social conditions as those of the Corinthian Christians, he could have advocated greater liberty than he did. It is clear from his greetings in his Epistles that he valued the work of those women 'who laboured much in the Lord'; it is clear too that he had at least some women

friends. Those who claim that we must be guided through all the ages by his teaching on such a subject as the ministry of women should consider how far it would lead them. As Bishop Gore once said, he who bade women pray with veiled heads would hardly have been satisfied with the little hats of modern women.

On the whole, it must be confessed that a careful study of the report of the Archbishop's Committee would seem to show us that we shall not get clear guidance, or indeed much guidance at all, from history in our perplexities about the functions of women in the Church of the present day. We have to face the fact that the whole position of women has been changed. How deep that change goes has not been recognised yet, either by the world or by the Church, or indeed by women themselves. With regard to their position in the Church, some would easily settle the matter by referring to tradition, to the universal custom of the Church from the beginning. Those who think to dismiss it in this way should realise how much they endanger, by such statements, the possibility of any value at all being attached to tradition by the younger generation on whom is laid the necessity of constructing a new world on the ruins of the old. For them at least tradition is a word of ill omen, and carries little weight. Some other word is needed to persuade them to attend with any patience to the lessons that the past has to teach, and to recognise the weight that should be attached to its authority. To the eager young mind that sees the vision of a new world in which every gift and capacity will be needed and should have free exercise, tradition seems like the dead hand of the past stretched out to crush their hopes and paralyse their activities.

In this distracted world religious teachers are repeating again and again that Christ alone can save society, and that every human relationship must be made conformable to His teaching. The ardent, thinking woman wishes to take her part in bringing this great truth home to the world. What is she allowed to do to help the Church at this crisis? She is told that she may become a deaconess, and she naturally asks what in that capacity she will be allowed to do? The Order of Deaconesses was revived by Bishop Tait on his own

authority in 1862. By slow degrees other Bishops followed his example, and in 1891 the Convocation of Canterbury made certain rules as to the position and admission of deaconesses, but the Anglican Church as a whole has never defined their functions. Their position, indeed the possibility of their existence in a diocese, depends upon the will of the individual Bishop. Where a Bishop will not ordain, there can be no deaconess. Neither in the words of the form of service by which they are set apart, nor in the kind of work that they are allowed to do, is there anything which differentiates deaconesses from other church-workers. They take no sort of vow; and the regulations of 1891 state that 'a Deaconess may be released from her obligations by the Bishop if he think fit, upon cause shown,' which shows that she is not regarded by ecclesiastical authorities as holding a permanent office in the Church. This state of things is profoundly unsatisfactory to the majority of modern deaconesses. They regard their vocation as lifelong, and they wish to have a regular position in the Church, with functions which they can execute by virtue of their office.

It is probable that the regulation which states that a deaconess may be released from her obligations by the Bishop was made to meet the case of those who might desire to marry. It is assumed that a deaconess cannot marry, though she takes no vow of celibacy. It is indeed, as things are at present, this fact alone that in the eyes of the world differentiates her from other trained and authorised church-workers. Opinions as to the possibility or advisability of having married deaconesses are much divided. Probably the great majority of deaconesses value the liberty which is gained, both in regard to their own personal outlook on life and in regard to their intercourse with others, by the fact that they have put away the possibility of marriage. But the idea that, should they marry, they would cease to be deaconesses seems to indicate that their office is a terminable one and not a dedication for life; and it is as a lifelong dedication that they regard it. It does not appear to be impossible in itself that a deaconess should be married. Marriage might involve some restriction of her activities, for a time at least, but,

considering the work accomplished by many married women, there is no reason why a married deaconess should not be able to do much useful work for the Church. It is probable that the removal of the ban on marriage would do away with the objection often felt by parents to seeing their daughters enter a life which pledges them to celibacy, though it is unlikely that many deaconesses would in any case wish to marry.

The marriage question really gains its chief importance from its bearing upon the meaning attached to the ordination of deaconesses; and on this depends too the nature of the functions which by virtue of their office they are allowed to exercise, and which are not permitted to unordained women. These have never been stated; and it is probable that this indeterminate condition of the order has led to its growth being much slower than was hoped. It does not really afford sufficient scope, except in rare cases, to an able and highly educated woman. The modern girl, eager for wide opportunities of service, sees little more in a deaconess than rather an ordinary, uninteresting church-worker. The public, as a rule, only notices that she wears a distinctive dress, and assumes that she is some kind of nurse, not that she holds any special position in the Church. If the deaconess in the Anglican Church is to perform the work expected of her, her position should be recognised as one of dignity and importance; she must have her defined place in the orders of the Church and her peculiar functions, and her voice must carry due weight in its councils.

If we go on to consider other openings for women in the Church we find that those of a certain temperament in the various sisterhoods offer the kind of life which meets their aspirations. The religious life is a special vocation; it has its own place in the life of the Church; but it does not meet the needs of those who do not feel called to the secluded life, and wish to live in the world while they serve the Church. In this separation of the religious life from the secular life, there seems to them a savour of mediævalism and unreality. Such women do not wish to keep religion out of any department of life, or to feel that the religious life is a thing apart. To them, worldliness stands for the activities of this life with God left out. They wish for fullness of life, but God brought

in everywhere. They recognise that there are special kinds of work that can best be done by those who live in seclusion, but for them the secluded life has no call, and its emphasis on a special attitude of women as regards men is opposed to the ideal of free comradeship in work between men and women which is characteristic of the younger generation.

Other spheres of work were opened up to women at the time of the National Mission, by the institution of Pilgrimages of Prayer. Women, after some brief preparation, went in small bands, in a simple pilgrim's dress, through the country villages, making a stay of a couple of days in each village, visiting the women, praying with them and giving addresses. Their work has met with so much appreciation that it is likely to continue on a permanent basis. In many dioceses qualified women are being chosen as messengers, who shall be ready, on the demand of the Bishops and clergy, to help in missions, to teach, to give addresses, and to conduct meetings for prayer. Pilgrims and messengers alike give only a portion of their time to this work, and do not regard it as in any sense a profession.

The mission field has offered probably the most attractive opening for women who wish to give their whole life to the service of the Church. But here too they have felt themselves crippled by the way in which the work is organised, both at home and abroad. Too often the ultimate authority rests with councils on which they are not represented. The difficult problems which confront missionary work, and should be discussed by all workers of experience together, are discussed by men and women separately; and the final decision rests with the men. This practice is no doubt slowly changing, but in many departments and many spheres of work the change proceeds very slowly. Consequently, women are unable to make their full contribution to the solution of urgent and complicated problems; their thinking powers are not called out, and their faculties are atrophied for want of use. The times call for great women leaders and thinkers both in the mission field and on mission boards at home; but too often we seem hardly to have got beyond the days when the chief work of women for missions at home was considered to

be to collect money, and to organise prayer-meetings and working-parties. There remain of course all the usual activities of parochial life, in which women, next to the clergy, have long taken the most important part. But it has been work directly under the clergy, and dependent upon their approval and sanction. So long as the virtues of obedience and submission were considered as an end in themselves, no one questioned this state of things, either in the parish at home or in the mission abroad; but the modern woman asks why she should obey and whom, and to what purpose is her submission. She often feels more capable than the curate; it is possible that she has read and studied more even than the vicar or the head of the mission. If she is to work with the clergy, it must be on a basis of comradeship and co-operation.

The passing of the Enabling Bill has vitally changed the position of women in the councils of the Church. They have been recognised as forming part of the laity. On the parish councils they will be able to take their share in such part of the work of the parish as shall be entrusted to these councils. Here the danger may be that feminine influence will be too much felt, since the ordinary woman is much more interested in Church affairs and has more available leisure, as a rule, than the ordinary layman. It would be disastrous if the parish councils should seem to be run by women; and women as well as men must be on their guard against this possibility. The position given to women by the Enabling Bill will doubtless react on their whole position in the organisation of the various Church societies. Their practical gifts will be increasingly utilised; and it will be more universally recognised that they are fit to be entrusted with other work than the raising of money or the execution of Church embroidery.

But fuller opportunities to share in the administrative work of the Church cannot be expected to satisfy their desires. They can no longer accept in a submissive spirit what is stated to be the immemorial and consistent custom of the Catholic Church. The immense change in the social position of women since the days of the Early Church seems to call for a revision of the principles which then actuated the regulations that

governed the work of women. An inquiry such as that conducted by the Archbishop's Committee may have deep historical interest, but its conclusions as to past practice do not provide decisions valid for all times. Just as the monastic system grew up in accordance with existing needs, so the needs of the present time, and the changes in the position of women in the State, now call for further developments. It is of the essence of the teaching of Christ that it meets the needs of all times and of all conditions; it is a living spirit, not a dead letter. Probably it would be generally agreed that no deep and vital change should be made by one branch of the Catholic Church alone. At a time when there is such urgent necessity that a united Church should witness to Christ in a distracted world, few could wish to do anything which would erect new barriers between the great Churches of Christendom. Yet it might surely be possible to make some further use of the ministry of women without involving too hopeless a breach with Catholic tradition.

The exceptional needs of the years of war as well as the National Mission gave an opportunity for temporary experiments which was unfortunately lost through the opposition of the extreme Catholic party. Its members seemed to forget that even in Roman Catholic countries women are allowed to lead in litanies recited both in processions and in church. On the other hand, we owe it to Puritan influence that our churches are no more the homes of the people, but are so often kept with closed doors from one Sunday to another. There seems no reason why the church, the most beautiful and the biggest room in the village, should not be used for all the gatherings of the villagers held for serious purposes, as well as for mystery plays and music and all other objects tending to raise the spiritual life of the village. Some who have been anxious that women should be allowed to speak in the churches have been partly at least moved by the desire to see a fuller use made of the parish church. They would claim too that, as women form part of the laity, they should be allowed to do all that is permitted to laymen.

As laymen are allowed to help the clergy by reading the lessons in church, it might seem reasonable that a

suitable woman should be suffered to do the same. Women have been welcomed as soloists at musical festivals in our great cathedrals ; and it is not easy to see why to read the Bible aloud should give more offence than to sing its words. The question that has been most debated has been that concerning women being allowed to speak or preach in church. In order to arrive at a sound opinion on this subject, we need to come to a clear conclusion as to the position of the sermon in divine service. English people like to complain about the sermon and to criticise it mercilessly, but for the most part they feel defrauded when they are given a service without a sermon. All thinking people recognise that it is not easy for a hard-worked parish-priest to preach even one good sermon every week ; and often two or more are demanded of him. Yet there may be both laymen and laywomen in his congregation who have a message to give, and who may possibly have time for more reading and study than he has. The hungry sheep look up and are not fed, whilst those with stores of food that they would gladly offer sit silent. The people are in deep need of teaching at this time ; and the Church should be free to make full use of the teaching and prophetic gifts possessed by its members. Of late years women have been encouraged to engage in serious theological study. The Archbishop of Canterbury has instituted a special diploma for them which can only be won after prolonged and serious study. But those women who have won it can find little opportunity to use for the good of others the knowledge they have acquired, while young men without their knowledge preach sermons which they have hardly had time to prepare.

This again is so opposed to common sense that one asks what are the reasons which lead to the strong objection felt against the preaching of women. It will be answered that common sense has nothing to do with the matter, which has been decided by the age-long practice of the Church. It is stated with truth that the place of the sermon in the Prayer-book makes it part of the Liturgy. But there are sermons also at afternoon and evening services and on special occasions. Probably it would be well to confine lay-preaching to special occasions, but both laymen and laywomen might be

allowed to give special courses of instruction in church ; no one need come to hear them unless they like, and no offence would be given to the regular attendants at church. Some urge that, if women are allowed to preach, we shall be overdone with sermons, but this is a matter that can be easily regulated. Some women indeed are possessed of a fatal fluency and excel as verbose enunciators of platitudes, but this is not a quality peculiar to them.

One of the last objections that has been urged in a well-known magazine is that a charming woman in the pulpit would have a fatal attraction for men who would crowd to hear her. Does the writer not fear also the fatal attraction exercised by the charming curate on his female audience, and would he be prepared to be logical and urge that only men should listen to men and women to women? It would of course be necessary that the preaching of women, as of laymen, should be regulated by authority, and that only persons who had real knowledge or prophetic gifts should be allowed to teach or preach. They would probably not be many, but why silence those who have a message to give?

One question, though but a minor one, remains: If a woman is to be allowed to preach, from what spot should she preach? Some would allow her to speak from the body of the church; some would go so far as to allow her to stand on the chancel step; but most persons shrink from the thought of her entering the pulpit. It is not easy to see why the pulpit should be considered as a specially holy spot; it probably only exists to give the preacher a position from which he can easily be heard; but it is certain that no one who believes that women have a message to give will mind where they stand to deliver it, and this matter will easily settle itself.

A special committee, appointed by both Houses of Convocation last spring to discuss the ministry of women, reported in February, and recommended that, under certain conditions to be fixed by the Bishop of the diocese, it should be permissible for duly qualified women to speak and pray in consecrated buildings at services other than the regular appointed services of the Church. The proposed conditions were all of a nature to ensure

that the women so permitted should have the requisite knowledge and ability. But there was one strange recommendation—that no woman under the age of thirty should be permitted to address a mixed assembly in a consecrated building. One asks why, if she be duly qualified, her age should come into consideration. To determine the fitness of a person for a particular work by any hard-and-fast limit of age at either end always seems a short-sighted proceeding. For many years before the war, women were accustomed to being told that for the majority of posts connected with social, educational, or administrative work, no woman over forty should apply. Now it is being proposed that no woman under thirty should speak to a mixed audience in a consecrated building. If these two limits are accepted, only a bare ten years are left in which women are considered fit for responsibility. It would seem wiser to determine their suitability by consideration of their character and capacity than by reckoning their age.

Those who are alarmed at the thought of a young woman speaking in church are only too glad to listen to her at a large missionary meeting. There her youth and the freshness of her experience are considered to be of special value. The one vital question in regard to a speaker, whether in a consecrated building or in a public hall, should be whether he or she has anything to say worth listening to. No one could object if a higher standard were applied to women than to men in this respect. We have enough bad speaking as it is, and a high standard for women might raise the standard for men.

When the Report of the Committee on the Ministry of Women was brought before the Lower House of Convocation, even its very gentle recommendations proved too disturbing for the majority of the venerable members of that House; the resolution of the Report, mild though it was, was defeated, but only by a majority of one. Once more all the old arguments from St Paul's Epistles were brought forward. On these there is certainly nothing new to be said on either side; but, as the well-known arguments are heard, it is impossible not to wonder what the great apostle of liberty would say if he could hear them. The immemorial

custom of the Church is to many a convincing argument against any development of the ministry of women. Others, who go further and wish to find the principle which lies at the root of the relative position of men and women, find it in the story of the Creation, which in their opinion established once for all the domination of man. But this, they maintain, does not mean the spiritual inferiority of women; rather they affirm that to be subordinate, while being spiritually equal, is the glory of woman. One member of Convocation at any rate found the whole matter beautifully simple, since he stated it had been settled long ago, as woman was the last to be created but the first to sin.

The method in which the question was treated by the majority in Convocation suggested a denial of the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church; it is, as was said by the Dean of Ely, to bind the living Church with the iron bands of the past. Such views take us much further than the particular matter under discussion, and suggest a conception of the Church which certainly is contrary to that held by many whose most passionate desire is to make the Church a living force in the life of the nation and of the world. The Dean of Canterbury expressed his opinion that Parliament and the Bar had only consented to admit women because it could not be helped, and because they wished to put a stop to violence; he had no fear that they would use violence to enforce their claim to a share in the ministry of the Church. There can indeed be no fear of violence, but there may be real fear of loss, and real fear of driving out of the Church those who would, if they were allowed, do it signal service. The glory of the Church of England is its inclusiveness; it is to be hoped that wiser counsels may prevail, and that the new possibilities of self-government granted to the Church may open out ways by which all can make their full contribution to its life and work.

It is much to be hoped that the whole matter will receive serious and unprejudiced consideration at the coming Lambeth Conference, and that some conclusions may be reached which will allay the present restlessness and discontent. As it is, in certain cases the clergy are taking the law in their own hands, and are allowing

practices which have not been authorised by their Bishops. In this way, changes have before now been introduced in the customs of the Anglican Church, but it may be questioned whether it is the most desirable way, even though it seems to suit the English nature. On the whole matter a little clear thinking is needed. We are not a logical people ; and the organising secretary who urges a woman to address a large mixed meeting, and the Bishop who presides at the meeting, may easily be men who would be horrified at the idea of her reading a chapter of the Bible in church. They may quote the authority of St Paul against her being allowed to speak in a consecrated building, forgetting that St Paul knew nothing of consecrated buildings, and that a parish room or even a barn would more closely represent the kind of place where the assemblies were held in which he did not think that the women of his day should speak. It is clear that experiments must be tried, and that we must proceed slowly. Acts of Uniformity have always been disastrous in the life of the Church ; and in this matter of the ministry of women we need free discussion as well as experiment, in order to reach sound conclusions as to the nature of the Christian liberty which may be allowed if we would not run the risk of quenching the Spirit. Irritation and impatience on the one side, however justifiable they may seem, a stiff and irreconcilable attitude on the other, even though it may spring from a sense of the necessity to guard a precious heritage, may alike imperil the united witness of the Church in a world which sorely needs the triumph of the spirit of love.

LOUISE CREIGHTON.

Art. 8.—IMPERIAL MIGRATION AND THE CLASH OF RACES.

It is inevitable that there should be an awakening from the dream of unlimited prosperity to be obtained by the simple process of demanding higher and yet higher wages. When this awakening comes to pass the people of this country and their leaders will search for other means of attaining the end in view, the altogether legitimate one of bettering the status of the worker. There will be those who will clamour for revolution, who believe that the road to happiness and national prosperity lies in the direction of seizing and distributing the goods of others; there will be some, again, who, aware of the unparalleled riches which lie dormant in the British Empire, will demand that steps shall be taken to make that wealth available for the benefit of the community at large.

This demand must receive a reply. It is obvious that it has received no sufficient answer down to the present time. Are we to conclude that the problem is insoluble, and that all this vast wealth of which the existence is indisputable must for ever be beyond the reach of the people of this country?

If this be so, the British Empire, from this point of view, must be written down a failure. Great Britain has made unnumbered sacrifices to maintain and protect the Empire; its sons have shed their blood as the price of admiralty on every sea; it has sent out, and lost, the flower of the race, that distant regions might be colonised under the British flag—only to find that the gain is for others; that the Empire is not for the people of this land in any practical sense, and that they, for their part, must be contented with empty phrases. No wonder, if this be true, that the very words Empire and Imperial have fallen into disrepute. But is this necessarily so? Is there no path, divergent it may be from any we have followed hitherto, which may lead to other conclusions?

National wealth is the product of two factors—work and land. It results from the application of the energies, mental and physical, of a capable and industrious race to a sufficiency of fertile and healthy land and all that ample territory represents. The wider the land, the

better choice of opportunity and the richer the harvest. It will not be denied that the Empire contains a sufficiency of land. Perhaps, in view of the prevalent unrest and the widespread desire for shorter hours of work, it will not be so readily admitted that in the population of Great Britain we possess a hardworking and intelligent variety of mankind. Nevertheless, after making due allowance for human frailty and the abnormal circumstances of the time, when we look across the ages at the net result throughout the world of the efforts of our race, it must be conceded that no people who have yet figured on the stage of history have laboured to better purpose, or attained to a higher standard of excellence. Having also, then, within the Empire an immense mine of latent riches—a mine which is only awaiting development by labour of head and hand to become visible and tangible wealth—the problem before us now is how to divert to this virgin field the working energies of the race from less profitable enterprises determined by the accident of birthplace.

The methods which have been followed in the past in order to transfer population from the congested to the unpeopled lands are spontaneous emigration and the assisted emigration of selected individuals. Each of these methods is open to serious objection. In the first place, they have both proved to be wholly inadequate. We have only to look at the facts of the distribution of population in the Empire—three-quarters of the white population concentrated in about one per cent. of the area; or, to put it another way, a density of population about three hundred times as great in England as it is in Canada or Australia. This is the result, after more than a century of colonisation in both hemispheres. The economic loss, not to mention other important considerations, which these figures indicate, is incalculable. They mean that, while the greater portion of these territories is lying fallow and all its harvest unreaped, the majority of the workers are employed where they are not in reality needed; where they are not in sufficiently close contact with the all-nourishing earth, but have to buy its products from far-distant lands in competition with other nations; where they are necessarily occupied in comparatively unproductive labour.

In the second place, both spontaneous and assisted emigration, as they have generally been conducted, involve a lowering of the racial standard in the mother-country, an impoverishment of the breed. In order to make this clear it is only necessary to show, either that the men who have left our shores have possessed mental, moral, and physical characteristics above the average, or that they have exhibited in a high degree characteristics which are an essential part of the equipment of a great race. Each of these conditions holds. Not only is the emigrant generally the superior of his brother who stays at home, but he also exhibits traits, sometimes perhaps in excess, which the country can ill afford to lose.

What are the specific signs and qualifications of the ordinary emigrant? He must possess capital in the first instance—considerable for his station in life—or he cannot meet the expenses of passage and settlement for himself and his family, if he has one. The possession of this capital means either that he has saved it as a result of his own exertions, or that he has inherited it. If he has saved it, he must have shown intelligence, industry, and thrift; in the majority of cases he must have enjoyed good health. If he has inherited his capital, he belongs to a stock which has exhibited these characteristics in the past. Further, and apart from material possessions, the readiness to emigrate indicates both knowledge and enterprise, and the progressive spirit of the pioneer.

Now the man who is healthy, intelligent, industrious, and thrifty is above the average. To lose men of his type is to weaken the race; and the effect will be felt not only at the time but for generations to come. The process is identical with one which has been employed for centuries by breeders in the establishment of a new variety of domestic animals. Certain characteristics are eliminated from a race by removing the individuals which show those characteristics. After a time these characteristics no longer appear and the race is said to breed true. If we wish to banish from these islands all thrift, industry, and ambition, we could not devise a better method than this of deporting the type of man who forms the majority of our emigrants. For three centuries this emigration of 'the best,' so dear to colonial

ministers and emigration societies, has proceeded. The ultimate result, if it is to continue much longer, must inevitably be disastrous. The decadence of Rome and of Spain warns us of what follows.

There is little need to show that the emigrant whose passage is wholly or partly paid by an emigration society or other philanthropic body is also an instance of detrimental selection. All such societies innocently proclaim the scrupulous care with which candidates are chosen for their good qualities, their fitness for becoming successful colonists, and so on. It will suffice to quote from the records of an organisation which has been honourably distinguished for its efforts to improve social conditions—the Salvation Army. We read, 'The suitability of emigrants can only be determined by a careful system of selection.' It is only fair to add that the Salvation Army has adopted this 'careful system' under external pressure. The late General Booth, who originated the scheme, was well aware of its drawbacks; but he was unable to change the views either of colonial or home officials, and to this day the same ideas are dominant. When, as sometimes happens, the fairer plan is adopted of transporting the weak in due proportion to the strong, protests against the influx of pauper elements are speedily raised in the colonies, regardless of the fact that the same ship which carries these undesired immigrants brings also the men of more efficient type on whom the care of their weaker brethren naturally falls. As with private associations, so also with governmental schemes. The official plans for the emigration in 1920 of ex-service men provide only for the fit. A man may have been good enough to fight his country's battles, but it appears he may not be good enough for the colonies.

It may well seem inexplicable that biological laws and principles should be thus openly ignored in a matter to which they clearly apply. No doubt this is part of the penalty we have to pay for having in the past treated science as though it were a collection of fads. In spite of everything that science has to say on the subject, environment, not selection, is still supposed by the majority of people to be the principal factor in determining the progress or deterioration of a race. Behind

the policy which cheerfully robs this country of so many of its best, lies the fallacy that by making more room in a crowded land and opening fresh avenues for trade, that is, by bettering the conditions at home, the race must certainly be improved. But repeated investigations have shown that this is not so. Better conditions do not necessarily improve the breed; they may even have the opposite effect, by increasing the chances of survival of the unfit.

It is evident that any colonial policy worthy of the name must put an end to the exportation of those constituents of the national character which we can least afford to lose. There should be emigration of every section of the community in numbers proportionate to the strength of each section. Some exceptions to this rule there must necessarily be; on the one side, classes who are making a success of their lives will be left to pursue a promising career; these will be balanced on the other by those classes which are not worth exporting and which should be encouraged to die out—lunatics, criminals, and hopeless invalids. In this last respect emigration will continue to conform to the laws which colonial communities have for some time enforced. The young also must emigrate in higher proportion than the old.

It is the duty of those who attempt to deal with a subject of such far-reaching national importance as emigration, to speak openly and plainly to all who are concerned in it. We admire our colonial kinsmen, we are exceedingly grateful for the part they have played in the war, we think with pride of the new Britains they are building; but, if we are to effect a migration which will be advantageous not only to the daughter-countries but to the mother-country as well, if we wish to put the Empire upon a sound and safe basis, economically as well as politically, we shall have to sweep away a number of prejudices. We shall have to modify the conception which has for many years been the guiding principle of colonial governments—the principle that the colonies and all that they hold exist solely for the sake of the present colonists. They are able to quote precedent and instrument in their own favour. The transactions which

culminated in the transfer of the lordship of enormous tracts of the world's surface were for the most part negotiated between colonists, on the one hand, who realised the importance of these regions and were bent upon securing them for themselves and their descendants, and home statesmen, on the other, who had small interest in these lands, and whose imaginations had never been fired by the appreciation of their boundless possibilities which comes of intimate acquaintance. The colonists have not been told that they are the trustees for the whole British race of the domains which were won and kept by the efforts of the whole race. A Canadian or an Australian is quite honestly surprised if it is suggested to him that Canada and Australia are the heritage of the people of British stock and not merely of that offshoot of it which, thanks to the protection of the British flag, has occupied these countries, or rather a small portion of them. It would be unfair to allot to citizens of the Dominions the entire blame for the growth of these misconceptions; on the contrary, at least as much censure is due to those at home who failed at crucial times, as when self-government was granted, to assert and provide for the interests of those whom they were supposed to represent.

The question is an important one. The whole future of the British Empire will depend upon the way in which it is treated. If the claims of the people of this country are acknowledged in generous fashion, it will be possible to make an end of the anomalies and absurdities of the present distribution of population and of the financial losses which these entail. It will also be possible to avert the most serious external peril which confronts the Empire to-day. But, if these great ends are to be achieved, the subject of emigration will have to be considered from the standpoint of the mother-country as well as from the standpoint of the Dominions.

Most fortunately, however, it can be shown that the interests of these two divisions of the race are ultimately identical. Even in a financial sense a large immigration can be made more profitable to a new land than a more restricted one of better quality. But it is when we come to a wider survey of national policy, that the colonies are seen to be as deeply interested in the redistribution

of population as is the centre of the Empire. Indeed, we shall see that for certain parts of the Empire an increase of population is a *sine qua non* of existence. The good feeling no less than the good sense of our kindred across the seas will incline them to come to an agreement with the mother-country when once she has enunciated a clear and statesmanlike policy. If there has been a tendency in the past on the part of colonists to keep the good things of the Empire to themselves and to improve colonial stocks at the expense of the parent race, it cannot be said that they have acted more selfishly than is the custom of mankind. A careful consideration of future needs in the light of recent events will convince them that their policy hitherto has run counter to their own advantage.

How does Canada regard the British Empire of the future? Her outlook does not differ in principle from that of Great Britain. She looks upon it as a confederacy of states, holding the same ideals; state helping state to realise those ideals, with hands stretched forth in times of conflict or distress. She wishes that there should be union between the scattered parts, and strength in union. She looks forward, as her dowry of nature's giving entitles her, to becoming in time the most populous, the most wealthy, and therefore the leading state, in the family of nations of which Great Britain is at present the chief.

This aspiration she can only hope to fulfil by receiving a large accession of men of British nationality. The incoming of Americans, which has been such a noticeable feature of recent years, unless balanced by a large influx of British blood, would tend to endanger her independence of her southern neighbour. The flooding of the country with non-British European elements might make her a second less important United States, but could hardly justify her expectation of imperial hegemony. She needs men to develop her resources; she has every reason to welcome a scheme which would induce a more stable social order in Great Britain; she is alive to the necessity of peopling the outposts of the Empire against the great struggle which is even now beginning to darken the horizon—the struggle of the West with the East.

When we turn to the other great self-governing colonies it becomes apparent that immigration is not merely a desideratum; it is a matter of extreme urgency if they are to remain British. Among the many changes which have been effected, or revealed to the world, by the great war, none is more portentous than the alteration in the position of the white races in relation to the rest of the world. Signs of unmistakable import are multiplying which show that it will soon become impossible for the white peoples to hold the coloured peoples in a position of tutelage or vassalage except to a limited extent and for a brief period. The attitude of the Japanese at Paris was perhaps the most arresting of all these signs. Throughout the British Empire the subject races show symptoms of chronic unrest due to the emergence of ideas hostile to any assumption of racial superiority. This world-movement—for it is nothing less—holds a deep significance for the British Empire. Nor does it concern only the status of the coloured races within that Empire; it is of far greater scope, for it affects the holdings, throughout the world, of the European and North-American peoples.

A League of Nations seems, almost of necessity, to imply some sort of equality amongst the nations composing it. But, if the equality of nations be admitted, it becomes extremely difficult to justify the admission of some nations to certain portions of the world and the exclusion of others. That is the crux of the whole matter. At the Peace Conference the cloud seemed no bigger than a man's hand, but it is likely to overshadow the heavens. The equality of races as a theory is open to easy attack. Every one who has had prolonged dealings with distinct peoples is aware that they are unequal, in whatever way the measure is applied. So also are men, but it has long been found necessary to treat them on a footing of equality. It was not as an abstract proposition that the principle of racial equality was brought forward at the Peace Conference; it was raised with the clear practical intention of establishing the right of the yellow or black man to go where the white man goes and to vote when the white man votes. Upon these two claims hang the destinies of mankind; the history of continents will depend upon the response of the white

peoples. South Africa, Australia, South and Central America are all involved. The boundaries of the races of the world and the extent to which these races may intermingle are not matters which have been settled for all time. They have been provisionally settled by the white races in their own interest. But that the nations of Europe and their descendants should hold in perpetuity, for their exclusive profit, all the continental areas which have been discovered since the 15th century is agreeable neither to justice nor to probability. The numbers, the intelligence, the crowded condition of the Asiatics, and their future strength also, cry out against such a conclusion.

The Asiatic demands not merely to be recognised as an equal; he demands a share in the new lands of the world. He seeks an outlet for his increasing millions. He bitterly resents exclusion from some of the fairest regions of the earth. He knows that he could employ many of these lands to better advantage than does the white man, and he asks for the opportunity of doing so. Who is bold enough, when so reasonable a request is preferred, as it will be, by one half of the human race, to say that it will not be granted? Will a League of Nations stand in the way? Can the British Empire oppose it? Sooner or later this claim must be allowed. In South or Middle Africa, in Australia or in South America, in some or in all of these regions, room must be found for the crowded myriads of Asia.

This readjustment will necessarily follow the lines of least resistance. The region of greatest resistance will be North America; and that continent may be considered to have been definitely won for the white man. The fact that Africa and South America lie principally within the tropics, and the presence of considerable aboriginal or imported non-Aryan stocks, mark out these continents as territories fit for occupation by the oriental. British East Africa and the neighbouring tropical lands will probably be the first to be opened to unrestricted Hindu colonisation. The distance from India is comparatively small; the climate and soil are in every way congenial. A demand for the recognition of the rights of India in this quarter has already been put forward by the late Mr Gokhale. The unlocking of this

door will signalise the formal entry of the Asiatic into the field of colonisation. It will abolish the anomaly that the numerically most important member of the Empire should be denied free access to all its great dominions. The penetration of South America by the oriental will not be so simple a matter; but it should be possible to provide by peaceful negotiation for the successive settlement of Japanese and Chinese in suitable areas. Indeed, the former race has hitherto been welcomed, though not the latter. Spaniards and Portuguese have never shown the antipathy to miscegenation which distinguishes the Anglo-Saxon. The white races will still retain the southern portion of the continent, which they are rapidly developing and which is well adapted to their requirements.

It is by this test of development that peoples and lands will be judged. It is not enough to have discovered a country; it is not enough, as a Japanese naval officer has recently observed, to wave a flag over it; it must be developed—that is to say, the land must be made to yield its full quota in production for the good of mankind. No other plea will be considered of sufficient validity to justify the exclusion of those who could secure its complete utilisation. The tools to those who can use them.

These things are full of meaning for the British Empire. South Africa could only have been preserved as a British colony in any real sense by peopling the uplands with millions of our country-men; by tilling the land and by performing all other manual operations by white labour, by relegating the blacks to warmer localities, and by enforcing a more rigid exclusion of the Hindu. The land is there, and the climate; we in England have the men who could be employed to vastly better purpose on the wide veldt than in factories at home. But so radical a violation of the traditional *laissez aller* policy in the matter of colonisation was not to be expected; the temporary advantages of his position with respect to the Kaffir appeal to the South-African colonist more than the fate of his remote descendants; it would have taxed the genius of a Rhodes to overcome such obstacles. The greater part of Africa is destined to be non-European; the white communities, reduced to five or three or two per cent. through a

relatively small fertility, will be surrounded and engulfed by a sea of blacks; future policies will be determined by the coloured vote. Unless by some miracle a complete reversal of methods should take place, South Africa, as the home of a British people in the coming centuries, may be wiped off the slate.

It is far otherwise when we turn to Australasia. There is no disposition in that quarter to acquiesce in the presence of incompatible races. The final consequences of admitting Asiatics—loss of numerical superiority for the white, loss of political predominance, danger of ultimate absorption or expulsion—are clearly recognised. The Australians know that for them and theirs the matter is absolutely vital. No sacrifice, in their view, is too great to keep the continent safe from the despised but dreaded oriental. In this attitude they can surely command our sympathy. Let us imagine for a moment how we in England should feel if we were exposed to a like invasion of aliens, ready to supplant us at every turn, undercutting us in every branch of trade and production, bringing in their own languages, religions, customs, and interests, threatening by mere weight of numbers to turn England into China, let us say. Precisely thus do the Australians regard the menace of the Asiatic; and we are bound to afford them whatever help we may.

But, while the Australians have clearly grasped the consequences of admitting the oriental, the majority of them have not yet measured the danger of excluding him. We ourselves know how easy it is for a nation to be lulled into a false sense of security. The leaders are aware of the deadly peril that threatens Australia, but the mass of the people are still blind. This blindness has to be reckoned with; it will be one of the first of duties for statesmen in Australia to expose the situation in all its gravity, and to prepare public opinion for the steps which must be taken to remedy it. It may be doubted whether even the leaders have fairly gauged the issues in their entirety. The man of practical affairs is unfitted by his profession to look far ahead.

Australia is founding her hopes for the future on two bases. The one has been her sure defence in the past, the British navy. She deems that it will be supported,

if need be, by the American fleet. She has less confidence in the second, the League of Nations. The formation of a League of Nations has in fact shattered in some degree the expectations of Australia. Another league seemed to be within measurable distance of realisation. The United States is also deeply interested, though in a less degree, in the question of Chinese and Japanese immigration, and in the destinies of the Pacific shores. The tension between Japan and America on this account has more than once been menacing. It appeared at one time as though it would be possible to form a compact between the British Empire and the United States to guarantee the territorial *status quo* until such time as Australia had grown to maturity. But such questions as the future of the Pacific and its islands and the lands that encompass it will henceforth be debated in the councils of the League of Nations. The peoples of the East will unquestionably appeal to the international tribunal. The opinions of such countries as France, Belgium, Switzerland and a host of small nations, and, we may add, Germany, would be strongly in favour of a compromise, such as the admission of the Asiatic to tropical Australasia; and they would carry the majority with them. Australia, with or without the support of the Empire, would fight to the last man rather than agree to such a proposal. But would America help her in such an event? It was always doubtful; in the light of recent events it is inconceivable.

In any forecast which may be made as to the relative strength of the British Empire and of the nations of the East we are dealing with unknown quantities. But we may be helped by a comparison of the prospects, fifty or sixty years ago, of Canada and Japan. Both were then weak countries, but no one would have supposed that in less than half a century Japan would have so far distanced Canada as to have been able to defeat a first-rate European power on land and sea. The Japanese Empire counts to-day 77,000,000 of inhabitants. The total rate of increase of population, including Korea and Formosa, is about a million a year. In some twenty years it will have attained to 100,000,000 inhabitants, without taking into consideration such problematic gains as Shantung or other Chinese territories. Japanese

trade and wealth are growing at an astonishing rate. The suicidal tendencies observable in European industries are giving the Japanese a unique opportunity. They will develop China, if China does not develop itself. They manifest the vigour of a new race—the patriotism and the ambitions of a successful race. Does any one believe that this people can be confined to its own narrow islands? The expansion of Japan is as inevitable as was the expansion of England. Would the islands of the Malay Archipelago satisfy them? They are watching the great continent beyond.

In a good cause Australia could depend upon the whole forces of the mother-country and of the white races of the Empire. But if the cause is doubtful, if the Australians are held to have made insufficient use of their land, what then? Are we to repeat the overweening blunder of Spain, in striving to keep for ourselves a world we cannot use? If so, history may also repeat the defeat of the Spanish Armada. Where Japan goes China will follow. The 'Yellow Peril' is no extravagance of a fervent imagination. Chinese students have for years been thronging to Japan in thousands to learn the secret of her success. China will make up in mass for the slowness of her motion. Her momentum may become greater than that of her neighbour. We are in the presence of gigantic forces. To take one item only, it is difficult to overestimate the result of the application in scientific and methodical fashion of the labour of patient millions to 250,000 square miles of coalfields. Industrial progress has an inevitable bearing upon war. China and Japan, having settled their differences, may some day be in a position to meet the world in arms.

Nothing can be more agreeable to the oriental than the cry 'Australia for the Australians.' In so far as the catchword means that the actual inhabitants object to sharing the wealth of their continent with the people of the old country or with other whites, in so far as it means discrimination within Australia of a nature to make the country less attractive to the newcomer, in so far, even, as it means unwillingness to shoulder burdens in order to increase the speed or area of settlement, 'Australia for the Australians' to-day means 'Australia for the Asiatics' to-morrow. Australians will have to

face the fact that their ultimate heritage in Australia will be in exact proportion to their hospitality to the races most akin to themselves.

There are three possible futures for Australia. The first is that the continent should remain entirely 'white'; the second is that it should be divided between the Europeans and the Asiatics: the third is that it should become entirely or virtually Asiatic. The first of these possibilities is the goal set before themselves by the Australian people. It can be made a reality only by a supreme effort. The means to be adopted are fairly plain. Migration at a maximum speed from the mother-country, sufficient in amount to effect a gradual transference of a large proportion of her population; assisted immigration from other European lands, particularly from Italy, into the warmer temperate regions; maintenance and, so far as possible, enhancement of the natural increase of population; development of the tropical portions by indentured labour, or by other methods that may prove efficacious, short of actual Asiatic settlement. The second and third possibilities need not detain us long. They are each intensely repugnant to the Australians; they would be preceded by extremities of human suffering; but one or other is unavoidable unless the most vigorous measures are adopted. Australia can save herself by her own exertions, not otherwise.

The practical steps which would have to be taken to effect a migration of many millions of British men and women and their establishment in a new land cannot be described here in any detail. A few leading principles only may be briefly considered. Hitherto emigration has been conducted with reference to the numbers which a given colony can absorb in a specified time. In the absence of due provision, emigrants in excess of this power of absorption would become a charge upon the colonists. But, where emigration is directed to a favourable locality, and undertaken by a powerful organisation or by a government, there is no such limitation. Given abundance of fertile land, expert advice, temporary support, newcomers can be settled as fast as the railways can be built. The emigrant must be equal to his work; he can be made so by being trained in the land of his

adoption. There is no special mystery about life in a new land. The ordinary man can be made an efficient colonist just as surely as, and much more readily than, he can be made a good soldier. He can become self-supporting, or nearly so, from the start. All previous records in emigration could easily be eclipsed by the adoption of a well-devised scheme.

The expenses of transportation and settlement should be borne entirely by the country to which the emigrant takes his muscle and bone and brain. In going to a colony he increases its wealth by the value of his life-work. In an overstocked old country he may be an encumbrance; in a new country he is an asset. The effect of his entry into a neighbourhood is speedily seen in the increase in the value of property. If a certain proportion of the lands developed by the newcomers were to be set apart for the purpose, their increment of value, realised by sale or rental, would provide the funds required to subsidise the scheme of immigration. The only sort of emigration which we should encourage is one which turns to account the natural resources of the Empire or, in other words, which multiplies its wealth. This wealth enriches the new countries principally and directly; the old country is only benefited indirectly, except in so far as its capital is employed.

But what if Australia neglects to make the great effort that is required, preferring to sit at ease in the land she calls her own? In that case Australia can take no part in any constructive scheme of migration. So far as can be seen, there can be but one end to the attempt to hold for the white man a continent so closely linked to Asia. The prospect is not an attractive one, nor should we be justified in recommending colonists to settle in a situation thus threatened. In homely phrase, it would be throwing good money after bad. Our children are our riches, when all is said. Without Australia there is yet ample space within the Empire for as many as we can profitably spare; in New Zealand, where complete development is entirely feasible, and above all, in Canada, whose needs are second only to those of Australia.

Whether we take the Empire as a whole or confine our attention to any of its larger portions, there is

no surplus of population. With negligible exceptions, there is a niche for every one where he could not only lead a useful and happy life but where also his presence would be a factor of security. The millions of our countrymen whom in the past we have been so ready to fling away—the greater number to the United States—are the most important element in the 'resources of the Empire,' without whom, indeed, these resources are a snare and an incentive to attack. It is to be hoped that these unvalued millions will be husbanded to better use in the future.

A thousand motives urge us to action, but they are in danger of being forgotten amid the clamour of the catchwords. We are rightly concerned about our export trade. That problem, like many another, would no longer trouble us if our prosperity were based upon the mother-earth at our doors. To give a great people the freedom of its lands; to abolish the extraordinary spectacle of chronic unemployment, while countless millions of acres lie unused; to turn the masses from the vain dream of unlimited prosperity obtainable in an overcrowded corner; to dismiss for ever the dread of attacks upon the food supply; to lay the spectre of cut-throat foreign competition and become sufficient for ourselves; to aid our far-off kinsmen in maintaining the integrity of the Empire—in order to accomplish these aims but one thing is primarily necessary, viz. to spread a knowledge of the facts, to stimulate by all means in our power a thorough study of the question of emigration and of the connexion between pressure of population and economic stress, and to bring home, especially to our fellow-citizens in the Britains overseas, the dangers which threaten us in the not remote future.

FLEETWOOD CHIDELL.

Art. 9.—THE FIRST LORD HOLLAND.

Henry Fox, First Lord Holland; His Family and Relations. By the Earl of Ilchester. 2 vols. Murray, 1920.

WE have often had occasion to lament, when enjoying the hospitality of English country-houses, the indifference of country-gentlemen towards their books and, above all, to their papers. Men who are ideal landlords, admirable citizens in respect of the hard work that they do for the county, proud of their possessions, and well informed as to such things as their pictures and their china, are often strangely ignorant of the contents of their libraries, and regard their muniments and other papers as the affair of their agents. Let it be granted that a country-gentleman who knows all about all his possessions, his lands, woods, flocks, herds, house, and house's contents, is one of no ordinary culture. It is asking a good deal of a man to be a good judge of a bull and a good judge of a miniature, to be equally competent to conduct a drive of partridges and to read the court-hand of an ancient deed, to be able to gauge the merits or demerits of a tenant as a cultivator, and to date the undated letter of an ancestor. Yet such men are to be found, and Lord Ilchester is one of them. There are not many who would care to match themselves against him with a gun or with a dry fly; there are few who could teach him anything about his pictures, his furniture, his china, or his books. Not only does he cherish his papers, from a deed which bears the marks of Canute and Dunstan to the letter of the last man of note who has visited Holland House, but he also interprets the more interesting of them by genuine and laborious research, and sets them forth, with an excellently written though modest commentary of his own, for the reader of English history.

It is not until one peruses a compendious list of the Cabinets of the English Sovereigns from George I to Victoria that one realises how recently they have ceased to consist mainly of peers. Yet the great English names of the political world in the 18th century—there are practically only three—were all of them owned by

commoners, Walpole, Pitt, and Fox. Walpole was a country-gentleman of old family, one of the ruling caste who considered the House of Commons to be their peculiar property; and he had therefore some right to be a Prime Minister. But the Pitts and Foxes were, in a manner, *parvenus*; and the Pitts in particular, in virtue of the Regent diamond which Robert Pitt brought home from India in the heel of his shoe, actually belonged to the odious tribe of nabobs. They were detestable folk in the eyes of the English country-gentlemen, those nobodies who had 'shaken the pagoda-tree' and come home with the spoils of India to buy rotten boroughs and attempt, in a small but offensive way, to vie with old families, whose servants or dependents had obediently returned their masters' nominees to Parliament for generations. Small wonder that the House of Commons persecuted with peculiar bitterness the only two great men among the nabobs, Clive and Warren Hastings. But meanwhile the two *parvenu* families had each of them secured an earldom for one of their members and a barony for another. The Pitts have vanished. Their barony of Camelford is recalled only by the duel which extinguished it; and the glories of the earldom were tarnished by the doggerel that connects the second Earl with the Walcheren Expedition. The Foxes are more fortunate. The barony of Holland will be remembered longest, probably, through the hospitality which made Holland House the resort of such men as Macaulay, and of a score of others who were famous in their time. The Earldom of Ilchester will, we think, deserve henceforth at least a modest niche in the temple of English letters.

The family of Fox can be traced back in Wiltshire and in Hallamshire to the middle of the 15th century. Stephen, the first of his name to make a mark on history, claimed no remote or exalted ancestry, but was content to style himself 'a wonderful child of Providence, born of virtuous parents, distinguished from their neighbours by their orderly and pious living.' He came, in fact, of honest yeoman stock, and was sincere and humble enough to give God and his parents the glory for his success in life. Entering the world in 1627, the sixth son in a family of eight sons and two daughters, he drifted into the circle of Charles I's Court at the age of thirteen, and,

after passing through the service of sundry great magnates, finally settled down in 1644 with Lord Percy, Master of the Horse to the Prince of Wales. With him he migrated to France in 1645, and was followed in the ensuing year by Prince Charles himself. Stephen was then entrusted with the care of the Prince's horses and stables, and later with the arrangements for all journeys and hunting expeditions. In fact, he, and not Lord Percy, did the work of Master of the Horse; and Prince Charles failed not to take note of it. After several troubled years, he was recalled in 1653 to Charles's now impoverished Court, and placed in supreme financial control with the title of Cofferer. He was very evidently endowed with great administrative gifts, and was trusted by all and sundry as only a man of the strictest integrity could have been. Though disappointed of high office in the Royal Household at the Restoration, he was none the less the mainstay of the royal credit, which without him could hardly have existed. Hence it was that he received the Paymastership of the Army, whose wages he advanced regularly, not indeed without remuneration—for business is business—but without trespassing one inch beyond his legitimate rights. By sheer thrift and ability he amassed a fortune of some 200,000*l.*, 'all honestly gotten and unenvied, which is next to a miracle,' says Evelyn. In the matter of the army, his name is generally associated with the stoppages of pay which defrayed to him the interest on the money which he had provided; and stoppages have no pleasant sound in the British soldier's ears. This is unjust and wrong. Stephen Fox is entitled rather to the name of the British soldier's best friend, for it was he who originated the scheme for the foundation of Chelsea Hospital, undertook the collection of the necessary funds, supervised the works, and lent thousands towards the final accomplishment of his project, refusing all interest since he was working in the cause of charity.

Sir Stephen (for he had received knighthood in 1665) resigned the office of Paymaster in 1680 in favour of his son; but he continued to enjoy lucrative offices in the household under James II and William III. Upon the accession of Queen Anne, having invested his money well in real property in Wilts and Somerset, he retired

into private life; and in 1703, after seven years of a widower's life, he married for the second time. Greatly to his surprise the arrival of a boy, Stephen, showed him that he had laid the foundation of a second family. The birth took place a month after the battle of Blenheim, in which his only surviving son by his first marriage had indirectly no small share. This son, as Paymaster of the Forces, had evidently realised that money is the sinews of war, for at the close of the campaign he received a flattering letter from the august Corporal John himself. 'Mr Fox'—so ran the great Duke's missive in the sprawling round text which we all know—

'Mr Fox, if it had not been for your exactness never to have failed in furnishing the Army under my command with six weeks' pay beforehand, which I never wanted on the day it was due, I could not have gone to the Danube.'

Twelve months after the birth of young Stephen 'a greater wonder happened,' for twins were born to Sir Stephen, a son, Henry, and a daughter, Christian. Finally, in 1708, the year of Oudenarde, the old gentleman being then in his eighty-second year, Lady Fox presented him with yet another daughter. Not until 1716, three years after the Treaty of Utrecht, and two after the quiet establishment of the House of Brunswick on the throne, was Sir Stephen at length called to his rest, and buried in the church, which of his piety he had rebuilt, at Farley. He had been of the Court as a boy and had seen that Court dissolved, the country plunged into civil war, the Sovereign beheaded, and the Princes driven into exile. In that exile he had shared, and it must have brought him into contact, in 1646, with Abraham Cowley, Richard Crashaw, and Thomas Hobbes, all of them refugees at Paris in that year. He had witnessed the rise and death of Oliver Cromwell; he had seen his Prince restored, the succession of his brother James, the revolution which drove James across the sea, the accession of William and Mary, the great war with France which ended in 1697 with the peace of Ryswick, and the accession of Queen Anne. He must actually have been present at the coronations of every sovereign from Charles II to Anne. In his retirement he had watched from a distance the rise and fall of a

still greater soldier than Cromwell, John, Duke of Marlborough. As a boy he may have seen Ben Jonson; he may very likely have been nurtured on the poems, then just published, of George Herbert; and he may not have been unacquainted with those of yet another divine, the Reverend Robert Herrick. Yet Sir Stephen lived long enough to hear the fame of 'The Rape of the Lock,' and he may actually have seen Queen Anne touch a scrofulous child who bore the name of Samuel Johnson. Few men of long life have lived through greater times.

On the whole, we are inclined to rank this Sir Stephen as the greatest of the Foxes, certainly greater than his son Henry, while equal in intellect and superior in character to his grandson, Charles James. Lord Ilchester has happily reproduced for us a very fine portrait of his ancestor by Sir Peter Lely; and the face is that of a very handsome and highly bred man, sensitive, refined, straightforward, and resolute. One can never be sure that the hands painted by Vandyke and Lely really belonged to the bodies to which those artists have attached them; but, if Sir Stephen's hands were actually such as Sir Peter has represented them to be, they are well fitted to his countenance. We read without surprise that he took great interest in the fine arts, and employed not only Lely and Kneller to paint the family portraits but Verrio to paint the staircase of his new house at Chiswick. Moreover, we may be sure that Verrio received due payment for his work, which he did not from all of his patrons. Parts of the decoration of the house built by Fox at Redlynch in Somerset, which are now preserved at Melbury, show that Sir Stephen could be as sagacious in his choice of architects as of painters. Altogether he strikes us as a very remarkable man, presenting a rare combination of conspicuous administrative talent, fine artistic taste, spotless integrity, humbleness of heart, deep religious feeling, and wide and unfailing charity.

To turn from him to his son Henry, who is the hero of this volume, is somewhat of a shock to us. We follow Henry and his elder brother Stephen to Eton willingly enough, and we accompany them with joy upon their shooting expeditions. Of these they kept

a diary which, going back as it does to the year 1736, must be the earliest of its kind in the kingdom. There is a portrait, reproduced by Lord Ilchester, of Henry ready to start shooting, in a short jacket and long gaiters, with a very heavy and clumsy fowling-piece in his right hand, and two very 'leggy' spaniels in couples at his feet. He has the unmistakable face of the younger branch of the Foxes—heavy eyebrows, half-melancholy, half-humorous brown eyes, rather coarse mouth and rather heavy jaw—a curious departure from the austere, well-chiselled features of Sir Stephen. Yet the face is kindly and good-humoured, a little too easy-going perhaps, but welcome enough in a shooting companion. Men worked hard for their sport in those days; and the two brothers would scour the country for hours, generally on horseback, and return delighted with a bag of six or eight birds. Stephen must have been a remarkably fine shot, for, even with the awkward weapons of that primitive time, he once killed twenty-two partridges, a pheasant, and a wild-duck without missing a shot. Henry, though a diligent keeper of the journal, was not equal to his brother with the gun and not so ready to go out in all weathers. Still his entries show keen delight in the sport; though occasionally incidents are recorded which are heart-rending. Thus on one day 'four noble cock-pheasants were killed and not one brought home'; on another, 'The dogs caught a fine old cock-pheasant and ate it all up but the two legs.' We should guess from the picture that Fox's spaniels were quite capable of this crime. And so the journal goes on, intermittently, to the year 1753, when Henry Fox records that, 'being Secretary at War etc. he resigns the place of Recorder of the *Chasse*'; and we have reluctantly to tear ourselves away and follow him through the devious course of his public life.

Of what profit, it may be asked, can it be to study the political vagaries of such an one as Henry Fox who, rated at his highest, was never above the second or even the third rank? Has he any real claim at all upon our notice except as the father, and, from an educational point of view, the very bad father, of the famous Charles James? Who was Henry Fox? He was one of a fairly large class, the younger son of a country-gentleman,

who, having a certain amount of ambition and a fair proportion of brains, thought it no more than his right that he should be supported at the expense of his country, and entered political life as the surest means to that end. To speak plainly, he was an adventurer. The word has an ugly sound, but there are at all times many more adventurers in the political world than are called by that name. An adventurer is supposed to work mainly for his own advantage, to adopt such political opinions as will serve to that advantage, and to adapt them to the perpetual change of circumstances. Hence he is held to be always pliant and, if he knows his business, to be also, within certain limits, sagacious. But, after all, the political opinions of most of us are coloured, consciously and unconsciously, by predilection for that which may be profitable to ourselves. If we are well off under the existing system of government, we desire little or, at best, most cautious change; whereas, if we are ill off, we clamour for a revolution. No doubt it is wrong for any one class to order the ways of a whole community for its own interests; but the crime is no more heinous in country-gentlemen than in miners or transport-workers. An adventurer who works exclusively for his own class as against the rest of the nation is probably more mischievous than one who works entirely for himself as against other individuals.

Now in Henry Fox's time the dominance of the country-gentlemen was not seriously threatened, indeed hardly threatened at all. His battles were, in consequence, chiefly with individuals, cliques, *côteries*, and factions. He was not altogether ill-equipped for his venture. He possessed beyond question a good intellect, administrative talent, readiness and felicity both with tongue and with pen, no inconvenient encumbrance of principle, and a courage that amounted almost to recklessness. In private life the happy nature, which was his strong characteristic, had been strengthened by a runaway marriage, which endured to the end as an ideal partnership with an adored and adoring wife. Such a nature necessarily carried with it a genial manner; and this, added to a keen sense of the ridiculous, an affable courtesy and a very real and sympathetic generosity, made and secured for him many friends. On the other

hand, he was, in public life, hampered by very strong prejudices—he hated lawyers, for instance, far worse than he hated the devil, and took no pains to conceal the fact—and he had in him a streak of vindictiveness, not untinged by positive cruelty, which he kept under no control in hours of triumph. This touch of recklessness made him in reality a gambler rather than an adventurer; and it is not difficult to see from what source his son Charles derived the gambling spirit which was his bane alike in political and in private life.

Again, Henry Fox had not trained himself to be a full man even as a politician. He had made no study of foreign politics and knew little about them; and, as he happened to live at the time when Frederick the Great was hewing the way for Prussia to the hegemony of the Empire, and England was contesting with France the sovereignty of India and the New World, the deficiency was a little unfortunate. But, in truth, he was not ambitious of power unless it were as a means to patronage. What he really wanted was wealth and rank, with perhaps a certain standing in Parliament, where he could shine among his brother country-gentlemen and give some satisfaction to his intellectual vanity. For he was what is called a very clever fellow; and very clever fellows, who are far from uncommon, are frequently mistaken by superficial contemporaries for those rarest of God's creatures, wise men. But, after all, he obtained, in great measure, his heart's desire. He cut a considerable figure. He was thrown, as friend or enemy or both, with all the leading men of his time, and treated by them as of some importance. Finally, he amassed a very large fortune, not dishonestly gotten according to the standard of his day, by long tenure of the Paymastership of the Forces, and gained the barony of Holland. He did indeed fail to obtain an earldom—the one drop needed to fill his cup of satisfaction—and this, judging from the abject spirit in which he sought the honour, must have been somewhat of a mortification. Still, on the whole, he did well for himself. He acquired a delightful residence in Holland House, and, after he retired into private life, he had money enough to spend in a veritable riot of bricks and mortar at Kingsgate. Such a riot affords untold pleasure to some people; and

the first Lord Holland revelled in it as thoroughly as any. It is true that his two sons developed at an early age the extravagance which is hardly possible in any young men save those who, upon paternal principle, have been denied nothing. But, though Lady Holland mourned and lamented over this, his Lordship seems to have met the demands of the Israelites with unfailing good temper. He had helped many friends out of pecuniary difficulties without demanding a penny of interest, and could not be less sympathetic towards his sons than towards his friends. He had an enjoying nature, and judged no enjoyment, were it innocent or the reverse, with harshness. Altogether we confess to a liking for the man, with all his faults, and we feel sure that we should have found him likeable. But to take him, or even his son Charles James, seriously as public men is beyond our power, especially when we have such a standard whereby to measure them as that of old Sir Stephen Fox.

It seems very wonderful that, at a period when England was governed mainly by Foxes, Newcastles, and their kind, she should still have contrived to wrest North America and India from France. The substitution of Pitt for them during but a few short years sufficed for this; and yet Pitt was not one who could have governed for long. His strength was that his horizon was not limited as was that of his fellows. He could see visions and dream dreams, and, more than that, he could inspire others not merely to see and to dream likewise but to turn the shadow into substance. This gift of inspiration is rare and great; but it was the beginning and the end of Pitt's genius. His strategical designs were often faulty. His methods of arming the nation to execute them were, at best, imperfect and, at worst, vicious. His military commanders, Amherst and Wolfe, were neither of them of the first rank, and far inferior to the two Admirals, Saunders and Hawke. The greatest man of all at that period, greater, in our opinion, than Pitt himself, was Robert Clive; and he was not discovered, though he was instantly recognised as of extraordinary stature, by Pitt. Henry Fox, to his honour, was Clive's friend; but it is significant of the times that Clive sought recognition in England by joining the ranks of the

country-gentlemen in the House of Commons. One wonders what Henry Fox made of that moody, masterful genius. Clive's name occurs but twice in these two volumes, once when he described Fox as 'the patron of the East India Company'—a compliment which must rather have astonished the man to whom it was paid—and once when Fox intervened to save Clive from being unseated on petition. In this latter instance Fox 'threw the whole into a cause of faction,' stirring up one of those heated debates in which his soul delighted, because it gave him a chance, not so much of showing his friendship for Clive, as of wreaking his hatred upon the lawyers. In such strange fashion are the great names mingled with the little in this comical world.

And so we take leave, not without a kindly farewell, of Henry Fox. He and his like among the country-gentlemen can no longer claim support, in virtue of their position, for themselves and their children at the country's expense; and politicians no longer depend upon Court intrigues for advancement. We live in other and purer times. So we are told; but is it true? Other classes, more numerous than the country-gentlemen and quite as greedy, are now clamorous not merely for high wages at the cost of the State, that is to say of their neighbours, but for appropriation and division, in the name of the State, of all their neighbours' goods. And a Court is not needed as a centre of intrigue, for there are plenty of other centres, both political and financial. It may well be that when, a century hence, the secrets of the past fifteen years are laid bare, there will be revealed quite as much that is petty, contemptible, and even corrupt, as in the reigns of George II and George III. England does not readily part with her old traditions, be they good or evil. We venture to predict that, when the history of the great German war is written as fully as is that of the war of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War, there will be found plenty of Henry Foxes though there will be no William Pitt.

J. W. FORTESCUE.

Art. 10.—GERMANY, TURKEY, AND THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES.

Deutschland und Armenien, 1914 - 1918. Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke. Edited by Dr Johannes Lepsius. Potsdam : Tempelverlag, 1919.

DURING the course of the War, and especially in the years 1914 and 1916, the question has often been discussed whether the Turks or the Germans were chiefly responsible for the slaughter of the Armenian nation. At the time the position was somewhat obscure, through lack of information, but since then various books have appeared which throw light upon the subject. Among these the most valuable is undoubtedly the stout volume edited by Dr Lepsius, a noted orientalist and a true friend of the Armenians. This book furnishes us at last with the authentic documents relating to Armenia, comprising more than 400 dispatches and telegrams exchanged between the Berlin authorities and the German Embassy in Constantinople on the one hand, and between that Embassy and the German Consulates throughout the Turkish Empire on the other. It contains also numerous important official reports, memoranda, etc. Dr Lepsius had, on his own request, received permission to study the documents bearing on the Armenian question kept at the German Foreign Office, and he has published all the most important papers. His book, of which the British Press has hitherto taken practically no notice, is indispensable to the historian.

The massacre of the Armenians is probably the greatest crime in modern history. The Armenians are an old and highly civilised Christian race. They are a peaceful people engaged in agriculture and especially in commerce and industry. The business of Turkey was chiefly carried on by the industrious Armenians. At the outbreak of War, Turkey contained, according to the statistics of the Armenian Patriarchate, 1,845,450 Armenians. Of these about 250,000 succeeded in escaping to Russia across the land-frontier or the sea. Of the remaining 1,600,000, about 1,000,000, or two-thirds of their number, were killed. Half of these were women and children. Of the surviving 600,000 about 200,000

girls, women and children were carried away into slavery and were forcibly converted to Mohammedanism; and about 400,000 were wandering about in the wilderness, starving and in rags, or were kept in the Turkish concentration camps, at the end of the War. In addition to about 1,000,000 Armenians killed in Turkey proper, the Turks massacred from 50,000 to 100,000 Armenians when invading the Russian Caucasus. Lord Bryce and various other investigators have furnished us with figures similar to those provided by Dr Lepsius.

The murder of the Armenians was due not to Moslem fanaticism but to cold calculation on the part of the governing Turks. In their policy of extermination the Committee of Union and Progress followed in the footsteps of Sultan Abdul Hamid, Gladstone's 'great assassin,' whom they had deposed. At the Young-Turkish Congress held in Salonica in October 1911 the Committee of Union and Progress had formulated a Pan-Islamic programme according to which the Mohammedans were to secure for themselves the paramountcy in Turkey by extirpating those non-Turkish and non-Islamic nationalities dwelling in Turkey which were not willing to amalgamate voluntarily with the Turks. But the murder of the Armenians sprang not merely from political motives but also from sordid greed of gain. The Armenians were a wealthy community, including numerous millionaires. The lands and houses of the Armenians could be seized and their movable property appropriated by their murderers.

Turkey entered the War on Nov. 1, 1914. On April 20, 1915, the Turkish Government reported that a grave Armenian rising had occurred in Van. This 'rising,' which furnished a welcome pretext to the Turkish Government, was, according to Dr Lepsius, not an act of aggression on the part of the Armenians but merely an act of legitimate self-defence. The Turks had arrested and murdered some of the leading Armenians, and had then attacked the Armenian quarter at Van. Not unnaturally the Armenians resisted. In the fighting the Turks lost 18 men killed. This justifiable resistance of the inhabitants was henceforward described by the men in power as a treasonable act against Turkey. In its desire to put the Armenians in the wrong, the Turkish

Government asserted, through its accredited representatives in Berlin and elsewhere, that the Armenians had killed not 18 Turks but 180,000.

The ruling Turks resolved to destroy the Armenians by what they euphemistically called deportation. In the night between April 24 and 25, 1915, the Turkish authorities arrested in Constantinople 600 leading Armenians—politicians, priests, scientists, merchants, doctors, authors, journalists, etc.—and on May 27 the Turkish Government published a Provisional Law for the Deportation of Suspected Persons. Article II of that Law ran as follows :—

‘The commanders of armies, army corps and divisions may, if military requirements demand it, deport and settle in other localities, either individually or jointly, the inhabitants of the towns and villages whom they suspect of being guilty of treason or espionage.’

It will be noticed that no proof of guilt was required. Mere suspicion was considered sufficient for deporting the population of entire districts. In fact all Armenians were considered to be suspect.

Down to the end of June 1915 the persecution of the Armenians by means of forcible deportation appeared to be limited to those frontier districts which might seem strategically threatened. However, at the end of June, the Turkish Government began to deport large numbers of Armenians from the central provinces as well, although these were hundreds of miles from the theatre of war. Moreover, the Turks began confiscating all Armenian property throughout the country. As a rule, they killed all the men and carried away all the young women and girls. Altogether 1,400,000 Armenians were deported, and their possessions were seized. Wealthy and cultured people, invalids and delicate women, were driven like animals into the wilderness. People who had known every comfort and luxury were wandering about in rags and had to beg passers-by for a crust of bread or a drink of water.

The Armenian massacres were started by the Committee of Union and Progress with the two-fold aim of extirpating this Christian and non-Turkish race and enriching themselves. Count Wolff-Metternich, who

was the German Ambassador at the time, reported on June 30, 1916, to the Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg :

‘No one here has the power to tame the many-headed hydra of the Committee and its chauvinism and fanaticism. The Committee demand the destruction of the last remnant of the Armenians, and the Government must give way. . . . The members of the Committee cannot expect to obtain much from the persecution of these unfortunate people. Their property has been confiscated long ago by so-called “liquidation.” When, for instance, an Armenian had a house worth 100L., it has been sold to a friend or member of the Committee for about 2L. . . . To nationalise means in Turkey to expel or kill all non-Turks and to rob them of all they possess. In this activity and in the mechanical repetition of phrases about liberty learned from the French consists the vaunted regeneration of Turkey.’

In Turkey the governing politicians, the members of the Committee of Union and Progress, not the military, were responsible for the massacres. Many Turkish officers and high officials were disgusted with that policy and refused to carry it out. They were superseded. The Turkish outrages were tolerated and condoned by the German statesmen, who contemplated the murder of a whole nation with callous indifference. On the other hand, many German soldiers viewed Turkey's policy with undisguised disgust and horror. Several of the German generals in Turkey protested with the greatest energy, and even threatened to oppose the continuation of the slaughter by force of arms. But, without the support of their Government they were powerless. With strange indifference and perversity the German Chancellor and the authoritative representatives of the German Foreign Office watched the destruction of the Armenian people which they might have prevented. On May 31, 1915, the German Ambassador, Wangenheim, telegraphed to his Foreign Office :

‘To limit Armenian espionage and to prevent extensive risings, Enver Pasha means to close a large number of Armenian schools, to suppress Armenian postal correspondence and Armenian newspapers, and to settle in Mesopotamia all Armenian families which are not entirely free from suspicion. He asks urgently that Germany should not interfere with him in this.

'Of course these Turkish measures will once more cause great excitement among all the Powers hostile to Germany and will be exploited against us. These measures are certainly very harsh for the Armenians. However, I am of opinion that we may only try to mitigate their form but must not hinder them on principle. . . .'

When that dispatch was written, Wangenheim either was of opinion that the persecution of the Armenians, though harsh, was excusable and was due to military reasons of necessity, or he wished the German Government to believe that that was the case. However, a few days later he discovered, or thought it no longer safe to disguise the fact, that the Turkish Government had resolved not merely to persecute the Armenians but to exterminate them. Talaat Bey, in a conversation with one of the members of the Embassy, had given an unmistakable hint as to Turkey's aim, and information from other quarters had confirmed it. On June 17, 1915, Wangenheim reported to the German Chancellor:

'It is obvious that the banishment of the Armenians is due not solely to military considerations. Talaat Bey, the Minister of the Interior, has quite frankly said to Dr Mordtmann, of the Embassy, that the Turkish Government intended to make use of the World-War and deal thoroughly with its internal enemies, the Christians in Turkey, and that it meant not to be disturbed in this by diplomatic intervention from abroad. The Armenian Patriarch told the same gentleman a few days later the Turkish Government did not intend merely to make the Armenians temporarily innocuous but to expel them from Turkey or rather to exterminate them.'

These reports and others, which the German Government received from the Constantinople Embassy and from elsewhere, did not disturb its equanimity. The fate of the Armenians did not interest it. It did not intend to intervene, and it left action in the Armenian matter to its local representative who favoured the policy of non-intervention. However, in view of the indignation which Turkey's barbarous policy was likely to arouse, the German Foreign Office thought that a formal protest might be advisable for appearance's sake. So Herr Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Wangenheim on June 18,

1915: 'I leave it to you whether you should warn the Turkish Government urgently against rash measures against the Armenians, and whether you should advocate the cancelling of death-sentences against their leaders.' In consequence of this suggestion, Wangenheim thought it fit to send to the Turkish Government a mild note of protest, in which he appealed to Turkey's self-interest. The document is given in full by Dr Lepsius. This note of protest was handed to the Grand Vizier on July 4, 1915. On the same day Mr Lewis Einstein, an American diplomatist who had been attached to the American Embassy in Constantinople, wrote in his diary :

'In most instances the German Consuls have refused their assistance in mitigating this persecution of Armenians. They themselves have been willing enough, but had received instructions not to interfere in this from their Embassy. The Germans explain that, being allies in a life-and-death struggle, they cannot preach to the Turks. But inwardly many are not sorry to see their only possible rivals in trade destroyed.'

Although the German Ambassador and the German Government in Berlin were completely indifferent to the fate of the Armenians, they protested mildly, and in writing, against their persecution. In the opinion of the American diplomatists in Constantinople, they did so in order to be able to prove later, when reproached with their indifference, that they had done all that was humanly possible, but that their protests had proved unavailing.

Mr Morgenthau, the American Ambassador at Constantinople, in his excellent book, 'Secrets of the Bosphorus,' writes as follows :

'Wangenheim affected to regard the Armenian question as a matter that chiefly affected the United States. My constant intercession on their behalf apparently created the impression, in his Germanic mind, that any mercy shown this people would be a concession to the American Government. And at that moment he was not disposed to do anything that would please the American people.

"The United States is apparently the only country that takes much interest in the Armenians," he said. "Your missionaries are their friends and your people have constituted themselves their guardians. The whole question of helping

them is therefore an American matter. How, then, can you expect me to do anything as long as the United States is selling ammunition to the enemies of Germany? Mr Bryan has just published his Note, saying that it would be unneutral not to sell munitions to England and France. So long as your Government maintains that attitude we can do nothing for the Armenians. . . ."

The attitude of the German representatives in Constantinople, when approached about the Armenian tragedy, was one of utter indifference. They did not allow themselves to be disturbed when dining, or when playing cards, if the Armenian topic was raised, but showed plainly to their interlocutors that the subject bored them. That may be seen from the accounts of the American diplomatists and of others. But, while the German Ambassador at Constantinople and the Government in Berlin were entirely unconcerned about the sufferings of the Armenians, they strongly desired that the guilt should fall entirely upon Turkey. On July 16, 1915, Wangenheim wrote to Bethmann Hollweg:

' . . . Notwithstanding our repeated pressing representations, the Turkish Government continues to deport the Armenians and to expose them to destruction by settling them in barren districts. We cannot prevent them in this, but we must leave to Turkey the responsibility for the economic and political consequences.'

On the same day Wangenheim dispatched to the Imperial Chancellor a copy of a report, dated July 4, 1915, which he had received from Vice-Consul Kuckhoff from Samsun. In this report the Consul described the Armenian horrors and foretold that the world would attribute the guilt to Germany, adding:

'The consequences of the Armenian horrors becoming known can be foreseen. A cry of indignation will be heard throughout the Christian world. All the achievements of the Protestant and Roman Catholic Missions in Anatolia have been destroyed. Germany's enemies will of course exploit this affair, and our own countrymen also may be expected to be filled with the deepest indignation. The worst of the matter is that the whole world will attribute the guilt for the Armenian horrors to Germany, for our friends and our enemies believe that Germany dominates Turkey completely, and that such a

radical and important measure could not have been taken except with Germany's consent. . . .'

There were further protests on the part of the German Embassy, especially during Wangenheim's temporary absence from July 20 to Oct. 2, 1915. During that time Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg was in charge. He followed faithfully the policy of indifference adopted by Wangenheim and approved by the German Chancellor and the German Foreign Office. It is evident that the Turks fully understood that the protests made regarding the Armenians were made only *pro forma*, and *pro forma* they promised to abandon their cruelties.

While completely indifferent to the fate of the Armenians, the German representatives in Constantinople feared that Germany might be gravely compromised by the barbarous action of its ally, as Consul Kuckhoff had foretold in his Report of July 4 already quoted. It was generally believed in the provinces that the Germans had instigated the Armenian massacres. Hence Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg, the temporary Ambassador, telegraphed to the German Consulates in the provinces:

'During the last few weeks the Armenian atrocities have taken such an extension, our repeated representations notwithstanding, that we are in duty bound to express our distinct disapproval, if necessary. Turkish officers, clergymen and other people in Turkey have openly stated that "we Germans were the cause of these horrors." Such compromising statements must be energetically refuted.'

Germany occupied a position of undisputed superiority among the Central Powers. Her diplomatists and her generals directed all the activities of her allies. Turkey occupied a position of great inferiority, for she was dependent upon Germany for expert direction, for money, and for arms and ammunition. Thus Germany was able to bring considerable pressure to bear upon the Turks. The world began to reproach Germany for the Turkish massacres, because it was generally recognised that, although Germany might not have instigated them, she was certainly able to prevent or stop them. Hence Under-Secretary Zimmermann telegraphed to the Embassy at Constantinople on Aug. 18, 1915:

'Please express to the Turkish Government at an opportune time and in a suitable manner the conviction that the proceedings taken against the Armenians cannot be in accordance with the intentions and instructions given by the Government at Constantinople. Our friends in the Turkish Cabinet must understand that we have a lively interest in the suppression of these excesses, if only because we have been reproached with having originated them.'

Five weeks later, on Sept. 22, Herr Zimmermann telegraphed to the German Ambassador, requesting him to make once more a strong representation to the Turkish Government in favour of the Armenians. He desired that the Turkish Government should insist with energy upon the provincial authorities carrying out the instructions, which the Turks were supposed to have issued, for the protection of the Christian peoples, and particularly of the Armenian population. Of course, no such instructions had really been given. The Turks mendaciously asserted that, according to the orders dispatched, the provincial authorities should act with the greatest humanity; but the Germans ought to have been aware, and probably were aware, that these mendacious excuses and assertions belonged to the time-honoured stock-in-trade of Turkish diplomacy.

On Oct. 2 Wangenheim returned to Constantinople and once more took up the work of the Embassy, which he carried on to the day of his death, Oct. 25. During this time the American Ambassador, Mr Morgenthau, had a lengthy conversation with the German Ambassador, in which he renewed his efforts to induce Wangenheim to pursue an energetic policy in favour of the Armenians. The American Ambassador, in his book 'Secrets of the Bosphorus,' thus narrates his final conversation with the callous German :

'Wangenheim returned to Constantinople in early October. . . . For more than an hour, sitting together over the tea-table, we had our last conversation on this subject. . . . We again discussed the deportations. "Germany is not responsible for this," Wangenheim said. "You can assert that to the end of time," I replied; "but nobody will believe it. The world will always hold Germany responsible; the guilt of these crimes will be your inheritance for ever. I know that you have filed a paper protest. But what does that amount to?

You know better than I do that such a protest will have no effect. I do not claim that Germany is responsible for these massacres in the sense that she instigated them; but she is responsible in the sense that she had power to stop them and did not use it. And it is not only America and your present enemies that will hold you responsible. The German people will themselves some day call you to account. . . ."

"All that you say may be true," replied the German Ambassador, "but the big problem that confronts us is to win this war. Turkey has settled with her foreign enemies; she has done that at the Dardanelles and at Gallipoli. She is now trying to settle her internal affairs. . . . At the present stage of internal affairs in Turkey, I shall not intervene." I saw that it was useless to discuss the matter further. He was a man who was devoid of sympathy and human pity, and I turned from him in disgust.'

While the Germans refused to intervene with energy for the sake of humanity, they acted with some determination if Germany's interests seemed likely to suffer. When, for instance, the Turks wished to remove—which meant to exterminate—the employees and workers on the Bagdad Railway, a German undertaking, built with German money, General von Falkenhayn telegraphed from Headquarters to Enver Pasha:

'The development of the military position makes it appear possible that the transporting power of the railways which lead towards Syria and Mesopotamia will have to be increased to the utmost. I would therefore ask for your assistance. Please enable the railways to retain their experienced personnel. The efficiency of the railways would be seriously endangered if their Armenian employees should be deported during the war.'

In this case Germany's protest was successful. The Armenians on the Bagdad Railway were allowed to remain. If Germany had with similar energy insisted upon the protection of the Armenians in general, the massacres would never have taken place.

The German Government was not only kept informed on the Armenian position by its official representatives, whose reports possibly failed to depict the situation in all its horror, but it was also bombarded by private people with accounts which should have softened a heart of stone. For instance, Dr Martin Niepage, a

German teacher at Aleppo, wrote on behalf of his colleagues the following report for the information of the Foreign Office in Berlin :

' We feel it our duty to draw attention to the fact that our educational work will forfeit its moral basis and the esteem of the natives, if the German Government is not in a position to put a stop to the brutality with which the wives and children of slaughtered Armenians are being treated here. Out of convoys which, when they left their homes on the Armenian plateau, numbered from two to three thousand men, women and children, only two to three hundred survivors arrive here in the south. . . .

' Opposite the German Technical School at Aleppo, in which we are engaged in teaching, about four hundred emaciated forms, the remnant of such convoys, are lying in one of the hans. There are about a hundred children (boys and girls) among them, from five to seven years old. Most of them are suffering from typhoid and dysentery. When one enters the yard, one has the impression of entering a mad-house. If one brings them food, one notices that they have forgotten how to eat. Their stomachs, weakened by months of starvation, can no longer assimilate nourishment. If one gives them bread, they put it aside indifferently. They just lie there quietly waiting for death.'

Heart-rending accounts of the cruelties inflicted upon the Armenian population continued to reach both the Foreign Office at Berlin and the German Embassy at Constantinople. They reported not only the horrors perpetrated upon the helpless and innocent people but informed the German authorities at the same time that, according to common report, the Germans had organised these massacres, and that Germany's reputation would suffer irretrievable injury in consequence. While the fate of the Armenians was a matter of little interest to the leading German officials, they much disliked to hear that Germany's reputation was likely to suffer.

During many months the German Ambassador at Constantinople had sent to the Chancellor full accounts of the Armenian atrocities, and his reports had been supplemented by Consular reports and by letters and memoranda dispatched by various people and associations. According to the Imperial Constitution, responsibility for the policy of Germany, both foreign and

domestic, rested entirely with the Chancellor, to whom all the other Secretaries of State were subordinated. Now the remarkable fact is that, although Herr von Bethmann Hollweg had received during many months the fullest accounts of the misdeeds perpetrated by Germany's allies, he had apparently not taken the slightest official notice of them. At all events, in the collection of documents published by Dr Lepsius there is not a single document signed by the Chancellor until November 1915. The first document signed by him is dated Nov. 10; and it is significant that the Chancellor felt impelled to write to Herr von Neurath, not because hundreds of thousands of Armenians were cruelly put to death, but because the German Protestant and Roman Catholic Missions had indignantly protested to the Chancellor against the continuation of these barbarities. The Chancellor's intervention was aimed obviously not so much at protecting the innocent sufferers in Turkey as at protecting himself against the reproaches of the powerful German clergy. Bethmann Hollweg's first letter on the Armenian question runs thus :

'Prominent representatives of German Protestantism have put before me the facts regarding the Armenian question. I send you herewith their petition and a resolution relating to the same subject which has been passed at a Conference of the German Roman Catholic Missions. Both manifestations show that the proceedings of the Turks against the Armenians are observed with growing concern and indignation in Germany. I would ask you at every opportunity and with all emphasis to make use of your influence with the Turkish Government in favour of the Armenians and in accordance with the views and desires expressed in the two documents which I send you herewith; and I would like you particularly to watch that the measures which have been taken by the Turkish Government against the Armenians are not applied to the other Christian peoples in Turkey as well.'

While the German Government allowed its Turkish ally to slaughter innocent and defenceless people by the hundred thousand, it was stimulated into some activity by constantly recurring reproaches that Germany had egged on the Turks. For instance, on Nov. 29, 1915, the Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow, wrote to Count

Wolff-Metternich, who had been appointed Ambassador at Constantinople :

' . . . Hostile and neutral foreign nations do not cease to hold us Germans responsible for the activities of the Turkish Government. According to the report of Herr von Scheubner, it is widely believed by the Turkish people that Germany caused Turkey to persecute the Armenians. We think that we are entitled to expect that the Turkish Government will be loyal enough towards its German ally to deny these rumours emphatically.'

The new German Ambassador recognised speedily that paper protests and warnings and verbal admonitions were worse than useless, and that the Turkish Government would continue its policy of atrocities unless it was stopped by fear of the consequences. On Dec. 7, 1915, Count Wolff-Metternich wrote to the Imperial Chancellor as follows :

' . . . Colonel von Kress, Djemal's Chief of Staff, tells me that the misery of the Armenians is indescribable and is far greater than we have been told. At the same time, the rumour was spread about that the Germans desired to see the Armenians massacred. I have employed extremely sharp language. Protests are useless, and the Turkish assertions that no further deportations will take place are worthless. . . . In order to have success in the Armenian question we must instil into the Turkish Government the fear of consequences. If, for military reasons, we may not dare to act firmly, it is useless to protest any longer. Mere protests rather annoy than are useful ; and, if we cannot act, we must look on while our ally continues his policy of massacre. . . . '

The Ambassador was perfectly right. The Turks would have stopped the massacre of the Armenians if the German Government had chosen to instil into the ruling Turks a wholesome fear. But that was the last thing of which the German statesmen thought. The Turks had begun their campaign against the Armenians by exterminating them indiscriminately. After the Russian revolution they even advanced into Russian Caucasia in order to continue the work of extermination on Russian soil. Subsequently it occurred to them that it would be worth while to de-Christianise and nationalise them by forcible

conversion, especially the young. That proceeding was likely to arouse the anger of the German clericals at least as much as the previous slaughter. Their protests became, indeed, loud and threatening. Consequently Herr Zimmermann instructed the Ambassador at Constantinople to protest against the forcible conversion of the Armenians to Islam.

The Turkish Government had treated the formal paper protests of Germany with the contempt which they deserved. Not till Dec. 22, 1915, did it condescend to reply to the mild and ineffective documents which the German Embassy had filed with the Porte since July 4. The Turkish Note, which referred to the various communications sent by the German Embassy in the course of six months, was extraordinarily abrupt; and Germany was practically told to mind its own business. The Turks were evidently tired of the comedy which the German diplomatists were playing. They knew that these sham protests and admonitions were made only in order to disguise the fact that Germany was largely responsible for what had happened. From the documents collected by Dr Lepsius it is not clear who, in the last resort, is to blame for Germany's policy in this regard. Theoretically, of course, the Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, was solely responsible. But the Emperor cannot escape his share, for under the old German Constitution, the Chancellor was little more than the private secretary and principal clerk of an autocratic sovereign. Only a cross-examination of the ex-Chancellor and of the ex-Emperor can elucidate that point.

While the German statesmen and diplomatists observed towards Turkey a policy of easy toleration with regard to the Armenian horrors, they asserted to those Germans who felt outraged at the Turkish cruelties that Germany had done everything humanly possible. For instance, on Sept. 29, 1916, Herr von Jagow stated before the Committee of the Reichstag:

‘In the Armenian question we have made energetic representations to Turkey from the beginning. Perhaps later, after the War, when our position is no longer as delicate as it is to-day, we shall publish a record of the whole of our negotiations. At present I can tell you in confidence that our Ambassador has gone so far as to arouse the ill-will of

the Grand Vizier and of the Minister of the Interior. These Ministers have said, after three months of the Ambassador's activity, that our Ambassador seemed to have nothing to do but to bore them with the Armenian question. . . . I think I may say that we have done all we could. The utmost we could have done beyond this would have been to break off our alliance with Turkey. You, gentlemen, will understand that we could not make up our minds to do this. Much as we deplore the fate of the Armenians from the point of view of pure humanity, our sons and brothers are nearer to us than the Armenians. They are spilling their precious blood in terrible battles and they depend for their security upon Turkey's support. The Turks are rendering us a valuable service by protecting the flank of our military position. You, gentlemen, will agree with me that we could not break off our alliance on account of the Armenian question.'

Turkey, like Germany, was fighting for her life. Turkey was absolutely dependent upon Germany's support. An ultimatum dispatched in time, or a mere threat made in full seriousness, would have ended the Armenian massacres although it might possibly have led to some temporary estrangement between the Turks and the Germans. The German diplomats, or the German Emperor, did not care to bring adequate pressure to bear on the Turks. Possibly the Emperor did not wish Germany to intervene, and Bethmann Hollweg, who was no Bismarck, was unable to resist him. So the representatives of the Foreign Office had to pretend that, for military reasons, Germany had been unable to do anything for the Armenians. That pitiful excuse became the stock defence of the German authorities.

But, while German statesmen and diplomats callously looked on, German soldiers in Turkey, and even those who had been placed under the orders of Turkish commanders, protested with energy against the inhumanities of the Turks. General Liman von Sanders was roused to indignation and threatened to oppose the continuation of the slaughter by attacking the Turks.

On July 29, 1918, Field-Marshal von Hindenburg telegraphed to Enver Pasha:

'Various reports unanimously point out the pressing necessity to allow the Armenian fugitives to return to Armenia so as to enable them to bring in the harvest. Otherwise hundreds

of thousands must die of hunger for they can in no other way be supplied with food.'

Again, on Aug. 20, 1918, General Kress von Kressenstein telegraphed to the German Embassy at Constantinople:

'The apparent concession of the Turks relating to the return of the Armenian fugitives is absolutely worthless. While in the districts occupied by the Turkish troops that part of the harvest which has not been taken away by the Turks is rotting for lack of labour, huge masses of the Armenian population are going to certain destruction in the barren lands into which they have been driven. From day to day the position becomes worse. If all the desperate cries for help on the part of the Armenian leaders and clergy remain unheard, the responsibility for the annihilation of this ancient Christian people will lie upon Germany and Austria for all time. History will not and cannot admit that the two great Christian Empires of Central Europe were not able to enforce their will upon their Asiatic ally when the existence of the whole Armenian nation was at stake.'

Recent events have only too clearly shown that the bloodthirstiness of the Turk is not yet assuaged.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

**Art. 11.—THE JEWS AS A REVOLUTIONARY LEAVEN:
A REPLY.**

THE Count de Soissons' recent article on 'The Jews as a Revolutionary Leaven' * follows two main lines of argument. The one is general in its bearing, and points to the activity of Jews as a natural force of disorder in Europe;

'the Jews (says the writer) are the most radical nation in all departments of life, and their radicalism frequently verges on nihilism' (p. 172). 'The Jews . . . possess no country; they are dispersed throughout the States of Europe; and, physically united with and involved in its life, they cannot be passive spectators. Every European tremor acts upon them directly or indirectly. Persecuted and slighted during so many centuries, they now have no feeling but hatred towards Europe; and since, among the factors of culture, the most adverse for them is Christianity, they direct their hatred above all against the religion of Christ' (p. 185).

The other main line is directed to the construction of a particular chain of evidence between Spinoza (and Hegel) at one end, and Marx, Lassalle, and Trotsky at the other. The intervening links in this chain are Heine and Herzen, with Feuerbach's doctrine 'uniting Hegel with the positivism and materialism of later days' (p. 183).

'There is a certain similarity in the mental development, views and life of Heine and Hercen' (p. 172). 'The thoughts of the Jew Spinoza, whom Heine ventures to call "the successor of Jesus Christ," produced the most abundant fruits on German soil' (p. 177). 'Hercen took a prominent part in the revolutionary movement of Russia and Europe. . . . Heine, Marx, and Lassalle were united by their Jewish origin, by a common admiration for Hegel, and by the similarity of the revolutionary conclusions . . . which they derived from Hegel and Feuerbach' (p. 183). 'Heine's wish is fulfilled; for, in Russia, Christian blood is being spilt in abundance, and the followers of Trotsky are carrying to unforeseen, but not illogical, conclusions the principles of the Jewish revolutionary writers—Spinoza, Heine, Hercen, Marx, and Lassalle' (p. 187).

This, briefly, is the argument (generally, to Jewish

* 'Quarterly Review,' January 1920.

extreme radicalism and morbid detestation of Christianity; particularly, to the sources of Russian Bolshevism in certain Jewish revolutionary writers) which it seems desirable, as we hope it is possible, to meet and refute, if Jews are to maintain and to extend their place in our common civilisation,* whether spiritually as monotheists or morally as Hebraists, after the recent upheaval.

How far the war itself is responsible for the present phase of the Jewish question is a speculation, however fascinating, which is not quite relevant to our context. In a chapter of 'The Times History of the War,' published at the end of 1917, it was said:

'One after another, the great latent social and national problems of the world were raised by the war, and with the advance of the British forces from Egypt came the turn of Palestine and the Jews.'

Certainly, a part of the emphasis now laid by Count de Soissons and other writers on the racial type and national character of the Jews may be traced to the national activities of Jewish Zionists in respect to Palestine. But to other Jews, as has recently been pointed out in an excellent handbook on the subject,† these activities seem misplaced. They object to Jewish nationalism on several grounds that seem sufficient to them, and particularly because it tends to shift the *differentia* of a Jew from his religion to his race. They maintain that it is for the sake of the religion that the race has been kept apart, since a majority race would absorb a minority religion; that in all strictly national characteristics the Jew is identified with his fellow-countrymen; and that the admission of non-Jews to

* See particularly a posthumous book by Dr Joseph Jacobs, 'Jewish Contributions to Civilisation: an Estimate'; Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1919; also a passage in S. H. Butcher, 'Some Aspects of the Greek Genius': 'Henceforth it is in the confluence of the Hellenic stream of thought with the waters that flow from Hebrew sources that the main direction of the world's progress is to be sought' (1891).

† 'Zionism and the Future of Palestine: The Fallacies and Dangers of Political Zionism.' By Morris Jastrow, Jr., Ph.D., LL.D. New York; Macmillan, 1919: 'The claim is made that Zionism is part of the movement for the reassertion of nationalities that form such a striking feature of the political history of Europe in the 19th century. . . . This impression is certainly erroneous and misleading. As a matter of fact, of the Jews settled in Western European countries and in this country [U.S.A.] . . . only a very small percentage . . . approve of political Zionism.'

Judaism (at marriage, or on other occasions) is a proof of the purely *religious* test by which the name Jew is properly to be defined. We need not follow this reasoning further here* save to note that it commands the assent, if the author of that handbook is correct, of the large majority of Western Jews, and that, briefly, it may be expressed in the formula: Disraeli is a Jew to the Gentiles and a Gentile to the Jews.

Nor need we pause to discuss merely verbal differences with Count de Soissons. A 'nation' possessing 'no country' is a phenomenon rare enough to justify a somewhat closer scrutiny than is accorded to it in the article under reply. Assuming, then, with the assent of most Jews both in Western Europe and in America, that the Jew is identified with his fellow-countrymen by the habits of national life—patriotic sentiment, language, education, and the culture which he shares and to which he contributes—and is distinguished from them by his Judaism, which imposes, for its self-preservation, an interdict on marriage with a person not professing the Jewish religion, is it not much easier to account for the variety of type among Jews, as among members of other sects, classes, and (political) nations? We might refer at this point to the course of the struggle for Jewish emancipation, which was fought demonstrably in this country on a purely religious basis, and was closed by the victory of the principle of 'Englishmen of the Jewish religion.' We might refer, again, to the more recent formulation of that principle on the part of the Jews of the British Empire who attended the Peace Conference in Paris. They, too, like their forbears in the last century, placed Judaism first, in pleading for the rights of their co-religionists in foreign countries.

'Zionists (they wrote)† and the Delegations from Eastern Europe insisted on the presentation to the Peace Conference of a demand for the recognition of the Jews in their respective countries as a separate nationality. . . . The Anglo-Jewish

* See 'Zionism and Anti-Semitism,' 'Quarterly Review,' April 1902.

† 'Report of the Delegation of the Jews of the British Empire on the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain-en-Laye and Neuilly and the Annexed Minority Treaties'; London, 1920. The Delegation consisted of Sir S. Samuel, Messrs C. G. Montefiore, H. S. Q. Henriques, J. Prag, and Lucien Wolf (Secretary).

Delegates were unable to concur in this proposal, . . . and the Alliance Israélite also rejected it.'

It was on behalf of members of a religious community that the claim was preferred and vindicated for equal national rights. Thus, while, on the one hand, we demur to Count de Soissons' description of 'the Jews' as 'countrymen' of Karl Marx, and to his use of the word 'compatriots' in writing of a religious community, which provides loyal subjects to all countries, on the other hand we venture to suggest that a more open-minded attitude towards the Jews would not dwell exclusively on characteristics acquired by certain Jews in environments which have made, and are making, revolutionaries of men and women of any creed or none. Sir John Monash is a Jew as well as Trotsky, Samuel Gompers as well as Lassalle; and the zeal for order and moral righteousness is arguably more purely Jewish in its origin than local vices engendered in a reaction from Prussian militarism or from Russian autocracy.

This seeming neglect of Judaism in the constitution of a Jew, and the apparent concentration of Count de Soissons on qualities developed here and there in Jews exposed to influences contrary or indifferent to Jewish teaching, is at once the lock and the key to our difference from some of his conclusions—the lock, because it debars us from approaching his contention in the same plane as he; the key, because we must use it to explain our own point of view.

In nearly every instance adduced by Count de Soissons to prove his particular inference from 'Jewish revolutionary writers,' we should take, if not higher, at least other ground. We should say, frankly, of Spinoza, that, since he was expelled from the Jewish Church, Jews, adhering to Judaism, are no more entitled to the blame of the revolutionary principle traced by Count de Soissons to his writings than they are entitled to the credit of the praises bestowed upon his philosophy in the past. They will recall that Goethe was impressed by Spinoza's 'boundless unselfishness'; that Coleridge joined him with Bacon and Kant as a writer of one of the 'three great works since the introduction of Christianity'*; that he

* 'Biographia Literaria,' ch. x; quoted in 'Spinoza,' by Sir Frederick Pollock, p. 375.

affected Wordsworth through Coleridge; and that Henry Sidgwick said of him, 'Of this [self-development], according to Spinoza, the highest form consists in a clear comprehension of all things in their necessary order as modifications of the one Divine Being, and that willing acceptance of all which springs from this comprehension.'* But they will pass these praises by, on the ground that Spinoza, as a thinker, was cut off from communion with Judaism. Thus, 'the thoughts of the Jew Spinoza,' to which Count de Soissons ascribes so authoritative a part in the causation of modern revolutionary thought, are found to be akin to the thoughts of Hegel and other begetters, and not to proceed from 'the Jew,' as such. It may be urged that this view is academic, dialectical, sophistic, or the like, and that Spinoza was not less a Jew, in a common acceptance of the term, because the Synagogue at Amsterdam cast him out. We shall not elaborate the argument, but we submit that, if Jews themselves have seen fit to take the extreme step of denying spiritual communion with a member of their race, whose influence on posterity is of the spirit, it is not unjust to refer his 'thoughts' to some other part of him than 'the Jew.' It is a difference which must be felt, not expressed; but if Goethe, as the Count says, 'was a Spinoza in poetry,' the thoughts of the *Jew* Spinoza would seem not to have been specifically Jewish.

We stand, we think, on even firmer ground when we come to Alexander Herzen. For Herzen (1812-1870), unlike Spinoza, was not entirely a Jew by race. The name of Herzen is not mentioned in Graetz' 'History of the Jews.'† We have no record that he ever entered a synagogue, that he was acquainted with any rites of Judaism, or that he was even aware of his partly Jewish origin. 'His real name,' we learn, 'was Yakovlev; his father, a wealthy nobleman, married in Germany, but did not legalise his marriage in Russia, so his children took their mother's name'‡; and the son of a wealthy Russian nobleman, educated at a Russian university, is hardly to be regarded as the final type of Judaism through the

* 'The Methods of Ethics,' p. 90.

† At least not in the index (104 columns) of the English translation. We have not read all five volumes for verification.

‡ 'Outline of Russian Literature,' by the Hon. Maurice Baring, p. 150.

ages. In all the circumstances of birth and upbringing, Herzen would seem the very anti-type of a Jew, and the least suitable of all men to be included in that list of 'Jewish revolutionary writers,' whose principles and blood are the inheritance of 'such unscrupulous and blood-thirsty monsters as the leaders of Russian upheaval.'

Perhaps we may inquire more nearly who precisely Herzen was, and what place he occupied in Russian thought in the first half of the 19th century, before we admit, with Count de Soissons, that 'he was a foe not only of the ideals which produced contemporary culture, but also of all negatives of the ideals approved by the Revolution' (p. 182), or that he dreamed, like Heine, of an 'absolutely new order to be reached by revolutionary destructive madness' (ib.), or that, hating and dreaming these things, he 'followed' and 'in turn inspired' 'able and active Jews' (p. 172), and that among those whom he inspired is Trotsky (p. 187).

Mr Maurice Baring, a trustworthy authority, writes more accurately of Herzen, 'that he lived to see his ideas bearing fruit in the one way of all others he would have sought to avoid, namely, in "militancy and terrorism." When an attempt was made to assassinate Alexander II in 1886, and Herzen wrote an article repudiating all political assassination as barbarous, the revolutionary parties solemnly denounced him and his newspapers.' And an outlaw of 'revolutionary parties' should not unreservedly be included among direct agents of anarchism and revolution.

Our exception of Herzen from this category of 'Jewish revolutionary writers,' in the sense of a writer who derived his incitement to revolution from his Jewish race and blood, may be stated even more positively. Far from following active Jews, or inspiring them in turn, Herzen, it is legitimate to submit, was very typically Russian, in the true line of succession of Russian literature, and a very son of his own generation. In this connexion, Count de Soissons may have overlooked the life and works of Peter Chaadaev (1793-1856), whose letters on 'The Philosophy of History' in the 'Moscow Telescope,' 1836, were the direct forerunner of Herzen's letters in the press. Chaadaev in Russia, like Ibsen in Norway, aimed at a spiritual revolution. 'Solitary in

the world,' he called his country, as Herzen was to write in the same vein: 'A thinking Russian is the most independent being in the world'; and Chaadaev, who was solemnly found insane, though the pretence was abandoned after a month, became the prophet of Herzen and a true founder of 'Westernism' in Russia. We miss, too, any reference to Biélinsky (1816-1848), the great radical critic and philosopher, who, though not even half a Jew, was the chief force in the encouragement of the ideals, which, happier than Herzen, his disciple, he did not live to see exploited and traduced. We are not told of the oath of Turgenev (1818-1883): 'I swore never to make peace. This was my oath of Hannibal, and I was not the only one to take it in those days. I went to the West in order the better to carry out my oath.' We are not told of the likeness of these 'revolutionaries' to the hero-type of Russian fiction, in Herzen's 'Who is to blame?', in Lermontov, Gogol, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and Turgenev himself.* The essential qualities of the type are displayed in Goncharov's delineation of Oblomov, and in Turgenev's 'Fathers and Sons'; and it was invented, as Brückner tells us, to express a philosophy of life by a circle of earnest seekers, who 'followed no definite revolutionary, political, or social programme, but were active in the field of religious philosophy.'†

We confess to being no more content with Count de Soissons' evidence from Heine. To our thinking, very little of Heine is accounted for by recalling his Jewish origin. The Jews have never before or since produced the like of the lyric poet, who, jesting with all comers, jested at the last with Death himself:

' Ah! not little, when pain
Is most quelling, and man
Easily quell'd, and the fine
Temper of genius so soon
Thrills at each smart, is the praise
Not to have yielded to pain!
No small boast, for a weak
Son of mankind, to the earth
Pinn'd by the thunder, to rear
His bolt-scathed front to the stars;

* See Vogné, 'Le Roman Russe,' particularly p. 193.

† 'Geschichte der russischen Litteratur,' p. 298.

And, undaunted, retort
 'Gainst thick-crashing, insane,
 Tyrannous tempests of hate,
 Arrowy lightnings of soul.'

If Arnold's tribute be true, and many hearts have accepted it, can it also be true to say of Heine, that his 'most striking characteristic is his sensualism' (p. 173)? Somehow, we think of the tradition that the enemies of Rabelais strewed hams and sausages on his grave.

Heine, certainly, hated tyranny—the tyranny of the Synagogue, among other kinds—and he may well have seen, as the Count records (p. 187), 'a prophetic vision of the present storm in Russia, during which waves of destruction would rush threateningly towards the West.' But we cannot agree that it is Heine's wish that is fulfilled, when 'in Russia Christian blood is being spilt in abundance,' or that Trotsky is, therefore, a follower of Heine. Surely, Heine, who 'ruthlessly satirised and ridiculed, fairly and unfairly, any person, party or political tendency which he thought gave him a chance of attack,'* was not alone in denouncing the reign of autocracy in Russia. So recently as 1892, Herbert Spencer wrote to a correspondent:

'My hope is that the intensified despotism of late years, displayed by these measures against the Jews, as in other ways, leading as it does to the accumulation of various explosive forces, will end in a catastrophe which will break up into half a dozen kingdoms this great barbarian Empire.'

Spencer wrote more deliberately than Heine, but he is not therefore to be included among the makers of revolutions, whether Jewish, half-Jewish, or non-Jewish, whose intellectual descent is traced here from Hegel to Trotsky.

If we have succeeded at any point in proving or suggesting a weakness in the stretched line of 'Jewish revolutionary writers,' we should like, in conclusion, to say a word about Count de Soissons' more general argument. This, we saw, was, briefly, to the effect that the Jews, 'persecuted and slighted during so many centuries,' 'can have no feeling but hatred towards

* 'Cambridge Modern History,' xi, 413.

Europe,' and 'direct their hatred above all against the religion of Christ.' We shall not pause to ask if loving the Jews might not turn their alleged hatred to reciprocal love, and if a majority which persecutes and slights is less blameworthy than a minority which fails to turn the other cheek after many centuries. We hesitate even to ask if all liberal thought is really so destructive as Count de Soissons might lead us to suppose. Are we altogether to forget Körner, Kossuth, Mazzini? To side with Sir Timothy Shelley against his son, and to let the laurels fade at Missolonghi? Leaving these questions aside, we perceive, not without approval, that Count de Soissons would probably reverse Matthew Arnold's warning in 1865, and would remind us now that an epoch of concentration, at the end of a long war, seems to be opening in this country. Thrift and its kindred virtues, and the charity which begins at home, are so appropriate at the present time, that we must not quarrel with a counsellor who would bid us beware of disturbers of social order, whether practical or theoretic. But we are not prepared to go so far as to identify members of the Jewish race with the factors of disorder. Jews have a religion as well as a race; and, though some of them are still seeking a new country as a refuge from 'persecution and slights,' the vast majority of those whom we know have approved for themselves, and seek always for their co-religionists whom we do not know, a national status in the countries where they dwell. Their distant hope of the reign of a Messiah, as Macaulay said in 1833, does not shake their loyalty to the King of England.

We have tried to reconsider the Count's conclusion in the light of the actual facts about Spinoza, Herzen, and Heine, on whom he chiefly relies. We would add now, in respect to the general charge, that, though great-hearted Jews, like other men, have hated, hate, and will hate oppression, tyranny, and ignorance, and all forms of obscurantism, no adherent to Judaism, as such, no Jew representative of Jewish teaching, has ever hated any form of Christianity which true Christians do not also condemn. Count de Soissons accounts for that 'hatred' (or at least he admits it as a cause) by the experience of slights and persecution, to which we have

already referred. But is he not therein making a new scorpion out of the old scourge, and convicting Jews again for the very hate? It was a rarely clear-sighted Prussian who wrote, in the worst days of Bismarckian anti-Semitism: 'We Christians have tied up the rod with which Jewish usurers are flaying us.'

Jews, we venture to assert, have never hated Christianity as the social law of Europe. Here and there a Jewish voice may be raised, which confuses the evils of modern civilisation with the spiritual government that dominates it; which speaks of poverty, crime, bestiality, cruelty, prostitution, hate, in terms of a criticism of the Christian Churches; and which may even argue *post hoc* to *propter hoc*. But such voices and such unreason have never been the monopoly of Jews. Judaism, we hold, should be judged, not by its weaker adherents, nor by the worst of its renegades, but by its noblest and most truly bred sons, from Moses Maimonides in the 12th to Moses Montefiore in the 19th century. So, its critics will approach its tragic history, not in order to revive an ancient prejudice, but rather to illustrate the struggle in the aspiring soul of man, seeking in every department of secular thought, and in every age of the world's history, to reconcile the appearances of things with the Divine image in which he was created.

Art. 12.—A STRATEGICAL RETROSPECT.

1. *General Headquarters, 1914-1916, and its Critical Decisions.* By General Erich von Falkenhayn. Hutchinson, 1919.
2. *My War Memories, 1914-1918.* By General Ludendorff. Hutchinson, 1919.

PART I

THE purpose of this article is to supplement the series which appeared in the 'Quarterly Review' during the war by discussing some phases which, as we look backward, appear as landmarks in the general perspective. It is concerned more with the conduct of the war than with the strategy of campaigns. Thus, while we shall again traverse some ground already trodden, we shall endeavour to view it in a different aspect—that in which it was seen by the supreme directing authorities at the time, whose point of view could then only be conjectured. It is fortunate that, while the events are still comparatively fresh in the memory, enough can be gleaned from authoritative sources to serve our purpose.

Of the two, Falkenhayn is the more straightforward, the clearer thinker, and, perhaps, the more able soldier. His main object is to justify his decisions by describing the view of the situation, and the line of reasoning, on which each was based. Ludendorff wishes, in addition, to impress his version of the lessons of the war on the German people, that they may learn how to win the next war; for they share with the Government the responsibility for failure. With the Government Falkenhayn was always at loggerheads, because it would not conform to his dictation. While there may have been some ground for his complaints against successive Chancellors, his obvious animus makes one suspect that he exaggerates their remissness in supplying the needs of the army. He certainly makes small allowances for their difficulties. His narrative is often hard to disentangle from the jumble of miscellaneous reminiscences and political and propagandist digressions, with which it is interwoven; and there are occasions when one suspects him of being

'wise after the event.' His conceit is remarkable; and in the effort to magnify himself he does not show to advantage. A gloomy situation he paints black; he is weighed down with anxiety and responsibility like any weakling, only that he may emerge the one man of indomitable resolution. Hindenburg, his chief, he only mentions casually. No doubt Ludendorff's was the directing intellect; perhaps also the controlling will.

In Germany the conduct of the war, as regards plans and operations, was vested in the General Staff, which, being directly under the Emperor, was independent of the Chancellor. But in practice the Staff found its freedom somewhat restricted. The preparations which had been expected to cover all the requirements of the war proving inadequate, huge demands had to be made on the national resources; so that the Government, because it controlled the means of war, acquired an unforeseen influence on its conduct. In fact, the war-directing machinery came to approximate in character to that of the democratic belligerents. Much depended on good relations being maintained between the Staff and the Government. In this respect Ludendorff failed. Still, within the limits indicated, the freedom of the General Staff seems to have been unquestioned. Hence the German operations were usually characterised by promptitude and vigour; and they were, for the most part, confined to one object at a time, on the attainment of which all available means were concentrated. For the rest, the General Staff had direct relations with the General Headquarters of Germany's allies, and, in a great degree, influenced their plans. It may be said, broadly, that it really, though informally, directed the war for the Quadruple Alliance.

Russia conformed in principle to the German model. Between the French system and our own there was no fundamental difference. The Chief of the (British) Imperial General Staff was ostensibly the responsible adviser of the Government on military questions. It was his duty to prepare plans of operation; but these might be 'modified or rejected' by the Government. The Commander-in-Chief in the field was charged with the execution of the plans, as adopted; but he, again, was 'subject to such orders as he might receive from the

Government.* Thus the Government was entitled both to set aside its 'responsible adviser,' and to interfere at any stage of the operations. The system was a compromise between military and constitutional requirements. It purported to place the direction of war in the hands of the body of officers which had studied and prepared for war, while affirming the ultimate responsibility of Government by reserving to it the right to assume the direction itself. Clearly much would depend on how the system was worked.

One of the first steps taken on the declaration of war threw our war-machinery into confusion. One unversed in British methods might have thought that, in war, the 'brain of the army' would assume increased importance; but, from the first, it began to recede into the background. As pre-arranged, the Chief of the General Staff became Commander-in-Chief, and many of his subordinates also took the field. We copied the letter of the German system, but the spirit was wanting; our wars were directed from Downing Street, not from General Headquarters. The vacant places were filled by experienced officers, who had been ear-marked for the purpose; but the change of personnel doubtless impaired the prestige, and to some extent the efficiency, of the Staff. These measures did not affect the system; but a new departure was involved in the replacement of the civilian War Minister by a distinguished soldier, who became virtually Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener's strong personality, and the reputation he enjoyed with the public, were undoubted assets to a Government conscious both of the need for firm guidance in its counsels, and of the advisability of winning public confidence. These objects were achieved; but the constitutional status of the new Minister did not satisfy his thirst for responsibility. With characteristic energy and distaste for advice, he attempted to unite in himself the functions of the Chief of the General Staff, and of the heads of the Administrative Departments—a task beyond the capacity of any man, even in normal times.

Thus it happened that, for some months, the counsels of the Cabinet were dominated by the personal views of

* See Field Service Regulations, Part II, ch. 1.

the War Minister, whom years of absorption in other questions had given little leisure to study and reflect upon the problems of a great war. Later, wisdom was sought in a multitude of counsellors, some of whom, however excellent in their individual lines, were unfitted either by training or by special study, to advise on large questions of strategy. In the conflict of opinions which resulted, the Cabinet found itself in a sorry plight. Small wonder that 'expert' advice should have been discredited, or that the Government should sometimes have decided to follow its own counsels or to take the middle course of compromise.

Such, in rough outline, were the systems of war-direction with which the belligerents began the war. Our readers will remember the changes made by the Allies, as they realised the need of combination, in order to secure the degree of unity of command, and the promptitude of action conferred by the German system. The latter stood the test of war in the sense that it remained unaltered to the end. It had the weakness which every system must have which involves concerted action by a number of individuals with different responsibilities and different points of view. The Government, not being responsible for the conduct of the war, may have been less alive to the needs of the army than ours became when it awoke to realities. But the success of any system must depend on the men who work it. Germany lost the war (so Ludendorff says) for want of a Roon and a Bismarck. Falkenhayn, when appointed Chief of the General Staff, retained his post of War Minister for some time, to start his successor on the right lines. Again, it seems open to question whether it was sound practice for the Chief of the General Staff to assume direct command of the principal operations for the time being; it might not have been better had he restricted himself to the general conduct of the war.

Neither Falkenhayn nor Ludendorff makes more than incidental allusion to the German plan of war; but its development is easy to trace, and the considerations which determined its final form may readily be conjectured. War being the final instrument of policy, a European war became likely when, Bismarck's policy

having been abandoned, German aspirations began to run counter to Russia's interests. When the treaty with Russia lapsed, the German General Staff had to consider the problem of a war on two fronts—a problem which leaped into importance on the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance in 1895. From that time onward the war-plan developed in conformity with the changing situation, and the preparations deemed necessary for its effective execution continued to receive attention. Of these it will suffice to notice two—railways and fortification—which unmistakably define the trend of German military policy since the Franco-German war. Believing in the offensive, and knowing the importance of gaining the initiative, Germany preferred to put her money into the field-army, and the railways for transporting it rapidly to the frontiers, rather than into fortifications. The result was the creation of a comprehensive railway system, and the dismantling of the French fortresses in Lorraine (except Metz and Strassburg) and most of the works on the Vistula. The latest measures before the war are especially significant. The Vistula defences were restored in modern form, and supplemented by additional works; and arrangements were made for the establishment of a great military base at Aix-la-Chapelle, where the abnormal growth of railway sidings could hardly escape the notice of the least observant traveller.

It is evident that these latest preparations were associated with a change in the general situation which may be described briefly as the estrangement of Italy from the Triple Alliance, the *rapprochement* between France and England, and the military reorganisation of Russia as a result of lessons learnt in Manchuria. The Germans, so long as they could count on Italy and Austria, were not anxious as to the issue of a war with France and Russia alone; but the changed conditions made it advisable to prepare for a strategical defensive on one front. The preparations at Aix-la-Chapelle marked the decision to throw large forces against France on a front overlapping the defences of the French eastern frontier; while the Vistula fortifications provided for a possible withdrawal in East Prussia; the essence of the plan being to eliminate France before Russia should become dangerous.

There were ample reasons for the decision to deal first with France. It would obviously be sound policy to strike at the enemy who would be ready first. It was known that France could mobilise as rapidly as Germany: Russia was not expected to put appreciable forces into the field till a much later date. A stroke at Russia would be wasted in the air; it would find no definite objective. The Russians would follow their traditional policy of retreating, the value of which would be greater than in the past, because of the vast supplies needed by modern armies; and they would gain strength as troops came from the outlying districts, while the Germans would be weakened by the demands of the lengthening lines of communication, and delayed by the usual expedients. There were no vital centres nearer than Petersburg and Moscow. A march on the former would be out of the question, because touch with the Austrians would be lost. An advance on Moscow would expose the flank to attack by the sixteen divisions of the Petersburg district. Even if defeat were avoided, Russia could hardly be eliminated in one campaign; and disappointment of the hope of speedy victory, on which the armies and peoples of the Central Empires had been fed, would affect their *moral*—the decisive factor in war, especially when contending against superior numbers.

France, on the other hand, would afford little space for retreat. Paris is little more than 100 miles from the Sambre. The French armies would have to accept battle to cover the capital, or admit a moral defeat. If Paris were abandoned, the east-frontier defences would also fall, opening new and convenient lines of communication for the German armies. In short, the conditions, compared with those existing in Russia, would favour a quick decision.

These are general considerations. If, still following the German line of thought, we attempt to sketch a plan for attacking Russia, we find ourselves at once in a dilemma. The French armies would muster some 70 divisions; the Germans could, in all, dispose of only 78 divisions at the outset. It is plain that, if strong enough in France, Germany would be too weak in Russia. The conditions would not admit of flexibility in the defence of the western frontier; for the loss of the

Lorraine iron-field, yielding annually 20,000,000 tons of ore—three-fourths of Germany's whole output—would have meant the loss of the war. An active defence—the only possible solution of the problem—could not be attempted with forces much inferior to those of the enemy. Needless to say, the system of entrenchments, which has given rigidity to the defensive, had yet to be evolved; in fact the Germans, at that period, restricted the defence, on principle, to a single line. Nor, had they been able to dip into the future, would they have found the solution of the dilemma. During their defensive campaigns in France, they found a strength not less than two-thirds of the Allied forces barely sufficient; from which we may conclude that some 50 divisions would have been needed, at the outset, to hold a defensive zone in Alsace-Lorraine. The force available for the eastern campaign would thus have been weaker by some five divisions than that which was twice baffled by the Russians in the autumn of 1914.

The invasion of France having been decided upon, let us imagine how the Germans would regard the problem. The first step would be to determine the minimum force needed to keep Russia in check, by estimating the numbers which that Power could put into the field during the expected continuance of the French campaign. But the Russian system of mobilisation, unlike other systems, not being uniform, did not lend itself readily to calculation. Some military districts were of vast extent (e.g. Petersburg embraced 720,000, and Kazan 820,000 square miles); communications were sparse and indifferent; and in many cases reservists would have to travel long distances by road to their mobilisation centres. The railways and rolling stock were inadequate for the swift transport of the mobilised armies to the frontier. There were thus wide margins for error; and these were liable to be increased by improvements in the system of mobilisation and concentration (as known to the German staff), and by the process being begun secretly before the declaration of war. Whatever their estimate may have been, the Germans allotted ten divisions to the defence of East Prussia. The Austrians, who, judging from the peace distribution of the Russian army, should have a decisive superiority on the Galician front, were

doubtless intended to launch their main forces towards Brest Litovsk, to isolate the army of Poland (ten divisions), and to defeat the Russian reinforcements in detail, if these should cross the Bug without first concentrating. In any case, the situation might be expected to compel the enemy to abandon the offensive in East Prussia.

The remainder of the German forces would be approximately equal to the estimated strength of the French field army; but, by moving a strong wing through Belgium, the two primary conditions of success—superior numbers on the decisive battlefield, and surprise—might be secured. For the French, equally intent on seizing the initiative, would probably concentrate for an attack in Lorraine, the only quarter offering any advantages. Had the Germans, as they alleged, expected a hostile move through Belgium, they would probably have launched their main attack on the Lorraine front—a course which would have obliged the French to abandon an enterprise aiming at no vital point, in order to meet a real danger. That the plan was the best (ethical and political considerations apart) that the conditions admitted, is clear. An invasion through Switzerland would have been a risky adventure, on account of the difficulty of the country, the efficiency of the Swiss Militia, and the prospect of guerilla warfare; while the two lines of railway debouched, one at the fortress of Belfort, the other opposite the entrenched camp of Besançon. Preferable to this would have been a direct attack on the Verdun—Belfort fortress-line; but here there would have been no effective surprise, for, *ex hypothesi*, the French would have been in force. If a breach were forced, it would still be necessary to subdue the great fortresses that bar the railways without which the armies could not be supplied; and the enemy, in falling back, would cover their communications and Paris.

In short, Belgium offered at once the safest and the most promising line of operations. The Germans hoped to destroy the Belgian army before it could be supported; and the occupation of the country would be a step to its annexation. The possible hostility of England does not seem to have caused them much anxiety. If we may take Falkenhayn's opinion, expressed with reference to a

later period, as indicating the German view before the war, it was considered that 'for England the campaign on the Continent of Europe with her own troops is at bottom a side-show'; and that, if France were defeated, 'there is no certainty that she would give up, but there is a strong probability.'*

It was not till Aug. 15, when the Germans were reported to be crossing the Meuse in force at Liège, that General Joffre penetrated the enemy's design. It was then too late for counter-dispositions to be completed; and the Allied forces were caught, much as the French had been in 1870, in the act of concentrating. The plan had achieved its object; it had brought superior forces to the battlefield. Why, then, the ultimate failure? Apart from the gallant front maintained by the Allied armies, and the stand made upon the Marne at the decisive moment, the Germans marred their own plan in the execution. Alarmed at the invasion of East Prussia, Moltke sent four divisions from the important right wing to reinforce Hindenburg—a decision which Ludendorff characterises as 'fateful.' Then the promising situation on the Sambre battlefield was lost for want of united action on the part of the three army commanders (Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen) on the Sambre—Meuse front, which the Great Headquarters failed to remedy. Bülow drove Lanrezac back while Kluck's right wing was still a day's march from its objective. The British having to conform, Kluck's enveloping attack missed its mark; and Hausen, who should have forced the Meuse in time to intercept Lanrezac and thus complete the envelopment, came on the scene too late. Lastly, the Germans, anxious to retrieve the lost advantage, out-marched their supplies, and reached the Marne weary, hungry, and short of ammunition. These were conditions not of victory, but of defeat.

The German war-plan seemed to have fallen to pieces; but it was put together again in a different shape. The elimination of the west front had not been achieved; worse still, the situation in the east had become perilous. But the unforeseen innovation of

* Falkenhayn, p. 214.

trench warfare led, after some preliminary manoeuvres, to the deadlock which enabled the Germans to do what had seemed impossible—to maintain a defensive in France while turning against Russia with forces which, though weaker than they had hoped, were still considerable. In fact, the aspect of the war had changed; the importance which had belonged to the west front was, for a time, diverted to the east. Here the plan had failed signally, the Russian forces having far surpassed the estimate. The Austrians had been thrown back; and, on Aug. 17, Russia had invaded Galicia. East Prussia had been invaded from east and south; and the German commander contemplated a withdrawal behind the Vistula. But to abandon East Prussia in the circumstances which had arisen would have been to court disaster. Ludendorff, preoccupied with his own prowess at this crisis, slurs over the essential features of the situation, which dominated the German conduct of the war on the east front for some months.

Galicia was the real point of danger. Had the Austrians been equal to their task, there would have been little reason for anxiety about East Prussia. But the inferiority of the Austrians, obvious since their first contact with the Russians, boded ill for the defence of Galicia; and the occupation of both these provinces would clear the flanks of a hostile advance through Poland, which would turn the Vistula defences. An invasion of Posen, Silesia, and even Hungary—with consequences, perhaps, disastrous to the Dual Monarchy—would come within the range of possibility. Silesia itself, from its mining and industrial resources, ranked with Lorraine in importance.

Thus Moltke's decision to clear East Prussia of the enemy was justified on purely military grounds, as a preliminary to helping the Austrians. Those who point to it as evidence of unsoundness in the original plan ignore the fact that no plan can extend, in detail, beyond the first contact with the enemy. What follows must depend upon the situation which results from actual fighting. The original object may still be pursued, or it may have to be, at least temporarily, abandoned. The German war-plan was only by degrees evolved in its new shape; and this rather by force of circumstances than

by a clear view of the situation. Ludendorff seems to have realised after the first battle of Ypres (November) the necessity of resorting to a strategical defensive on the western front. Falkenhayn (who succeeded Moltke on Sept. 14) still hoped for a decision in France; but he tells us that he now 'began to familiarise himself with the idea of taking the conduct of operations in the East into his own hands.'* In January 1915 he placed eight divisions at Hindenburg's disposal—a step forced upon him by 'the conviction that Austria-Hungary must otherwise collapse in a short time under the burden of the war.'† It was not till three months later that large forces were transferred from France for the great offensive, which, starting from the Dunajetz in May 1915, wore itself out in September at Dwinsk and Vilna.‡ The delay was doubtless to Germany's advantage; for a winter campaign in Russia would have involved great hardships and difficulties, without achieving equal results.

We may notice in this place a fundamental difference of opinion between Falkenhayn and Ludendorff. Falkenhayn never intended to do more than to throw the Russians back to a safe distance, and there to establish a firm front.§ He believed, with Clausewitz, that Russia's military power could not be destroyed in the field—that it would collapse only from internal causes; and he was averse from squandering Germany's resources in a fruitless enterprise. Ludendorff believed that the 'annihilation' of the Russian armies was not only possible, but a necessary preliminary to an active campaign in France, for which sufficient troops could not otherwise be spared. That these views were not formed 'after the event' is proved by correspondence which took place between Falkenhayn and Hindenburg in August 1915; and we shall find that they affected the conduct of the war by their respective exponents. Even the campaign of 1915 was influenced by Ludendorff's obstinate adherence to his opinion; for he cherished visions of enveloping the Russian armies in Poland by a wide movement towards

* Falkenhayn, p. 59.

† Ibid.

‡ Mackensen's 'phalanx' was composed principally of troops from the western front (Ludendorff, vol. I, p. 140).

§ The conclusion arrived at in the 'Quarterly Review,' April 1915, pp. 581-583.

Vilna, and, in consequence, pleaded inability to reinforce the Narew front at a crisis which might have been decisive. Throughout the second half of the campaign Falkenhayn carried the principle of allowing Hindenburg (i.e. Ludendorff), a free hand to the point of weakness; and, indeed, he candidly admits the fault. There resulted the most striking example of friction and cross-purposes known to have occurred in an organised army.

The state of stagnation which supervened on the west front after the first battle of Ypres gave rise, on the part of the Allies, to various projects for regaining freedom of action. These we may pass by, merely noting how, when the tension of the preceding three months was relaxed, the weakness of inter-governmental conduct of war began to appear. It is not surprising that, when a respite from immediate danger enabled political influences to assert themselves, divergent aims and anxieties, and, perhaps, the tendency to impute motives not purely altruistic, should have led to divided counsels. A suggestion for combined naval and military operations against the German right flank, approved in London, was negatived at Paris in favour of frontal attacks elsewhere, nearly three months having been spent in discussion and correspondence.* Fortunately the factor of time, usually vital in war, was in this case unimportant; but the incident did not augur well for the conduct of the war. The project itself is of interest, because it seems to have set some active minds thinking that it might be better to utilise what the late Sir Frederick Maurice happily termed our 'amphibious strength' than to expend our slender military resources in frontal attacks in Flanders. Various projects were mooted. Ultimately the idea took shape in the fateful expedition to the Dardanelles, the history of which discloses the weakness of our machinery for conducting war.

It is necessary to understand the psychological situation which existed during the winter of 1914-15. Falkenhayn, as we have seen, continued to hope for a decision on the west front without resorting to drastic measures against Russia. The attitude of the Western

* See '1914,' by Field-Marshal Viscount French, p. 302.

Allies was more complex. Belief in the possibility of breaking the German front, faith in the policy of 'attrition,' expectation of further German attacks and anxiety as to their outcome, solicitude about home defence—these were feelings which, in one quarter or another, tended to cloud the judgment, and to militate against energetic action. Allowance must be made for the weight of responsibility which those in authority had to bear at a time when they were still suffering from the effects of severe nervous strain. But, while a strict limitation of operations to the west front would have been intelligible, it would be hard to understand why a new departure of such importance as the Dardanelles expedition was lightly undertaken, were not the story told in sufficient detail in the reports of the Dardanelles Commission.

The project, chosen, as it was, from among several proposals for the employment of our amphibious strength, did not originate in any clear strategical aim. When first discussed by the War Council (Nov. 25, 1914), it was in the form of a 'diversion,' somewhere on the Asiatic coast, or at Gallipoli, to 'defend Egypt'; the design evidently being, not to defeat the Turks, but to draw them away from Egypt, and thus put off the evil day when they would have to be fought. On Jan. 3, 1915, Russia, in reply to an appeal for help, was promised a 'demonstration' (which, Sir Edward Grey aptly observed, need not mean active operations at all). Ten days later it was decided to prepare for a 'naval expedition, to bombard and take (*sic*) the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective.' On Jan. 28 the Council resolved to carry out the operation; a weighty reason urged in favour of a purely naval attack—at once strange and significant of irresolution—being that it could be abandoned without loss of prestige. But, soon after this meeting, the Council seems to have been assailed by doubts on two points; first, the practicability of ships 'taking' land positions; second, the possibility of breaking off the attack without loss of prestige. As time passed, these doubts grew into a kind of half-conviction; so that, on Feb. 16, it was decided to order the 29th Division to Lemnos, to supplement the troops already in Egypt. But, in disregard of an elementary principle of war, the land force was only

to be used in the event of the naval attack failing—'after every effort has been exhausted'—while the Russians who were to attack the Bosphorus, were to make no move until the Dardanelles had been opened.

To make matters worse, Lord Kitchener, anxious about the situation at home and in Flanders, suspended the embarkation orders of the 29th Division, which did not take effect till March 16—two days before the failure of the naval attack proved that, as most soldiers had originally held, the land positions would have to be taken by the troops to open the way for the ships. Delays due to the tardy dispatch of the 29th Division, and to the careless loading of the transports, gave the Turks just the respite needed to complete their preparations. A German Staff Officer, who has given us a glimpse behind the scenes, tells how Liman von Sanders, when appointed, on March 25, to command the defence, found it necessary to re-cast the whole plan, and to employ 'battalions of workmen' on road-making. 'In the month at his disposal, the Field-Marshal, with superhuman energy, just contrived to get things ready. Had the attack come a little sooner, heaven knows what the end would have been.'* Liman's anxiety was not relieved until the certainty that there would be no landing at Enos, and the withdrawal of the French from the Asiatic shore, enabled him to concentrate his forces in the Peninsula.

The difficulties of the operation were much underestimated, in respect both of the numbers and fighting qualities of the Turks. Undue reliance was placed on the reports sent home by ill-informed or mendacious agents; and it was supposed in the highest quarters that the Turks, having made a poor show in the Balkan campaign, would be put to flight by a few big shells. Thus the force provided was too small, and it lacked the special training needed for the conditions under which it would have to fight. These defects could have been remedied had the enterprise been postponed till July, when sufficient forces would have been available for the extension of operations to the Asiatic coast, without which success could hardly be expected. But the Government thought to avoid meeting the requirements of the

* 'Gallipoli, der Kampf um den Orient.' Berlin, 1916.

situation by creating a situation which would suit the means available at the moment. The instructions given to the Commander-in-Chief, by forbidding any operations on the Asiatic shore, sought to limit the force that would be needed by chaining it to a position which made lateral movement impossible. Thus the Turkish defences, impregnable in front, could not be turned. To recall another episode in the war, it was as though, when the force advancing on Kut was held up at Sanna-i-Yat between the marshes and the river, Sir Stanley Maude had been forbidden, by orders from London, to execute the movement south of the river by which he beat the Turks.

An enterprise conducted in so half-hearted a manner was foredoomed to failure. 'Everything,' as Clausewitz said, 'usually miscarries in war, that is not undertaken upon clear conviction, and with the whole will and energy.'* It stands to the credit of those responsible for the conduct of the war that, in spite of the psychological influences to which I have referred, they went so far as to recognise that the one vulnerable spot which Germany would find it difficult to protect was Turkey. But their perspicacity carried them no further. They did not see that the early defeat of Turkey was almost a necessity; and so they compromised between the needs of the expedition and the insistent demands pressed upon them from France. Yet even in France, as we have seen, there was not merely a lack of 'clear conviction,' but a sharp difference of opinion, as to the best course to pursue on that front. In fact military opinion was so unstable, and the influences at work were so varied, that firm and vigorous conduct of the war was improbable.

It is doubtful if, at that period, the situation was fully grasped by any of the Allies. It was a fundamental weakness of their position that their front was divided. The Germans complained of having to fight on two fronts, although these were closely inter-connected by railways; the Allies had to fight on two fronts—the western and the eastern—between which there was no communication except by sea round the North Cape, or by the Siberian railway. Had a similar situation existed in a small theatre of war, its disadvantages would have

* 'On War,' Bk. VI, cap. 18.

been plain. Everybody realised what the breaking of the front at Amiens (March 1918) would have meant. After Caporetto (October 1917) Italy was saved by reinforcements rushed from France. If Russia's isolation had been ended early in the war, the Allies might have been saved from many anxieties and sacrifices. It was the factor in the general situation which most favoured the Central Alliance, contending, as it was, against forces which, in the aggregate, were much superior. The moral effect, dominant in war, would have been great. Free intercourse, and the interchange even of small bodies of troops, would have done much to frustrate the aims of German propaganda among the Russian people and armies, by vindicating the sincerity of the Western Allies, and dispelling the belief that they were using Russia as their catspaw. Other considerations, which need only be mentioned, were the supply of munitions to Russia and Rumania; the export of corn which ultimately went to relieve the rigour of the blockade; and the menace which a possible revival of the Balkan *bloc* would have implied to Austria. At the least, there would have been a good prospect of preventing the defeat of Serbia and Rumania, which, by the end of 1916, had cost the Allies more than half a million men; and it may be that a shortening of the war would have averted the ruin of Russia.

Great as was the importance of opening the Straits, there were, of course, other considerations of hardly less moment, which made the defeat of Turkey a matter of urgency. The Turks were Germany's instrument for weakening the Allies on the main fronts, by obliging them to detach forces for the protection of vital interests in remote regions; while Turkish influence and propaganda were expected to cause further dispersion of force by exciting disorder throughout Islam. Some people, wise after the event, think that the danger was exaggerated. How great it was, no one can now say; for the effect of the measures taken to counteract it—which, indeed, made no small demand on the Allies' resources—is not, nor can be, known. That the Turks had to be fought is, at least, quite plain; the only question was whether they, or the Allies, should choose the place and time. In such circumstances the best course is to strike

at the enemy's vital centre, the loss of which, if it should not paralyse him, will at least weaken any further effort. Falkenhayn, plainly in compliment to the Turks (on the value of whose aid he is, at the moment, enlarging), pretends to believe that the fall of Constantinople would not have caused them to yield. However this may be, they would have ceased to be of much account in the field; and their prestige and influence in the Mahomedan world would probably have declined. To the Central Powers the defeat of Turkey would have involved not only the loss of an ally valuable out of proportion to his military power, but the downfall of the Balkan and eastern policy for which they provoked the war; and the moral effect would have been commensurate with the magnitude of their aspirations.

We have now ample means of knowing how the Germans regarded the situation in the Near East. Falkenhayn tells us, in reviewing the general situation as it existed when he became Chief of the General Staff, that he 'considered it indispensable that this [the Turkish] alliance should materialise.' (A secret alliance had, in fact, been concluded on Aug. 2, 1914; but this had not been made public when he wrote.)

'If,' he continues, 'the Straits between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea were not permanently closed to Entente traffic, all hopes of a successful course of the war would be very considerably diminished. Russia would have been freed from her significant isolation. It was just this isolation, however, which offered a safer guarantee than military successes were able to give, that sooner or later a crippling of the forces of this Titan must take place, to a certain extent automatically.'*

Such being his view, he began, so early as January 1915, to urge on the Austrian Command the importance of crushing Serbia—a course which, by 'opening up the communications with the south-east, held more promise than did any local successes in the Carpathians, or on the East-Prussian frontier.'† The project was again considered in April, May, June, and August; the chief object being to join hands with the Turks, in order to ensure

* Falkenhayn, p. 19.

† Ibid., p. 57.

the isolation of Russia. But action had to be postponed because the Bulgarians refused to join till after the harvest; and without their aid success would be uncertain.

It is evident that the attitude of Bulgaria was, for Germany, the ruling factor in the problem of relieving the Turks. It was, moreover, an uncertain factor. If we may believe Falkenhayn, Bulgaria's enthusiasm for the German cause waxed and waned in harmony with the changes of fortune on the eastern front; and the certainty that it would be finally extinguished if America should join the Allies led to the suspension of the 'unrestricted' submarine campaign. Had the Allies made no move against Turkey until July 1915, and then employed suitable forces, Bulgaria would probably have become deaf to German persuasion. Still, Falkenhayn had to be prepared for an effort to save Turkey, with or without Bulgaria's aid, if Constantinople should be really endangered. Accordingly, he so arranged the operations against Russia after the fall of Lemberg (June 22) that, without relaxing the pressure on Russia, forces could be provided to open communications through the Balkans, and to meet the Allied offensive in Artois and Champagne, where preparations were observed in July. This problem had to be solved 'at any moment in which it might suddenly become urgent'; for he was 'convinced that it was more important than the question of bringing the Russians to their knees.'* He considered the advisability of seeking a way through Rumania, instead of through Serbia—a course which would have freed Austria-Hungary from anxiety on that side, besides securing a rich corn country. But the idea was abandoned because 'it was not advisable to give Germany another open enemy.' Hence he decided to attack Serbia; but how he proposed to deal with a neutral Bulgaria he does not say. Negotiations were re-opened at Sofia in July, when, possibly, Bulgaria agreed to allow passage to German troops under the plea of *force majeure*. The conquest of Serbia single-handed would, however, have been a serious undertaking; and, with the front in Russia longer by 170 miles than it was in the following October, it is hard to see how he

* Falkenhayn, p. 159.

could have hoped to bring timely and effective aid to the Turks 'without relaxing the pressure on Russia.' He would also have had to provide for the possible hostility of Rumania, which would have placed the Austrian armies on the Galician front in a critical position.

The conquest of Serbia three months later satisfied, for the moment, the needs of German war-policy in the east. By freeing Turkey from danger in the only quarter where defeat would have been decisive, it made Russia's isolation permanent. It enabled the Germans, so far as their resources permitted, to supply the munitions and railway-material which the Turks needed for their campaigns in the secondary theatres of war. The Allies were thenceforward committed to costly and indecisive operations, which, though offensive in form, were imposed by the necessity of defending regions and interests which could not be neglected. Thus nearly half a million men were dispersed in Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Caucasus, while as many were locked up in Salonika. The British forces engaged on outlying fronts throughout the war numbered from three to four hundred thousand at different periods. These were consequences of the failure to restrict the area of the war by disposing of Turkey at the outset. The presence of a hostile force at Salonika was not, indeed, welcome to the Germans; but Falkenhayn, for reasons which need not detain us, decided, after repeated consideration, to tolerate it, finding consolation in the thought that the Allied troops would be immobilised by the Bulgarian army, which could not be drafted to the main fronts, whereas the expulsion of the Allies would free them for employment in other theatres of war.

W. P. BLOOD.

(To be continued.)

Art. 13.—THE ECONOMICS OF THE PEACE.

1. *The Economic Consequences of the Peace.* By John Maynard Keynes, C.B. Macmillan, 1919.
2. *The Peace Treaty and the Economic Chaos of Europe.* By Norman Angell. Swarthmore Press, 1919.
3. *The New Germany.* By George Young. Constable, 1920.

FEW, if any, writers on public finance or on the dismal science of Political Economy have leaped so rapidly into fashion and celebrity as Mr Keynes. Half a century after Adam Smith's death, when Sir Robert Peel's Cabinet was converted from Protection to Free Trade, not a single member of it had read 'The Wealth of Nations.' Neither Malthus, Ricardo, Karl Marx, Bastiat, Friedrich List, Bagehot, Jevons, Henry George, nor any other economists who have disclosed unsuspected truths, exposed popular fallacies, or invented potent fictions, ever took the City and the West End by storm as Mr Keynes has done with a single stroke.

Various explanations may be offered for the success of the book. The subject was not new or attractive. Publishers tell one that English readers are sick of the war and want to forget all about it. Pleasure, sport, love stories with happy endings—these are eagerly bought, or borrowed from the lending libraries. But, if people want to forget the carnage, they are immensely curious and anxious about the economic consequences of the struggle. War, like a tree, is judged by its fruits. Men and women, who had never dreamt of inquiring into the mysteries of the currency, are now eager to learn about the 'Bradbury,' the franc or the mark; why dollars are dear, and *lire* cheap; why the peseta is at a premium; why Russian roubles and Austrian crowns barely pay for printing, and, above all, why everything is dear. Here in England the intoxication which greeted the Armistice has been followed by the customary headache. The promises and pledges of the General Election were incapable of fulfilment; and, as time advances, the Georgian Eldorado, with its plentiful supply of cheap houses for all, low taxes and abundance, seems to be fading away. Above all, the German indemnity, which was to pay for the war, is not forthcoming.

Now Mr Keynes' book was well adapted to the autumnal mood of a disappointed and disillusioned public, which wanted to know the cause of its disappointment and its disillusionment. The crowd had celebrated the Armistice with spontaneous emotion, and the Peace with official rejoicings. But the fruits of peace, instead of ripening, seemed to have turned sour at Paris. Was it conceivable that the great men who had won the war had failed to win the peace, that the Treaty, so long in coming, was not, after all, a masterpiece of human wisdom? The continuation of conscription and 'D.O.R.A.,' of high prices, high taxes, heavy expenditure and borrowing, suggested that something must be wrong. Suddenly there steps forth from among the experts, who attended and advised the Big Four, a person as discontented as these bewildered murmurers. When the advice he tendered was definitely rejected—in the first week of June 1919—he resigned, and wrote this book, in which are stated, as he puts it, 'the grounds of his objection to the Treaty, or rather to the whole policy of the Conference towards the economic problems of Europe.'

There is something piquant in his position. There is nothing of the pacifist about our author. So far as we know, he had no qualms of any kind about the war, or even about the policy of the 'Knock-out Blow.' He was satisfied with the war aims of Mr Asquith and the war aims of Mr Lloyd George. He was not a regular civil servant, but his temporary attachment to the British Treasury during the war was so highly valued that they made him their official representative at the Paris Peace Conference; and he also sat as deputy for the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Supreme Economic Council. Thus he was able to watch the leading actors in the peace drama; and the fascination of the book lies partly in his delineation of their characters, but still more in the dramatic skill with which he deduces from their characters, and from their political interests or commitments, what he regards as the unwisdom, injustice, imperfection, and impracticability of the Peace Treaty.

Once more let us be under no mistake as to Mr Keynes' own convictions. He is no apologist for Germany. The hanging of the Kaiser does not appeal to him, because (as he tells us on his very first page) it was the German

people who, 'moved by insane delusion and reckless self-regard,' overturned the foundations on which the other nations of Europe were building in peaceful and unsuspecting security. For this crime obviously no punishment would be too heavy, no indemnity too large. The Kaiser, on this showing, was only an instrument of the popular will. 'Delirant Achivi,' and, for once in a way, 'plectitur rex.' But Mr. Keynes is a practical economist. From the stand-point of abstract justice, he agrees, the Germans ought to pay for the whole cost of the war, because they were solely responsible for it. There would be precedent for this, for they made the French pay the whole cost of the war of 1870-1, viz. 200 millions sterling. But the cost of *this* war was at least 24,000 millions sterling; so that the interest on it for one year would be six times the capital sum paid by France to Germany.

Consequently, in spite of the Committee which advised the Prime Minister just before the General Election that Germany *could* pay the whole cost of the war, Mr Keynes arrived at the conclusion that they could *not*; and of this the Big Four seem gradually to have been persuaded. But, while the Big Four thought Germany could pay a third of the cost, Mr Keynes thought they could only pay one-twelfth—i.e. 2000 millions. Further, he argues, there is a moral as well as an economic limitation upon the sum which Germany could be called upon to pay by way of reparations and indemnities. He reminds us that the Armistice was not an unconditional surrender. It was a military and naval triumph for the Allies; but the German commanders laid down their arms and their negotiators surrendered their fleet in accordance with the terms offered by President Wilson and endorsed (with two reservations) by his Allies.

If we turn now from Mr Keynes' general ideas and attitude to the book itself we find a very skilful and artistic arrangement by which the reader is led through green and flowery paths into the financial labyrinth, and thence—after severe but endurable trials with statistics—into a view of the state of Europe and a survey of 'remedies.' 'Bad Faith' is the inscription which Mr Keynes would write above 'Chapter IV: The Treaty.' He regards the Peace Conference as a battle between President Wilson's pledges—the 14 Points—and the war

aims of M. Clemenceau and his Allies, their principal objects being the enfeebling of a dangerous enemy, and above all 'the shifting by the victors of their unbearable financial burdens on to the shoulders of the defeated.' His survey of the Armistice conditions and of the Treaty itself in this chapter makes for, and is intended to prove, the startling proposition that the Peace of Paris is legally as well as morally invalid. If his argument (pp. 51-59) is sound—as it seems to be—a solemn agreement was entered into between the Allies and Germany. After summarising the documents exchanged between the German Government and President Wilson (Oct. 5-Nov. 5, 1918), Mr Keynes says:—

'The nature of the Contract between Germany and the Allies resulting from this exchange of documents is plain and unequivocal. The terms of the peace are to be in accordance with the Addresses of the President, and the purpose of the Peace Conference is "to discuss the details of their application." The circumstances of the Contract were of an unusually binding character; for one of the conditions of it was that Germany should agree to Armistice terms, which were to be such as would leave her helpless. Germany having rendered herself helpless in reliance on the Contract, the honour of the Allies was peculiarly involved in fulfilling their part, and, if there were ambiguities, not using their position to take advantage of them.'

It is perhaps hardly necessary to refer to the contention that the Allies were not bound by the agreement of November 1918, involving adhesion (subject to two reservations) to the principles laid down in President Wilson's Fourteen Points and certain subsequent speeches, were it not that this contention appears to have been upheld by Sir Herbert Stephen in a long letter to the 'Times' (Feb. 27). If not stated *totidem verbis*, this may be inferred, and indeed is the only inference to be drawn, from the argument that the agreement with Germany was not a 'contract' in the legal sense of the word, because there was no law to enforce and no independent authority to appeal to, and because the language of the Fourteen Points was vague and rhetorical. This may be all true, but what does it matter? We ought never to have accepted the Fourteen Points as the basis of a

treaty, but, having accepted them, we were in honour bound to carry them out, interpreting their ambiguities, e.g. in regard to 'reparation and indemnities,' in a fair and honourable way. The question whether the interpretation put upon them, in regard to certain particulars, was one which they could fairly bear, is another matter, which Sir Herbert does not discuss. We may pass over the contumely which he pours out on the author for 'an unprecedented breach of official confidence'—a breach which, by the way, has never been shown to go beyond describing, possibly caricaturing, his superiors in their more secluded moments—for this only reminds us of the legal maxim: 'When you have a bad case, abuse the plaintiff's attorney.' But we must protest against the immoral doctrine that, because an agreement is not a legal 'contract,' it is therefore not binding. If this is not the inference to be drawn, what is it? Surely the 'scrap of paper' view of international agreements was never defended by such a piece of legalistic quibbling before.

When the draft Treaty was presented to the German Peace delegates, adds our author, 'the German commentators had little difficulty in showing that the draft Treaty constituted a breach of engagements and of international morality comparable with their own offence in the invasion of Belgium.' Mr Keynes calls the Treaty 'vindictive, perfidious and egotistic'; but, in his judgment, the quality 'which chiefly distinguishes the transaction from all its historical predecessors' is its insincerity. These are hard words, and if applied to the Treaty as a whole, quite unjustifiable. Mr Keynes, however, confines himself almost entirely to the economic clauses. Even so, his epithets can hardly be defended, but his general contention deserves the closest scrutiny.

The object of the two introductory chapters, in which Mr Keynes gives us an economic sketch of Europe before the war, is to show the inter-dependence of the Continental States, in spite of the protective tariffs by which most of them tried to secure a certain amount of industrial isolation. His principal conclusion is that Germany was the central support around which the rest of the European economic system grouped itself. He goes so

far as to assert that the prosperity of the rest of the Continent mainly depended upon German prosperity and enterprise. Exaggerated as this contention may appear at first sight, some of Mr Keynes' statistics go far to establish its correctness; at any rate, it is difficult to see how Western and Eastern Europe can prosper, if Germany is to remain in its present condition of semi-starvation and pauperism. A second point is the prodigious increase of the population of Russia (including Poland and Finland) which had grown from 100 to 150 millions between 1890 and 1914. Mr Keynes is oppressed by the Malthusian idea that before the war Europe was over-peopled and was becoming dangerously dependent upon what might soon become a diminishing surplus of exportable food-stuffs from America.

'The most favourable factor in the situation' before the war, in the author's judgment, 'was to be found in the extent to which Central and Western Europe was being fed from the exportable surplus of Russia and Roumania.' Nay, the very fabric of our social system—founded upon property, interest, wages, and profits—was (we are assured) already tottering when war broke out.

What, then, was the position after the war, when, in addition to the direct results of the conflict, the upheaval in Russia had overturned religion, property, and the hierarchy of classes? The answer may be given in Mr Keynes' words:

'The war had so shaken this system as to endanger the life of Europe altogether. A great part of the Continent was sick and dying; its population was greatly in excess of the numbers for which a livelihood was available; its organisation was destroyed, its transport system ruptured, and its food supplies terribly impaired. It was the task of the Peace Conference to honour engagements and to satisfy justice; but not less to re-establish life and to heal wounds. These tasks were dictated as much by prudence as by the magnanimity which the wisdom of antiquity approved in victors.'

M. Clemenceau might have replied that his 'Carthaginian Peace' was borrowed from the wisdom of ancient Rome. But Mr Keynes holds (as we have seen) that France and Italy will themselves be involved in the economic ruin of Germany and Austria; and it is from

this angle that in the next chapters (III, IV, and V) he examines the work of the Peace Conference, the Peace Treaty, and the Reparation Clauses.

Chapter III is the most brilliant and entertaining part of the book. It describes the Conference and the three chief *dramatis personæ*—M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, and Mr Lloyd George. The portraits are vivid but, it must be owned, over-drawn. To explain the Treaty it may have been necessary to examine the characters, abilities, and aims of those who made it, but this should have been done with more reserve and less sarcasm, and without those personal touches which have given his opponents the opportunity of charging him with a breach of confidence, and with using the peculiar advantages of his official position in order to hold up his chiefs to ridicule or condemnation. Some of this criticism is, in our opinion, unwarrantable; it is more just to say that Mr Keynes exaggerates the defects and carefully avoids the merits of his sitters, and that consequently his portraits do not present a complete or trustworthy view of the characters portrayed. M. Clemenceau was not so cynical nor Mr Wilson so stupid as Mr Keynes makes them out to be. So one-sided a treatment makes one distrust the writer's judgment; and, whatever attraction these brilliant pages may have for many readers, the book would have been better without them. After all, what matters is not the way in which the Treaty was made nor the characters of its makers, but the contents of the Treaty itself.

Under the territorial clauses of the Peace Treaty Germany becomes a much smaller and poorer country than France, though it has to support a larger population. The Allies have taken all Germany's fleet of large merchant ships, half her small ones, and a quarter of her fishing boats. Germany has also lost all her overseas possessions—which indeed were a source rather of pride than of profit—and the Allies have confiscated the railways and other Government property in them. Private property belonging to Germans is also being seized in territories outside Germany; and, though Mr Keynes finds the distinction between public and private property 'artificial,' he asserts that there is no

precedent for the treatment which the Peace Treaty metes out to individuals. With regard to the first of these propositions, it may fairly be said that the common distinction between public and private property is both sound and serviceable. For instance, ships of war and state-owned railways are public property; merchant ships and shares in a business are not. As to the second, while there is nothing unjust on the face of it in confiscating public property to meet a public debt, or in levying a general tax for that purpose, to seize the private property of a few individuals is an act of discrimination which cannot be justified by law, reason, or precedent. Yet the thing is being done. Our newspapers are already beginning to supply examples of the private wrongs that are being suffered in consequence of Article 297 (b) and other clauses of the Peace Treaty, which enable the Allies to seize the property of German citizens (often married to Englishwomen) in their jurisdiction. We are justified in regarding this policy with the utmost apprehension, not only because of its injustice, but also because it is likely to form precedents of a most mischievous character in the future. If, it will be said, the Allied Government ended their great war for justice and right by confiscating private property and ruining those unfortunate individuals who happened to have investments outside their own country, how can private wealth at home complain if a Labour Government proposes to confiscate private property in any business which it thinks suitable for 'nationalisation'? Under another provision the Reparation Commission is actually allowed to demand the surrender of German properties and German enterprises in *neutral* countries. This will be found in Article 235, which 'introduces a quite novel principle in the collection of indemnities.'

But we must return from the provisions which seem to aim at the ruin of individuals to those which impair the productive power of Germany and reduce the surplus (or profits) out of which alone indemnities can be paid. The seizure of the German fleet has already been mentioned, but to this should be added the seizure of floating docks, etc., in 'compensation' for the Scapa Flow affair. The appropriation, for a certain time, of

the coal in the Saar Basin, which Mr Keynes describes as 'an act of spoliation and insincerity,' is capable of defence,* but it is doubtless a heavy blow to German industry. Moreover, out of the coal that remains after the loss of Upper Silesia and the Saar Basin, Germany has been forced to undertake to deliver to France enormous quantities for the next ten years to make up for the loss of production in French coal mines destroyed during the war. Further, large amounts of coal have to be delivered to Belgium, Italy, and Luxemburg. The result is, according to Mr Keynes, that Germany is likely to have only about sixty million tons of coal left for her own requirements, which will amount to about 110 millions of tons annually. It looks therefore as if half the factories of Germany will have to close down. As to iron ore, about 75 per cent. of German iron ore came from Alsace-Lorraine. Thus the two chief sources of the industrial productivity of Germany are extinguished. It is doubtful, therefore, if Germany would be able to pay her way after all these losses and confiscations, even if there were no indemnity at all.

In addition to this, the great water-ways of Germany have been handed over to Commissions on which the German representatives are in a minority. In regard to the Elbe, at all events, it will be very much as if the Powers of Continental Europe were allowed to nominate a majority on the Thames Conservancy or the Port of London. A committee elected for the purpose by local interests and inhabitants is not necessarily very good or efficient, though it is much more satisfactory than a body of official nominees. But of all possible forms of business administration the worst conceivable is a committee of bureaucrats appointed by the Governments of countries which have been fighting one another, so that all are inclined to pull in different directions.

It would be foolish within the limits of this article to make any pretence of examining in detail the masterly chapter of over 100 pages in which Mr Keynes handles the German indemnity, or what he calls 'the categories of damage, in respect of which the Allies were compelled to ask for reparation.' Morally and politically

* See the number of this 'Review' for July 1919, pp. 247-249.

the controversy between Mr Keynes and his political chiefs as to whether the Allies were bound as a result of the Armistice negotiations by any legal contract or obligation of honour is profoundly interesting and important. It not only affects the character of President Wilson primarily and of his European colleagues secondarily; but, if Mr Keynes' contention is on the whole approved, it will become the duty of the nation to revise the Treaty so as to make it consonant with the understanding on which our enemies laid down their arms. This is altogether apart from the long array of financial and economic arguments which are to be found in Mr Keynes' treatise and in the small but suggestive work by Mr Norman Angell cited on our first page, to which we may add a number of parliamentary debates, and especially that which Lord Parmoor initiated in the House of Lords on Feb. 18, 1920, in connexion with Sir William Goode's official report to the Government on the distressed territories of Europe.

But from the purely selfish and practical view of making Germany pay for the cost of the war in accordance with the programmes of the British and French Governments, and more especially with the pledge given by Mr Lloyd George and Mr Bonar Law on the eve of the last General Election, the question how much of the Treaty is legally or morally valid is curiously unimportant. To prove this with the requisite brevity we may use simple figures and refrain from entering into details and subtleties. When the question of an indemnity first came up, it was pointed out that Germany, after a war and a blockade extending over five years, was much poorer, much more exhausted, and in a much worse condition to pay an indemnity than France was after the six months' war of 1870-1. That war cost France about 200 millions sterling, besides 200 millions paid by way of indemnity to Germany. The late war cannot have cost Germany less than 8000 millions. France in 1871 was easily able to borrow the indemnity at home and abroad; and the 200 millions were all paid off in 1873. French credit and currency were practically unimpaired. The credit and currency of Germany are almost extinct. The loss of an undeveloped Alsace-Lorraine to France and the gain to Germany were small

compared with the results of the reverse transaction now. France was not deprived of anything else, and her loss of man-power in that war was a bagatelle compared with Germany's loss since 1914. Nor did France suffer a long famine blockade after the Armistice.

The reader who weighs all the facts and circumstances will see in a moment why it matters little whether the Big Four try to levy their indemnity of 8000 millions or reduce it to the 2000 to 3000 millions to which Mr Keynes thinks they were entitled.* But in the end we have to descend from what is just to what is practicable, from that to which we are entitled to that which we can get. After a very gloomy analysis of Germany's potential trade and productive capacity, Mr Keynes works himself up to an unexpected optimism which permits him to hope for an indemnity payment of 100 millions a year, that being the favourable trade balance which might conceivably accrue. Then relapsing into uncertainty and gloom, he adds (p. 186):

'Having regard to the political, social, and human factors, as well as to the purely economic, I doubt if Germany could be made to pay this sum annually over a period of thirty years; but it would not be foolish to assert or to hope that she could.'

With regard to this possibility, how much (we may ask) would it cost to France, England, Italy, and Belgium in armaments and military occupation to hold Germany in political and economic servitude for the next thirty years? Mr Keynes proceeds:

'I reach, therefore, the final conclusion that, including all methods of payment--immediately transferable wealth, ceded property, and an annual tribute--2,000,000,000*l.* is a safe maximum figure of Germany's capacity to pay. In all the actual circumstances I do not believe that she can pay as much. Let those who consider this a very low figure bear in mind the following remarkable comparison. The wealth of France in 1871 was estimated at a little less than half that of Germany in 1913. Apart from changes in the value of money an

* In one sense, on the precedent of 1871, the Allies were entitled to the whole cost of the war--say 24,000 millions. Their actual claim is indeterminate--8000 millions sterling, or as much more as they can get.

indemnity from Germany of 500,000,000*l.* would, therefore, be about comparable to the sum paid by France in 1871; and, as the real burden of an indemnity increases more than in proportion to its amount, the payment of 2,000,000,000*l.* by Germany would have far severer consequences than the 200,000,000*l.* paid by France in 1871.

Here evidently is the foundation of what, it is to be feared, will turn out to be a completely erroneous conclusion on the part of Mr Keynes. He compares an estimate of French wealth after the war of 1870 with an estimate of German wealth before the war of 1914-1918. We need not labour the point. Germany to-day, in the condition described by Mr Keynes and depicted for us at first hand in our newspapers, by financiers, business men, and journalists of every colour, is a beggared nation with a bankrupt exchequer. Almost any one, who considers her debt, her paper currency, and her losses in men, will perceive that it would be a far harder task and a far heavier burden for Germany to pay 200 millions in 1920 than it was for France to pay the same amount in 1871.

A few pages later Mr Keynes expresses his moral disapproval of the indemnity of (say) 8000 millions actually imposed, in the following words:

‘The policy of reducing Germany to servitude for a generation, of degrading the lives of millions of human beings, and of depriving a whole nation of happiness, should be abhorrent and detestable, even if it were possible, even if it enriched ourselves, even if it did not sow the decay of the whole civilised life of Europe.’

If Mr Keynes was right on page 1 in indicting the whole German nation and making it solely responsible for the greatest crime ever committed in the history of civilisation, there are many people who would find nothing ‘detestable’ in such a punishment; though they would probably agree with him as to its short-sightedness and imprudence, in view of the probable danger and certain damage to ourselves and our Allies. But it is strange that Mr Keynes should limit the economic servitude of Germany to a generation. If he had said that the indemnity scheme of the Peace Treaty would take at least 200 years to carry out, and that his

own would take fifty, he would not have been far wrong. As a matter of fact the Armies of Occupation seem likely to cost the Allies far more in cash than the annual instalments they can hope to extract from Germany for a long time to come.

It is evident, however, from another passage, that Mr Keynes' estimate of Germany's capacity to pay is based not only on this erroneous parallel with the Franco-German indemnity, but also upon the theory (which seems, strangely enough, to have survived the laughter of Moore and the ridicule of Macaulay) that internal debt does not matter, being 'all in a family way.' The size of the British debt does not seem to trouble him at all. 'The war has impoverished us, but not seriously,' he remarks cheerfully in another place. It would be pleasant to be able to accept his domestic optimism, and to think with him that there is not 'the slightest possibility' of a catastrophe in this country. But an economist who holds that the size of the National Debt does not matter, so long as it is borrowed at home, is hardly likely to make a good forecast of the course of events after a war which has multiplied our previously large dead-weight debt by eleven. The truth is that the burden of a debt depends not upon the place where the creditors live but upon the nature of the purposes for which it was contracted. A debt for reproductive purposes borrowed abroad need not be any burden at all; a debt for war borrowed at home must be a burden, unless indeed the enemy can be made to shoulder it. And the evidence which our author has so carefully collected unfortunately strengthens the opinion, now widely held, that our own war-debt is not likely to be much reduced by contributions from Germany.

Art. 14.—THE QUESTION OF THE VORARLBERG.

AMONG all the vital problems which Austria has to solve, among all the dangers which menace her existence and her internal peace, among all the political uncertainties with which Europe has to reckon, the aspirations of the people of the Vorarlberg are perhaps the least known but not the least pressing.

First of all, what is the Vorarlberg, and what does it want? The Vorarlberg is a province of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, containing 140,000 inhabitants and situated to the east of the Rhine between Tyrol on one side, and Bavaria and Switzerland on the other. Geographically, the Vorarlberg is part of Switzerland. All its rivers flow towards the west into the Rhine, while it is separated from Tyrol by lofty and almost impassable mountains. The Rhine is a natural frontier only on the map. In reality, it is a purely dynastic and artificial boundary, created in the Middle Ages by a chance division of heritable estates. For the population that dwells on its banks, it is rather a link than a division. Ethnically, Switzerland and the Vorarlberg are inhabited by one people. While the Tyrolese speak a Bavarian dialect, the inhabitants of the Vorarlberg use the Swiss-German dialect, which is very different. Its population is not of German but of Allemanic race,* another branch of the great Germanic family, the only exception being that part which is of Romansch origin and resembles the population of the Engadine. The Vorarlberg was colonised in the 13th century by immigrants from the mountains of the Valais and the Grisons. Its customs, the names of its villages, and the folk-lore of the country, testify to its close relation with German-speaking Switzerland.

From the economic point of view, the Vorarlberg is identical with Switzerland. Its principal industry, embroidery, connects it closely with the manufacturers of Saint-Gall; its food supplies, as a rule, can come only from the west. Moreover, the Vorarlberg belongs to the Swiss railway system. The economic importance of the

* 'Nous ne sommes pas des Allemands; nous sommes des Allémanes c'est à dire des Suisses' (Speech of Dr Deuring at Feldkirch, Aug. 10, 1919).

Confederacy is chiefly based on the fact that it occupies the point of junction of all the great lines of communication on the Continent. Now, the Vorarlberg is similarly placed on the road which, encircling Helvetic territory to the north and the east, connects Southern Germany with Venetia.

Historically, the links between the two countries go back to the tenth century, to the time when the Convent of Einsiedeln established in the Vorarlberg the Convent of St Gerold, which still belongs to it. In the 13th and 14th centuries, the Vorarlberg voluntarily gave itself over to the Swiss and received the soldiers of the Confederacy as liberators. It was in the plain of Frastanz that, near the close of the 15th century, Switzerland definitely won her independence. After this event the district was given in fee by the House of Habsburg to the Swiss who, down to the French Revolution, had the right of military occupation in case of war. In 1798 the Confederacy demanded that it should become formally part of Switzerland, but did not succeed in attaining its object. Nevertheless, the old feeling of comradeship still survived down to the eve of the recent war. At Munich, the Vorarlberg students were members, not of the Austrian Corps but of the Swiss Students' Club; and at Vienna they were in the habit of ironically calling the Vorarlberg the 'Twenty-third Canton.'

It is therefore not surprising if, at the moment when the Monarchy began to dissolve, a great movement of opinion in favour of Switzerland became perceptible in the Vorarlberg. On Nov. 3, 1918, the Diet of the country proclaimed its independence. A petition, which was organised in mid-winter, under most difficult conditions, in a mountainous country covered by snow, received, in a few weeks, the signatures of more than 70 per cent. of the electors. On May 11, 1919, a plebiscite, which was organised by the Government and carried out with complete regularity, showed 47,208 votes for the re-union with Switzerland, as against 11,248. The Vorarlberg deputies who sat in the National Assembly at Vienna, did so only under reservation of the ultimate fate of their country. On Aug. 10, 1919, popular assemblies, held throughout the country, re-affirmed

with great enthusiasm their wish to be separated from Austria and re-united with Switzerland. A week later, two delegates of the Vorarlberg addressed to M. Clemenceau a despatch, in which they declared that their people regarded the Swiss Confederacy as their real mother-country. It runs as follows :

'The undersigned are persuaded that the Allies, after having destroyed the power of the Hapsburgs in order to emancipate the peoples of the Dual Monarchy, and to secure for them the right of self-determination, will not refuse an audience to the regular delegates of a mountain people which aspires to be free, not in order to escape from the consequences of a war which was decided on without its consent, but from a traditional and henceforward inflexible attachment to independence.'

In spite of this appeal, and against the conclusions of the territorial commission, which desired to leave the people free to decide its own fate, the Peace Conference did not think it necessary to solve or even to discuss the question of the Vorarlberg. There are, however, facts which one may ignore but cannot suppress ; and the unanimous will of a people is one of these. This consideration is all the stronger because it appears that the attitude of the Supreme Council was based upon the mistaken notion that the Vorarlberg was indispensable to Austria.

In the face of this movement for union, the attitude of Switzerland has been extremely reserved. Divided by reasons of domestic policy, the Federal Council resolved to refrain from taking the initiative, and so to prove the absolute disinterestedness of the Confederacy. During the summer of 1919, in spite of repeated hints from the Ministers of the Allies, the Swiss Government refused to give any opinion, and thus allowed the favourable opportunity to pass by. Nevertheless, last November, when it appeared that this negative attitude was productive of danger for Switzerland, M. Calonder, President of the Political Department, was induced to make, in the Chamber, an official declaration which stated that, while Switzerland would do nothing to detach the Vorarlberg from Austria, she could not remain indifferent if the Vorarlberg itself obtained recognition of its right to independence.

The new fact which led to this change of attitude was the policy of Germany and Austria, which menaced the Swiss people in its most vital interests. Far from showing in regard to the Vorarlberg a disinterestedness like that of the Confederacy, Germany has taken an active part in the propaganda which has been carried on in that country against Switzerland. A propaganda committee of pan-German tendencies, called the *Schwaben-Kapitel*, was installed at Bregenz and supported* by the funds of the A.E.G.,* the powerful industrial organisation headed by Herr Walter Rathenau. Before the war, Germany made great efforts to obtain the control of the Swiss waterfalls. These efforts are now of no avail, but the interest which inspired them, far from disappearing after the German defeat, is stronger than ever, since Germany has now less coal and consequently a greater need of electricity. This explains the anxiety in Germany to get control of Tyrol and the Vorarlberg, and the interest of the A.E.G. in securing this object.

But Germany has not confined itself to propaganda. The Vorarlberg is in a very precarious economic situation. Its own food supply is not adequate for its requirements, and the present rate of exchange prevents its having recourse to Switzerland, where two hundred-weight of potatoes would cost it about 1200 kronen.† It has therefore been forced to apply to Württemberg to obtain the supplies necessary for its existence. At Stuttgart, the negotiation was conducted by the Prussian Minister, Herr von Moltke, who promised that Germany would assist the people of the Vorarlberg—but only on conditions. 'It need hardly be said,' he remarked, 'that in exchange for the food that we are to send you, Germany will demand security on your waterfalls and your forests.' Every one knows what that means. It is the regular method of pacific penetration. Before the war, Germany made desperate efforts to draw Switzerland by such means into the orbit of its influence. Similar methods are now to be applied to tighten the bonds between Germany and Austria. The object is to bring about the union of the two countries without any

* The Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft.

† At pre-war rates of exchange, this sum would have meant about 48l.

apparent violation of Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles. Towards this German intrigue the Austrian Government appears to maintain a favourable attitude. Many symptoms show that the Government of Vienna is in agreement with that of Berlin in endeavouring to obtain for Germany a footing in the Vorarlberg and thus to prepare, in the future, for a re-union of Austria with Germany. Herr Renner loses no opportunity of saying that the union of Germany and Austria is both necessary and inevitable. It is, then, for the benefit of Germany that he wishes to preserve the integrity of his country.

In its dealings with the whole question, the Austrian Government has played a double part. Before the conclusion of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, it repeatedly asserted that the question of the Vorarlberg was an Austro-Swiss question which could easily be settled in a friendly way, since the Vorarlberg was absolutely useless to the Austrian Republic, and that, consequently, it required no settlement at the hands of the Allies. In May last M. Ender, who had been elected Governor of the Vorarlberg, was invited by Herr Renner to come to Saint-Germain as the representative of a territory in dispute, but he was prevented from entering into any relations with the Conference and therefore left Paris. After the signature of the Peace, the Austrian Government adopted quite another tone. It declared that the Vorarlberg was indispensable to Austria—an assertion which cannot be maintained from either the economic or the political point of view, and is contrary to all Herr Renner's previous declarations. He declared further that the question was a European one, and laid it himself before the Conference, while preventing the Allies from hearing Herr Ender.

Herr Renner's efforts were at first crowned with success. On Dec. 16 M. Clemenceau wrote to the Austrian Chancellor an official letter containing the following passage:

‘The Allied and Associated Powers, desirous of ensuring the existence of Austria within the frontiers assigned to her, and resolved to maintain the dispositions of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, declare that they will oppose all attempts calculated to injure the integrity of Austrian territory, or

which, contrary to the stipulations of Article 88 of the same Treaty, would have the effect of compromising in any way, whether directly or indirectly, the political or economic independence of Austria.'

The question thus seemed, in appearance and in law, to be settled, but it continues to exist and will inevitably re-appear. The Vorarlberg does not wish to remain Austrian. The country is practically unanimous against such a solution. At all events this is the case with the real natives of the country. The Austrian officials and a certain number of immigrant Socialists stand alone in the opposition to union with Switzerland. The figures of the plebiscite are in this respect very significant. Those inhabitants who do not wish to be Swiss make profession of being pan-Germans. But the population in general has pronounced against any truck with Germany. There has been no opposition to re-union excepting in the towns. The mountain districts, where there are no foreigners, have voted for it with practical unanimity.

Face to face with so strong a national sentiment, the Government of the Vorarlberg cannot remain inactive. Every one at Bregenz is convinced that Austria cannot endure in her present shape. Ample proofs of German intrigues and plots in Tyrol are forthcoming; and it is expected that, one of these days, this country will detach itself from Austria and proclaim its union with Bavaria. The Vorarlberg would, in that case, and perhaps very soon, be faced by a *fait accompli*; and it wishes to anticipate such an event in order not to fall into the hands of Germany. Its feeling on this matter coincides with the obvious interests of Switzerland.

The presence of Germany in the basin of the Rhine would be a military menace for Switzerland, because the frontier on this side is, to a large extent, open and indefensible, resembling geographically the Trouée de Belfort, and Switzerland would thus be laid open to invasion. The military authorities of the Allies have strongly asserted the interest which Europe has in closing the Swiss frontier on the east. Secondly, it is an economic menace, because it would give Germany command of the Rhine where it enters the Lake of Constance, the control over the navigation of the Upper

Rhine, a railway to compete with that of the Saint-Gothard, and waterfalls wherewith to annihilate the electrical industry of Switzerland. Finally, it is a political and moral menace, because the establishment of Germany in the basin of the Rhine would greatly facilitate pan-German propaganda in Eastern Switzerland.

The question of the Vorarlberg is a typical case of the rights of peoples. The population is almost unanimous in its desire for re-union. Historical, economic and geographical arguments point in the same direction. From the military point of view, Europe is interested in preventing the weakening of Switzerland, whose neutrality she has just recognised. To Austria the Vorarlberg is useless. Its own productions are not sufficient to feed it, and Austria is unable to supply the deficiency. Its only wealth is in its waterfalls and its abundant forests. On the other hand, it is necessary to Switzerland as much from the economic as from the political point of view. One looks in vain for an argument which can be opposed to the wish of the people.

The union of the Vorarlberg with Switzerland, far from compromising the internal unity of the country, can only help it. The disturbance in the present balance of votes between the two ethnical groups which form the Swiss Confederacy would be insignificant, and would cause no trouble. This is recognised by a great number of French-speaking Swiss, who are strong partisans of the re-union, seeing in the Vorarlberg a national ally in their struggle for federalism. It is not they who are afraid of the result. On the contrary, it is their traditional adversaries, the centralisers and the Germanophiles, who know well that the people of the Vorarlberg, who do not wish at any price to become German, would strengthen the resistance to German influence in Switzerland and, being a Catholic and agricultural population, would oppose extreme centralisation.

Switzerland was built up in the Middle Ages on the ruins of the Habsburg possessions in Hither Austria. One alone of the districts then involved has been unable, owing to the chances of history, to satisfy its desire for union with the Confederacy. Circumstances now offer it the chance. Switzerland has neither the right nor the desire to shut the door in its face; and the

French-speaking cantons, who joined the Confederacy in 1914, in analogous circumstances, have too keen a sense of the national interest to oppose a desire aiming at completing the historical development of Switzerland, and displaying anew its vitality. Switzerland has not taken the initiative—this has come entirely from the people of the Vorarlberg—but, full of enthusiasm as she has been, for five years past, on behalf of the Rights of Nations, she has not the moral right to reject without reason the hand held out to her. And she counts on her friends to help her. For England, which has no direct interest in maintaining the integrity of Austria as a sacred dogma, has on the contrary a great interest in placing on an unshakable foundation the domestic peace and the independence of Switzerland, as guardian of the Passes of the Alps, in other words, of the European equilibrium.

It seems to be feared that any alteration in the Treaty of Saint-Germain might be a step taken towards the further dissolution of Austria. But is there not still more danger in retaining artificially, within the Austrian frontiers, a people which has no sentiment of patriotism in common with the rest of Austria, and which therefore will constantly seek to detach itself from that State, to break up the Treaty of Saint-Germain from the inside, and thus to render a conflict between Switzerland and Austria a possible contingency? The least that one can demand from the Allied Statesmen is that they should study the question objectively and endeavour to find, in harmony with the League of Nations, a final and beneficent solution. Europe owes this to the principles it has proclaimed and to the people of the Vorarlberg, which demands only justice. It owes it to Switzerland, which desires to complete its historic development. It owes it finally to itself, for it has no greater need than that for peace and repose.

Art. 15.—A NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL.

1. *The History of Trade Unionism*. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. Revised edition, extended to 1920. Longmans, 1920.
2. *The Cotton Trade Boom and Some Considerations for Promoting a Lasting Industrial Peace*. By Sir C. W. Macara, Bart. Sherratt and Hughes, 1920.
3. *The Industrial Council for the Building Industry*. Harrison and Sons, for the Garton Foundation, [1919].
4. *Industrial Courts Act, 1919* (9 & 10 Geo. 5, Ch. 69). Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1919.
5. *Report of Provisional Joint Committee of the Industrial Conference* [Cmd. 501]. H.M. Stationery Office, 1920.

THE sane and practical pacifism which is responsible for the idea of a League of Nations has wisely admitted the legitimacy, in the last resort, of a recourse to arms, and has concentrated on limiting, so far as possible, the occasions of conflict, and restricting the area of such conflicts as may occur. A sane and practical statesmanship will adopt the same attitude with regard to strikes. Our ultimate aim must be the substitution of the rule of reason for the rule of force in industrial as in international affairs; but our immediate task is not the abolition of the strike weapon, but the removal of outstanding causes of dispute, and the adoption of such measures as shall prevent an industrial struggle from becoming as ruinous to our national civilisation as international conflict has so nearly been to the civilisation of the world. Only, as the League of Nations has been led on from the bare prevention of wars to schemes for the better government of the world, we shall inevitably be led, by inquiry into the strike menace, to a consideration of the adequacy of our present industrial and political organisation.

To begin with the discussion of the narrower but more immediately pressing question; the extent of the perils which may be involved in industrial conflict under present conditions, was exemplified in the Railway Strike of September–October 1919. It was only by extreme good fortune and thanks to the moderation displayed by both sides, that the worst of those perils remained unrealised.

Nothing in connexion with the strike is more remarkable than the contrast between the gigantic forces actually or potentially arrayed on either side and those actually called into employment during its course. The strike had its origin in a dispute as to wages between the National Union of Railwaymen and the Railway Executive, but the relations which existed between the railways and the Government rendered it inevitable that the Government as a whole should, at an early period, be drawn in as a party. It was, indeed, a letter containing the "definitive offer" of the Government which the railwaymen interpreted as a challenge; and it was not until after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a modification of this offer from the Prime Minister that the N.U.R. and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen called out their members as from midnight on Sept. 26. Thus the issue lay directly between the strikers and the Government; and, in view of their expressed opinion that the strike was brought about by a conspiracy against the existing social order, the Government might have been expected to employ ruthlessly the whole resources of the State for the purpose of defeating the railwaymen. It is asserted by Mr and Mrs Webb, in the new edition of their 'History of Trade Unionism,' that the Government at one time contemplated starving out the strikers by discriminatory issues of food supplies and by confiscation of the Trade Union Funds; but no such action was, in fact, taken. While the Government paraded, somewhat ostentatiously, their determination to preserve order, the measures adopted for this purpose were marked by considerable restraint; and, beyond taking the necessary steps to safeguard the food supplies of the country, the Government's activities were practically confined to a vigorous argumentative propaganda as to the merits of the dispute.

Against the Government was arrayed, actually or potentially, a large proportion of the organised labour of the country. The strikers themselves numbered some 500,000; and the conference held at Caxton Hall on Oct. 1 to consider the question of sympathetic action, represented unions comprising some 1,900,000 workers. The miners, though not represented, were already becoming restive; and, had the strike been prolonged, a further conference,

representing the whole trade-union organisation of the country, would have been held on Oct. 7. It was thus evident that a stoppage of work was imminent which would throw the whole economic life of the country into chaos, and on the surface the position of the strikers was very strong. Far, however, from requesting active support, the N.U.R. definitely refused, down to Sept. 30, all offers of sympathetic action; and, though Mr J. H. Thomas announced on that day that he would be unable to persist in this attitude, he was known to be strongly averse to an extension of the strike. In spite of strong pressure from the rank and file of the unions, who believed that the Government was attacking, through the railwaymen, the interests of the whole body of workers, the Caxton Hall Conference adopted a similar attitude. Not only did the Union Executives refrain from calling out their members, but their whole efforts were devoted to securing a settlement which would avoid the possibility of a general strike. On Oct. 5, two days before the date fixed for the special Trade Union Conference, a settlement was arranged at an interview with the Prime Minister; and, through the strenuous exertions of Mr Thomas and other leaders, this settlement was ratified by the rank and file of the railwaymen.

To some extent, the moderation displayed on the Labour side may be attributed to tactical motives. The majority of the unions had received very large accessions of membership during the war, but there had not yet been time for their fighting funds to be brought up to a corresponding point. The miners were suffering from the effects of the Yorkshire Coal Strike, and were, moreover, preoccupied with the development of their own nationalisation campaign. A prolonged struggle was likely to test sharply both the finances and the solidarity of the unions. But, in the main, the attitude of the leaders must be attributed to broader considerations. From the first, Mr Thomas insisted that the sole object of the strike was to obtain for the railwaymen the satisfaction of their wage demands. For this normal use of the strike weapon, the N.U.R. had no need to seek assistance outside its own ranks and those of the Locomotive Engineers. In view of the paramount importance of railway transport to the food and coal supply, and to

the industries of the country, a general railway strike was in itself sufficient to extort any concessions which industrial pressure was capable of extorting. To bring out the members of all the unions represented at Caxton Hall would hardly have strengthened the hands of the railwaymen, for, if the Government were determined to resist to the end the pressure already applied, they could hardly fail to regard such an extension of the strike as a challenge to their authority which must be fought with all the resources at their command, and they would be able to rally to their support tens of thousands who might be expected to stand neutral in a railway strike pure and simple. On the other hand, the disturbance and dislocation of economic and social life would be so great and universal that the leaders could no longer hope to keep their people in hand, as they did with conspicuous success during the actual strike. Disorders would be inevitable, and the conflict would assume the aspect of an embittered class-war which might end either in the destruction of the Labour organisations, or in the complete overthrow of the existing social order.

These possibilities were very imperfectly apprehended by the majority of those who urged an extension of the strike. By the small minority of real revolutionaries they were consciously accepted. Many of them absurdly under-rate the powers of resistance inherent in the existing order; and, in any case, the fanatic of revolution is always prepared to take the risks of chaos, on the chance that his own particular form of Utopia may arise from the ashes. Yet even the serious revolutionary might well ask himself how far solid support could be depended on for an extended strike which should become avowedly revolutionary in its object. The proceedings at the Glasgow Trade Union Congress indicated a swing towards the extreme Left, which had, indeed, been manifest for some time in the growth of the 'rank-and-file movement' and the 'direct-action' agitation. But, while high prices, reaction from war-strain, and the disappointed hopes of a 'better world' after the war were responsible for much bitterness, the extent to which the majority even of the extreme Left would go was doubtful. It is one thing to pass abstract resolutions; it is quite another to decide on immediate action.

For the responsible leaders, the dilemma was a painful one. For some months it had been common talk, not exclusively in Labour circles, that the great Capitalist organisations were on the alert to choose a vantage ground for a fight-to-the-finish with organised Labour, and that an effort would be made to involve the Government on their side. By Labour speakers and Labour newspapers of every shade of opinion the attitude of the Government towards the railwaymen's demands was represented as the first step in a campaign to break the power of the unions and reduce real if not money wages to an *ante-bellum* standard. It was this prevalent belief which inspired the offers of sympathetic action; and nothing was done to dispel it by the unfortunate talk about an anarchist conspiracy, an accusation which was bitterly resented by the sober majority of the railwaymen themselves. Thus the delegates at Caxton Hall were faced with the alternative either of abandoning comrades whom they believed to be fighting their battle, or of plunging the country into the chaos of a social upheaval which would imperil the whole cause of constitutional organisation and peaceful reform to which many of them had devoted their lives.

Much the same considerations as dictated the attitude of the N.U.R., and afterwards of the Caxton Hall Conference, may be presumed to have weighed with the Government. Great as were their powers, they could not wisely be employed without restraint in the course of an ordinary trade dispute. In taking steps for the preservation of public order and the safeguarding of the food supplies, they could rely upon the support of the great mass of public opinion, but beyond this they could not go without denying the right of the railwaymen to strike, and thus involving themselves in a direct conflict with organised Labour as a whole. An extension of the strike openly revolutionary in character would have found the great majority of the British people solidly behind the Government; an extension produced, even in appearance, by a direct challenge to Labour on the part of Government would have let loose all the passions of class-war in a most uncertain conflict.

The justness of this view is confirmed by the reception given to the settlement. Accepted as just and satisfactory

by both the Government and the railwaymen, it was welcomed by the country as a statesmanlike agreement; but by the extremists on both sides it was bitterly resented. The reactionary group among the Capitalists accused the Government of flinching; the Labour extremists criticised Mr Thomas sharply for his refusal to extend the strike. Almost universally the organs of the extreme Left, whether they regarded the settlement as a victory or a betrayal of the Labour cause, drew the moral that the whole attention of the workers should be concentrated on 'direct action,' and that the Parliamentary Labour Party and even the Trade Union Executives should be replaced by an active rank-and-file organisation. On the other hand, the organs of the I.L.P. and the constitutional elements of the Labour movement found the main lesson of the strike in the necessity for greater parliamentary activity.

From all this, two clear facts emerge: first, that the country was brought to the verge of civil war through a dispute arising over a complicated schedule of wages about which it knew very little; secondly, that the main danger of the strike lay in the fact that the Government itself was a party to the dispute, and that the struggle could thus be represented by extremists on both sides as a direct conflict between Labour and the State. Towards this danger we have long been drifting. The typical modern strike is no mere question between the employer and employed in a single works or even a single industry. A stoppage which paralyses one of the great essential industries cannot continue for many days without affecting not only other industries but the community as a whole; and the Government, as trustee for the welfare of the community, is almost inevitably led to intervene.

Until quite recently, the part played by the Government in industrial disputes was mainly that of a mediator. As representing the millions indirectly affected by a strike, while having itself no interest in the question at issue, it could play this part with propriety and effect. During the war, however, the Government has itself become an employer of labour on an unprecedented scale; and its control of wage-rates and working conditions

has spread over large areas of the industrial field. In any of the industries where wages are regulated by a departmental decision, as well as in the public services themselves, a strike must inevitably become, in some degree, a strike against the Government.

The situation thus created is full of danger. The Government, being a party to the dispute, can no longer act as an independent mediator; and, since there is no other body which can claim to represent the public as a whole, the best chance of mediation and conciliation is lost. Moreover, it is in the highest degree unfortunate that the prestige of the National Executive should become involved in a struggle with Labour. The wider the extension of the strike and the greater the dislocation of national life, the more difficult it becomes for the Government to give way without weakening its authority in the country, and the greater must be the temptation to employ the whole resources of the State for the purpose of breaking the strike. Yet, when a dispute threatens to enlist against the Government any large proportion of the organised workers, it cannot go far in the use of those resources without giving to the struggle the aspect of a class-war.

Even the natural and proper precautions, which the Government is in duty bound to take for the protection of public interests, easily assume, to minds heated by conflict, the appearance of provocation; and a tactless or premature display of force may range large sections of moderate public opinion on the side of the strikers. The fact that the scheme of food distribution by motor transport, which was employed during the railway strike, had been worked out in advance, is cited by Mr and Mrs Webb as evidence of the Government's deliberate intention to force on the conflict. The evidence, to say the least, is inconclusive, for, if there was any danger of a strike occurring, it was the duty of the Government to take steps to ensure that the community should not starve. It was, however, not unnatural that this conclusion should be drawn by the strikers themselves; and, in the same way, it was natural that the use of troops or the call for a 'Citizen Guard' to preserve order should be regarded as incipient strike-breaking. Thus the position of the Government as a party to the dispute

not only disqualifies it from acting as a mediator, but hampers it in the discharge of its normal functions. At the same time it plays into the hands of those who believe that the defects of the existing social order can only be remedied by force, and are only too glad to identify the political organisation of the State with every cause of industrial unrest.

To any nationalised industry these considerations must apply with special force, for, whatever scheme of labour co-operation in management may be evolved, so long as the final court of appeal is a Minister responsible to Parliament, the collective responsibility of the Government for his decisions must remain. It is, indeed, suggested that in return for nationalisation, the right to strike might be surrendered; but this is improbable in itself, and all experience goes to show that, even if such a concession were obtained on paper, the prohibition of strikes could never be effectively enforced when any important section of Labour was concerned in a dispute.

Thus the problem before us is to find some means by which a dispute arising in any industry in which the Government is concerned, either as employer or as a regulator of wages and conditions, may be prevented from developing into a real or apparent challenge to its position as guardian of the public peace and custodian of the public welfare. This is the more desirable since, even where a settlement is arrived at by the Executive under present conditions, it is inevitably based upon the course of previous departmental negotiations having no necessary connexion with the general industrial situation or the financial and labour policy of the Government as a whole, and is thus apt to produce unexpected and embarrassing reactions both in other controlled services and in free industries.

Since the settlement of the Railway Strike a new form of machinery for the settlement of industrial disputes has come into operation, in the shape of the Industrial Courts and Courts of Inquiry established by the Industrial Courts Act, 1919. The provisions of this Act are expressly extended to workmen employed by or under the Crown; and in perhaps the majority of disputes the verdict of an Industrial Court or Court of

Inquiry would probably be accepted on an appeal from a departmental decision. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Courts will win a prestige sufficient to overcome the temptation for powerful labour organisations to go direct to the Cabinet on disputes involving the most important issues; and, in view of the grave objections to this process, it appears desirable that there should be created some tribunal sufficiently representative and sufficiently authoritative to render it impossible for either Labour or a Government department to disregard its decisions, or go behind its back to the Executive, and to which all disputes in a State-regulated industry could be referred, either as an alternative to an Industrial Court or on appeal therefrom.

Such a tribunal would include representatives of the wage-paying and wage-controlling Departments, of the Treasury, and of the organisations representing Government employees, and workers whose wages are subject to direct departmental regulation. But in order to give it the necessary independence of character and width of view, it must also include general representatives of Labour appointed by, say, the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress, of the leading Employers' Associations, and of bodies such as Consumers' Councils, Co-operative Societies, and Ratepayers' Associations, which may fairly be considered as representative of the consumer and the general public. Such a body would probably work mainly through standing Committees or Committees appointed *ad hoc* for the consideration of particular questions; and in appointing these Committees the balance between the various elements in the tribunal should be carefully preserved. Power should be given to co-opt representatives of any body or class likely to be specially affected by the decision in a particular dispute. The proceedings of the tribunal, or any committee thereof, in connexion with any dispute, should, so far as possible, be public; and the final report should in every case be published, together with any minority reports. To render the decisions of the tribunal enforceable by legal penalties would probably wreck the whole scheme at the outset, as was shown in connexion with the Industrial Courts Act. The possibility of strikes cannot, therefore, be ruled out; but it is unlikely that

they would be frequent, and prolonged and extended strikes would probably be very rare.

In any stoppage of work involving a serious dislocation of national life, it is difficult for either side to stand firm without a large measure of public support, as was illustrated by the eagerness shown by both the N.U.R. and the Government in September-October 1919, to influence public opinion on the merits of the dispute. The representative character of the proposed tribunal would enable the probable course of public opinion to be ascertained at an early stage in the proceedings. The publicity given to its reports and proceedings would enable the issues of a dispute to be clearly and fairly laid before the nation. In these circumstances, either a Department or a Trade Union would think twice before adopting an intransigent attitude; while, should a strike break out, the weight of public opinion would be so strongly on one side or the other as to compel an early settlement.

Moreover, a strike, in these circumstances, would be directed not against a decision of the Government, but against the decision of a body representing all classes of the community, a body on which the Government was represented only in the same way as Labour itself. Not being a party to the dispute, the Government would be free to exercise its proper functions of preserving order and safeguarding essential public interests such as the food supplies, without creating the suspicion of a covert attack on the labour organisations; and there would be no serious risk of an industrial dispute being converted either by tactless handling or by the machinations of an extremist minority into a struggle between Labour and the State.

Even apart from strikes in controlled services, the present position is unsound and dangerous. Neither the Executive nor Parliament itself is necessarily qualified by knowledge or experience for playing the part of arbiter in industrial disputes, or for the still more difficult and delicate task of guiding the course of industrial development. Nor is it clear that this task lies within the scope of their primary functions. It is, in fact, as has already been suggested, impossible to deal adequately with the position of the Government with regard to strikes without touching on the wider

question of our political and economic organisation as a whole.

Our economic development has, in recent years, outstripped our political organisation. Through long centuries of growth we have built up a Constitution which, with all its defects, fairly reflects our present degree of social and political development. The keystone of this Constitution is the position of Parliament as at least theoretically representative of the community as a whole, and reflecting the general consensus of opinion on matters which affect the interests common to all. Various as the activities of Parliament have become in our complex society, it exists fundamentally to secure those essential conditions of liberty, security, and order, in which all are equally interested; and for this reason its members are chosen by electors grouped not according to class or function but according to geographical distribution.

During the last hundred years the importance of differentiation by function has enormously increased. In every department of life, and especially in industry, specialisation has become the dominant note; and with specialisation the function or employment of the individual has come to play an ever more important part both in his own life and in his relations to the community. This tendency has found its expression in a development of organisation by function which has sprung up side by side with, and in very imperfectly conceived relation to, the political groupings. The great Employers' Associations are, generally speaking, hostile to State interference in industrial matters, though, like other capitalist bodies, they have not hesitated to use their influence in the shaping of fiscal and other legislation affecting their interests. The Trade Unions have been, to a great extent, built up by men who believe in the ownership and control of all industries by the State, but are themselves purely industrial bodies, having the power of collective bargaining as their primary object. Each group has in recent years drawn more closely together within itself for the purpose of common defence, but the activities of neither group are fully co-ordinated. It is only very recently that attempts have been made to bring the two groups

together for the consideration of any question from the standpoint of industry as a whole; nor have either the Associations or the Unions any recognised responsibility to the State or the public, so long as their actions are confined within legal limits. The existence of the Parliamentary Labour Party and its relations to the Trade Union Congress represent an endeavour on the part of Labour to establish some working connexion between functional and political representation, but the history of those relations suggests the difficulties as well as the possibilities of the process; and, should the Labour Party be called upon to form a Government, its relations with the functional Labour organisations will become still more complicated and difficult.

At present, therefore, we are faced by the co-existence, on the one hand, of a political organisation controlling the whole legislative and executive power of the State and based on geographical representation, and, on the other, of a great number of Capitalist and Labour organisations based on functional representation and possessing enormous influence but no recognised place in the political Constitution, and only a very rudimentary machinery of co-operation among themselves.

The evils of the situation are manifold. Having no clearly defined responsibility to the community as a whole, the activities of the various functional organisations are directed mainly to the promotion of sectional interests; and, since Parliament is the only body which can give legislative effect to their desires, they are constantly tempted to secure their ends by putting pressure on the Government of the day. This pressure may be overt, as in the threat of a general strike, or silent and unobtrusive, as in the influence exerted by the great financial and trading combinations. Even in the event of a strike threat, the preliminary negotiations are usually conducted in secret; and, whether the pressure be applied by Labour or Capital, it is seldom that the public has any adequate opportunity to form a judgment on the issues. Meanwhile, Parliament and the Executive are overwhelmed with a mass of highly complex economic and industrial questions, which have never come before the electorate, and which they have neither the time nor the knowledge to treat satisfactorily. In the lack of the

specialised training and experience needed for the consideration of such questions as a rational basis for wage-systems, their excursions into the industrial field are apt to be spasmodic and ill-considered, with the result that industrial development is hampered by arbitrary measures adopted in order to secure freedom from immediate pressure. The knowledge that such pressure can be successfully applied increases the boldness and frequency with which it is employed; and the danger becomes great, not only that powerful groups of workers or employers may secure unduly preferential treatment, but that public policy on issues of wide national importance may be seriously deflected by this clandestine influence. Moreover, the identification of the political machine with the final industrial authority readily leads to the application of industrial or financial pressure to affect public policy on general political questions, with which the functional organisations themselves have no greater fitness or representative warrant to deal, than has Parliament to deal with the technical details of industry. At the same time, urgently needed social legislation is hung up by the pre-occupation of Parliament with industrial matters. Through the comparative failure of their industrial measures, through the impediment presented by pressure of work to the discharge of their primary functions, and through the knowledge that they are subject to external pressure, the reputation of Parliament suffers and the authority of Government is weakened.

This problem of the relation between the functional organisations and the State is one of the most difficult as it is one of the most important which we have to solve. The Guild Socialists cut the knot by proposing what is practically a reconstitution of society on purely occupational lines, but they seldom appear to have thought out clearly and fully the relations of the Guilds with each other and with the State; and, in their insistence on the importance of the functional element in modern life, they are in danger of overlooking the permanence of those primary individual and social needs to provide for which the State exists. On the other hand, State Socialism appears likely to intensify rather than remove the disadvantages attaching to the present system. In

their final chapter Mr and Mrs Webb have devoted some acute criticism to showing the dangers of exclusive control of industry by producers' organisations, and they suggest that such control must be shared by 'representatives of the community in Co-operative Society, Municipality, or National Government.' But they do not develop the suggestion in much detail, and they avoid the question how the Municipalities and National Government are to be rendered effective both for the control of industry and for the discharge of their political functions; nor do they discuss the effect on the political efficiency of these institutions of liability to become involved in industrial conflict. For it cannot seriously be contended that in a socialist State conflicts between producers and consumers, or between one group of producers and another, will never arise.

In any event, and whatever our views as to the ultimate goal of economic organisation, what we require at the moment is some machinery which will enable us to carry on, under existing conditions, with the minimum of disturbance both to industrial and political development. We want some form of organisation which, without infringing upon the proper domain of Parliament, will link up the existing functional organisations with some responsible, authoritative, central body, composed of members elected on a basis of specialised representation, and capable of dealing in a broad spirit with purely industrial questions. We want, in other words, an Industrial Parliament, with clearly defined duties and responsibilities, placed in definite relation to the political constitution.

A year ago, some such development seemed to be within reach. The Joint Industrial Councils set up under the Whitley Scheme provided machinery by which the workers' and employers' organisations in each great industry could be brought together, not merely for settling or averting disputes, but for the joint consideration of all questions affecting the industry or those engaged in it. A recently published book on the work of the Industrial Council for the Building Industry shows how far development and experiment on these lines may extend in co-ordinating the activities of functional groups, and realising the idea of industrial

autonomy in a single complex industry. But it was always recognised by advocates of this and similar schemes that no such machinery would suffice without the formation of some central body charged with co-ordinating the work of the Councils and considering the interests of industry as a whole. This proposal was made by the Industrial Conference, composed of representatives of the leading Employers' Associations and Trade Unions, which sat for a brief period in 1919. The failure to establish the permanent National Council proposed by this Conference has reacted most unfavourably on the development of the Whitley Scheme. It has also deprived us of precisely the kind of organisation which we need to avert the dangers and difficulties which arise from allowing the Government to become entangled in industrial controversy.

As Sir Charles Macara reminds us, the idea was not altogether a new one. A small Industrial Council, composed of representatives of Capital and Labour from leading industries, with Sir George (now Lord) Askwith in the chair, was appointed in 1911. That Council did valuable work in connexion with an inquiry into industrial agreements, and received a large measure of support and approval both from the workers and the employers. Had it been kept in being, if only as an advisory body, it might have rendered invaluable service during the war.

It is suggested, therefore, that the idea of a National Industrial Council should be revived; but even since 1919 much water has flowed under the bridges, and the first step appears to be the calling of the Industrial Conference in a more fully representative form, to act as a Constituent Assembly. It is obvious that the National Industrial Council can represent only industries which are already highly organised in themselves; and the natural electoral groups would appear to be, as suggested by the Conference, the existing Employers' Associations and Trade Unions. In industries where a Joint Industrial Council has been set up with success, the organisations represented might prefer to leave to the Joint Council the election of representatives of the industry in the National Council. It would probably be

wise to follow the Builders' example, and, having allotted to each industry or group its quota of members, leave the organisations concerned to decide upon the method of election.

With this Council should be linked up also as much as possible of the existing machinery of industrial control. Thus, it should have the power to demand the appointments of Courts of Inquiry under the Industrial Courts Act; and, should it succeed in establishing its position and authority, the whole administration of the scheme of Industrial Courts might well be placed under its ægis, together with the proposed tribunal for the settlement of industrial disputes in which Government departments are concerned. In such case, this tribunal might well be erected into a final Court of Appeal for industrial disputes in general.

It is of the first importance that the deliberations of the Council should, so far as possible, be public, like those of Parliament itself; for its object should be, in large measure, the education of public opinion on industrial matters, and the spread of a steadying sense of responsibility amongst the employers' and workers' organisations. It would be for the Council itself to decide how far the proceedings of investigational or other Committees could be conducted publicly, but their Reports should, at all events, be published.

It is obvious that the scope and powers of the National Industrial Council would require to be most carefully defined both in relation to the existing Joint Councils in the various industries and in relation to Parliament. It was never suggested that the National Council should interfere with the hardily-won autonomy of particular industries in matters domestic to those industries themselves. It should deal rather with questions common to all industries—the fixing of national minima in wages and working conditions, the consideration of such matters as decasualisation and dilution in their general aspects, the conduct of inquiries into such problems as a scientific basis for wage-systems and piece-rates, the degree of publicity which can be given to costings (both for this purpose and as a check on profiteering), the elimination of the gambling element in industrial finance, the avoidance and relief of unemployment. To it also would

be referred disputes or difficulties arising between the Industrial Councils on questions of demarcation, or decisions arrived at by any Council and alleged to have injurious reactions in other industries.

The relations of the National Council with Parliament require still more careful consideration. While there is an obvious advantage in leaving purely industrial questions to a specialist body, it is equally obvious that the decisions of such a body may have far-reaching results on society at large; and nothing can relieve Parliament of its final responsibility as trustee of the public welfare. It is obviously desirable that the liaison between the Council and the Ministry of Labour should be close and constant. Power should be given to the Minister to appoint on the Council representatives of the unorganised trades, and to appoint, on committees of inquiry into such questions as the effect of wages or profits on prices, representatives of Consumers' Councils or other bodies representing the general public.

It is, however, the question of sanctions which is perhaps the most important. It is obvious that the hands of the Council will be greatly strengthened if the suggestion made by the Industrial Council of 1911 be adopted, viz. that, where the Trade Unions and Employers' Associations include three-fourths of the workers or employers in an industry, any agreement between them should be held binding on the minority. The experience of the Whitley Councils has abundantly endorsed the opinions expressed by leaders of Labour and by such employers as Sir Charles Macara, concerning the disadvantage and danger of the non-unionist worker and the non-federated employer in an organised industry. With so great an increase in the development of industrial organisation as is here suggested, the enforcement of agreements could in large measure be left to the industrial organisations themselves; but in such matters as the fixing of national minima of wages, hours, or safety devices, a legal sanction would be necessary. To invest the Council itself with the power of making orders legally enforceable would derogate from the final responsibility of Parliament in matters affecting social as well as economic interests; and, in the event of legal sanction being required, recourse to Parliament, or to a Minister empowered by

Parliament to make orders, would be essential. In like manner, the sanction of Parliament would be required for any scheme involving the expenditure of public money. Such a question as the nationalisation of any industry, for instance, is a matter for the nation as a whole, and not merely for a bargain between Labour and Capital.

It may be suggested that the National Industrial Council would still have in its power, by pressure upon Parliament, or by agreements requiring no legislative sanction, to hold the community to ransom for the joint benefit of employers and workers. This possibility, however, already exists. We have seen to what pressure Parliament is at present subject; and the suggestion of collusion between the great industrial combines and their employees is by no means unknown. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that a National Council for all industries would to a great extent be free from the characteristic defects of the ordinary organisation of producers, since the majority both of the employers' and the workers' representatives would be in the position of consumers in respect of questions not directly affecting their own industry. The National Council would, in fact, form an invaluable safeguard against possible attempts to bleed the consumer on the part of the Joint Councils in individual industries. At the same time, both its fully representative character and the publicity of its proceedings would render it rather less than more effective for putting improper pressure on Parliament and the Executive than are individual organisations under the present regime.

The right of Parliament to pass industrial legislation, independent of any recommendations of the National Council, would remain unimpaired; and the regulation of wages and conditions in the unorganised or incompletely organised trades would remain in the hands of the Trade Boards. It is probable that, if the National Council were once established and proved its utility, Parliament would thankfully throw on to its shoulders as much as possible of the industrial burden; and that trades possessing no sufficient degree of organisation to receive representation on the Council would hasten to acquire it. But the transfer of power would be gradual, and ample opportunity would be given for interposing

such checks as experience might suggest. It is, indeed, essential that the original organisation should be sufficiently elastic to allow of gradual development, and that no attempt should be made to erect at one stroke a complete industrial organisation corresponding to the political constitution. The extent of the powers which might ultimately be bestowed on the National Council would depend upon the degree of prestige and authority which it acquired; and, if it were attempted to create for it at the outset a fixed, rigid constitution, large sections of industry would almost certainly stand aloof.

It is indeed a deliberative rather than an executive body which, at the moment, is needed. A Council representing the whole of the organised industries of the country is in no danger of becoming a mere debating society. Its conclusions would carry far too much weight to be lightly disregarded; and its influence would react upon both the authority and sense of responsibility of the various bodies represented on it. The educative effect of its work, both on those taking part in its discussions and on the formation of public opinion, would be invaluable. Its possibilities of development would be great, and even from the first it should do much to relieve Parliament from the burden of purely industrial questions and the pressure of sectional interests; for no individual organisation either of employers or workers acting in opposition to the declared opinion of industry as a whole could hope for public support. Whatever course the development of society may follow in the future, it is essential, if this development is to be accomplished without the certainty of perpetual friction and the possibility of devastating conflict, that we should proceed without delay to lay the foundations of an industrial constitution.

ERNEST C. FAYLE.

Art. 16.—FRANCE AFTER THE WAR: M. CLEMENCEAU
AND M. DESCHANEL.

1. *Clemenceau: The Man and His Time.* By H. M. Hyndman. Grant Richards, 1919.
2. *La Question Sociale.* Par Paul Deschanel. Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1898.
3. *L'Organisation de la Démocratie.* Par Paul Deschanel. Paris: Charpentier, 1910.
4. *Gambetta.* Par Paul Deschanel. Paris: Hachette, 1920.
And other works by M. Deschanel.

IF, in this era of plebiscites, it had been possible to alter the mechanism of the French Constitution of 1875, and to consult the French people directly as to their choice for the Chief Magistracy of their country, the result would have corresponded to the expectations of public opinion all over the world, and M. Clemenceau would be throned to-day in the Elysée. Given the overwhelming suggestion of appearances in France, it required exceptional perspicacity—and even M. Clemenceau himself, with all his knowledge of French things and his philosophic detachment, failed pathetically of this insight—to doubt that in M. Clemenceau the French had at last found the 'man' they had been longing for, and whom, having found, they would jealously conserve. After Sedan, fear of a 'man' became perhaps the most prevalent prejudice of republicanised France. This was the inevitable lesson of the experiment of the Second Empire. Yet, a whole set of deep-ingrained instincts had hitherto impelled Frenchmen to admit, as both natural and convenient, the notion of a strong Government relieving them from civic responsibility. Centuries of monarchical rule had developed this trait as a second nature. The influence of Louis Napoleon was to modernise and democratise this tendency, by introducing the idea of the plebiscite, in virtue of which he was able to declare himself an Emperor-President. This was, indeed, a sort of Jeffersonian 'camouflage' adapted to France. But Sedan was a formidable shock, and it left behind it a tragic disillusion.

Glory for glory's sake ceased in a night to allure; and Frenchmen decided to pause before running further

risks at the heels of uncontrolled ambition. Their regret, nevertheless, was immense. Millions of reluctant but resigned citizens of the Third Republic still felt homesick for the Old Regime. Yet, for political reasons, the fear of a 'man' was artificially cultivated by the men in office, while the longing for an epoch when some saviour could legitimately appear without risk for French society became more and more widespread. Thus, it was not irrational to believe that it would be M. Clemenceau's privilege singularly to reconcile this fear and this longing. And the conclusion was logical. To lift M. Clemenceau by acclamation to the Elysée would be to render the happy fusion of these two emotions, in a fine French blend, approximately complete. Was it not M. Jules Cambon who had said at the Academy on taking his seat among the Immortals :

'Comme pour mieux marquer la Communion française, la gloire a été réservée à celui qui fut l'adversaire de Gambetta et de Ferry, de réaliser leur pensée la plus chère. Ainsi l'union sacrée s'est faite par delà les tombeaux ?'

What mattered it that M. Clemenceau had presided over the Government that was responsible for that Agreement of 1909 with Germany which had created a potential Franco-German economic *condominium* in Morocco, an arrangement which logically produced the Cailiaux policy, with the Treaty of 1911, and was itself the inevitable consequence of M. Rouvier's action in cringing to the menaces of Germany and in sacrificing one of the greatest of French statesmen, M. Delcassé? These were errors of judgment which the later Clemenceau had magnificently corrected. In spite of all that could be adduced to accumulate distrust of M. Clemenceau, it was natural that men should impute to the French, as a foregone conclusion, the desire and determination that the 'Grand Old Gaul' who had sprung to the breach in 1917 should be eternal, and that his world-wide prestige should be utilised to the end. It was so unquestionably he who, after Gallieni and Joffre, and before Foch, had saved France! How could the Great Man be spared in the impending anxious aftermath of the War, when just such vigilance as his would be more than ever needed? Was he not the man whom the French Senate, bestowing

on him an unprecedented honour, had acclaimed by unanimous resolution as follows: 'Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council and Minister of War, and Marshal Foch, General in Chief of the Allied Armies, have well deserved the gratitude of the country'? Yet, to the astonishment of the world, when the fatal hour arrived to choose a successor to M. Poincaré, 'the hero of France' fell like a meteor. M. Clemenceau was defeated, and another Frenchman was preferred. Men are still talking of this mystery. Yet it is no mystery.

In the effort to answer these questions: 'Why was M. Clemenceau defeated, and why was M. Deschanel preferred in the elections for the Presidency of the Republic?' rumour and gossip have recklessly run riot. They have thus far confused and silenced all sober reply. Certain German organs have maliciously gone so far astray as to suggest that M. Deschanel's victory over M. Clemenceau was a sign of the revival of Caillautism, implying a return to a policy of cordial understanding with Germany. It has even been represented as the result of a deep-laid plot concocted by Socialist-Radicals, the vengeance of unforgiving political foes, Malvyists and Caillautists, martialled, for the nonce, by M. Briand. Certain French organs have blundered, likewise, in ascribing the event to a coalition of Extremists, to an unholy alliance between the reactionary France and the Anti-Patriots of the *Internationale*, bent on taking a last revenge against the ironic old gentleman whose bitter sarcasms have so often stung them to the quick.

None of these assumptions corresponds to the facts. They are based on an inadequate acquaintance not only with France and the French, but above all with the essential facts of the world since Nov. 11, 1918. When, on Thursday, Jan. 22, 1920, M. Millerand went to the tribune of the Chamber and began his ministerial declaration with an exordium in honour of 'the great patriot who incarnates before the world *la Victoire*,' even superficial observers, whether sincere or malicious, might have seen at once how mistaken was their judgment. Almost the entire House broke out in cheers, whereas the passage on the 'Society of Nations' fell amid a grim and even pathetic silence; yet the allusion

to the necessity for France loyally to maintain her alliances was roundly applauded.

There were, no doubt, several plausible minor factors which were bound to suggest to this or that individual citizen, and even to more than one political group in the Congress, the prudence of rejecting M. Clemenceau. There were some who could plausibly hesitate because of M. Clemenceau's great age. Members of Parliament might well demur to be influenced even by the national sentiment of gratitude felt towards M. Clemenceau as the saviour of France, and through France of the world, when they reflected on the probability that, before the close of his legal term of office, he must either die or be incapacitated. Again, many of the Congressional electors sincerely held that, while M. Clemenceau has magnificent qualities, those qualities are over-shadowed by serious defects, some of which might entail great inconvenience at the Elysée. Serenity and judicial calm, lofty detachment—such detachment as M. Poincaré showed by his noble choice of M. Clemenceau, his calumniator and insulter, to be Prime Minister, at the darkest period of the War—are, after all, outstanding requirements of the Presidential rôle; and no admirer of the Gallic Grand Old Man, known as 'Père la Victoire,' has ever attributed to him these characteristics. Finally, there were deputies and senators who were sincerely concerned as to the possible ravages at the Elysée, on the arrival there of a certain ambitious and irresponsible clique, a bodyguard whose disinterestedness was not above suspicion.

But, no one of these reasons, nor yet all combined, carried sufficient weight to determine the decision of the National Assembly to ignore the generous pressure of French popular opinion in favour of M. Clemenceau. The real cause of his rejection was of quite a different order. And, from the standpoint of international relations, it is of extreme importance that that cause should be clearly understood. The election at Versailles has a definite political sense. That election was an unmistakable proof offered to the world that France is anxious and dissatisfied. She is dissatisfied and profoundly irritated, owing to the kind of Peace which has been offered her by the very man on whom she counted to

establish her own notions of a sane solution of the problems raised by the World-War.

Indeed, what took place at Versailles on Jan. 17 is, in a way, the pendant of what has been going on at Washington during the last six months. American public opinion is mystified by the surprising consequences of what it almost unanimously holds to be an abuse of confidence on the part of a Chief Magistrate who has strained the sacrosanct American Constitution to the point of rupture. French public opinion is likewise mystified, and talks of imposture; but it feels above all that its interests have been inadequately defended.

France is aware, even if others have forgotten, that she has been the 'couverture de civilisation' against a race of brigands. And she perceives with anguish that, what with a precipitate armistice and the flimsiness of the guarantees offered her against a repetition of her martyrdom of the last five years, she may have again to assume this sublime but sinister obligation before the world. Infinitely grateful to M. Clemenceau for having saved them from disaster in the crisis of the struggle, Frenchmen were profoundly apprehensive lest the schemes and methods he had allowed to be adopted during the Peace Conference might wreck the future of their country. The French Congress feared that it might compromise the interests of France if, from sheer gratitude and sentiment, it were to lift Clemenceau to the pagoda of the Elysée as an idol to be worshipped.

It is not too much to say that the members of that Congress stoically strove to harden their hearts against what they felt to be the seduction of the popular appeal. In so doing they believed themselves to be sober, reflecting legislators. This was the mood of the immense majority of the responsible citizens of the nation. The purely malicious manœuvres of M. Clemenceau's personal and political enemies, the Malvyists and the Socialists, and the Leninists—and those manœuvres were real—could never of themselves have determined so effective a cabal against him. The mood of the majority in question was, in a word, accurately expressed in the exclamation of a certain deputy: 'I vote for Deschanel to the cry of Vive Clemenceau.' It was felt that a new man was needed, a Deschanel or another, and that the only League of

Nations that any longer really mattered was the Commission of Reparations, whose duty it should be to become a relentless Rhadamanthine Areopagus presided over by an argus-eyed Frenchman, bent on applying to the letter those guarantees at all events that France had been suffered to maintain against a potential *revanche* from beyond the Rhine.

Now, if this was the mood in which the majority of the French Congress confronted the election of a Chief Magistrate to preside over the destinies of France during one of the most critical moments of French history, we have, no doubt, an adequate explanation of its rejection of M. Clemenceau; but the firm resolve to part with M. Clemenceau by no means implies, as a necessary corollary, the preference of the Congress for M. Deschanel among all possible candidates for the Presidency. It remains to explain the choice of M. Deschanel.

It is true that M. Deschanel, although he had never been Prime Minister, had been regarded for more than a quarter of a century as a potential candidate for the Presidency of the Republic. In this connexion I venture to recall a picturesque bit of evidence. In 1891, at the age of 35, M. Deschanel spent four months in the United States. He returned enamoured of the American Constitution. Even eight years later, in the thick of the Dreyfus case, he manifested such satisfaction with the system of government in North America—a system permitting the Head of the State consecutively to carry out the domestic policies for which he had been elected—that he boldly declared, on Jan. 20, 1899, in an interview in the Nationalist organ, the 'Echo de Paris,' that 'nothing could divert him' from his resolve to spend his life in the effort to revise the French Constitution of 1875. 'Let us change that Constitution,' he said, 'or put our Presidents of the Republic in a position to use the considerable authority with which they are armed.' A certain imprudence in this declaration instantly struck the intelligence of my old chief, M. de Blowitz, correspondent of the 'Times'; and, on the day of its rash appearance, the wary journalist, who knew and loved Paul Deschanel, telegraphed to the 'Times' a friendly but ironic comment which, to the honour of M. Deschanel's

open mind, the critic never had to repeat. In this telegram M. de Blowitz wrote, among other things, as follows :

‘ . . . M. Deschanel wishes to be Prime Minister in order to convoke a Congress intended to alter the Constitution ; that is to say—for M. Deschanel is a great admirer of the Americans—to give the President greater personal power, similar to that possessed by the President of the United States. In a word, M. Deschanel, President of the Chamber, hopes to become Prime Minister ; and, once Prime Minister, he will prepare a Congress to bestow very great powers upon the President of the Republic. Then M. Deschanel, as President of the Republic, in the enjoyment of these enlarged prerogatives granted him by his Congress, will become—I really cannot say what, for there, for the moment, his tangible ambition stops and we enter on the field of hypothesis. . . . But it is always agreeable to be able to predict the brilliant career of one of the most sympathetic men now in French public life.’

This was in 1899. Now note how effectively the lesson went home. Four months after M. de Blowitz’s prediction M. Deschanel became a member of the French Academy. On Feb. 1, 1900, in his discourse on formally taking his seat, the young President of the Chamber formulated as follows the principles from which he has never varied :

‘ The democracy in those countries where it is the furthest advanced never ceases to create new organisms. We must not complain, for everywhere, in Austria and in Italy as well as in France, the Parliamentary regime is passing through a crisis. And it is presumable that, before long, the forms which have hitherto served to govern us, monarchical or republican, will be to the more scientific mechanisms of the future what the diligences, the coaches and the signals of our fathers are to the express trains, the ocean steamships and the telephones. But what will always remain the truth is that no people, whatever its institutions, can infringe without danger the great principles bequeathed us by the experience of the ages. . . . A nation is free and its Government is stable only so long as authority is divided. When, in law or in reality, the public powers are concentrated either in the hands of one man or in an Assembly, there is no longer responsibility or control or lasting authority. Whether the Government crush the Chambers or the Chambers paralyse and absorb the Executive Power, in either case it is despotism and anarchy.’

During the years that ensued, in all the great debates of the Palais Bourbon, M. Deschanel reiterated his now confirmed belief in the prudence of not tampering frivolously with the Constitution. Twenty-one years after his ambiguous statement in the 'Echo de Paris,' M. Deschanel published a brilliant essay on Gambetta. In the intention of M. Deschanel it is a not-too-critical panegyric of the Frenchman who, having incarnated the resistance of the nation in 1870, merited a pious recognition on the part of his grateful compatriots at the grand moment of the realisation of that Immanent Justice he had foreseen and prepared. Now, in this book, published only a few days before the Congress met to choose a successor to M. Poincaré, M. Deschanel says :

'As regards the Presidency of the Republic, the experience of 1848 had taught the Republicans, and Gambetta reminded the country, that, if the President were appointed by the people, he would dominate Parliament. On the contrary, certain minds, considering that a President elected by the two Houses is annihilated by them, turned their eyes towards the United States. Now, if by the American system the President of the United States has a considerable authority, it is because at the outset that authority was susceptible of slight application. . . . Undertake to transfer this system into our ultra-centralised France; and you would have during four years (for necessarily the length of the Presidential term would be reduced) the domination of the victorious party, while the minority would be oppressed by the majority; therefore less stability and less liberty. The American system implies a federated State, a country strongly decentralised.'

Now, although it is doubtful if many members of the French Congress recalled this picturesque and significant episode in M. Deschanel's mental development, the majority at all events remembered to his credit certain aspects of his political career which they held to be of extreme importance. When, in the last decade of the 19th century, the present Prime Minister of France, M. Millerand, accompanied by M. Clemenceau, was throwing sops to the Cerberus of unchained Marxism, M. Deschanel sprang into the arena, and, with foresight and courage, often with an invective that recalled the Catilinian orations, warned Frenchmen of the risks

involved in truckling to the Collectivist philosophers and agitators. With a steady dialectic he reaffirmed in the French Chamber the sacred right to individual property by free association and co-operation. He reminded Frenchmen that the logical fruit of the seductive fustian of 1848 had been the dictatorship of the Second Empire. And I remember well a brilliant speech of his at the Palais Bourbon in 1892 in which he adjured his colleagues to combat the ideas, which were returning among them in German garb, 'as if Germany meant to subjugate our brains after having conquered our provinces.'

Again, it is just over a quarter of a century since M. Deschanel woke the echoes of the Palais Bourbon with such words as these :

'No, no! our great and hardworking democracy now perceives the dangerous slopes towards which certain leaders would impel it. No, the clear intelligence of France, the country of Descartes, of Montesquieu and of Voltaire, will never allow itself to be lured on by your masters, the Karl Marxes and the Lassalles, and, wandering astray, lose its road in the fogs of the regions beyond the Rhine. No, never will the spirit of Germany, never will that worst of tyrannies, the Collectivist tyranny, lay its heavy hand on the idealistic soul of France.'

And, in a great speech in 1897 on Agrarian Socialism, a speech placarded throughout France, he ended his courageous exposure of the sophistries and chimæras of the time with the following words :

'If there be anywhere in the world a land where Collectivism can never succeed in taking root, it is our land of France. What our peasant loves in the soil is what he has himself put into it, what his father and forbears have put into it before him, namely, their toil, their patience, their courage, their virtues, all that is best in them and most sacred, all that makes for human dignity and honour. And this is why a halo of idealism surrounds even the humble tiller of the soil. Yet, for these sentiments, the most generous that can move the human heart, certain persons would substitute the vilest instincts of cupidity and envy. They point to the meadow larger than the peasant's own and say to him: "Such equality is necessarily injustice; if you are the stronger take it." Well, such persons mistake their epoch and mistake their country. For the generous-minded

Frenchman feels that human happiness is no Utopian dream of equality in the enjoyment of material values, but that it is placed higher up in the sense of conscious responsibility. Dear Peasant of France, constant creator of wealth, of power, and of liberty, constant saviour of thy country both in peace and in war, thou, who hast, over and over again, repaired our military defeats and the faults of our Governments, thy clear and delicate intelligence will save from barbarian materialism the idealistic soul of France.'

August 2, 1914, saw the realisation of these and similar prophecies of the vigilant deputy of nearly a quarter of a century before, the justification of his unflinching courage in challenging on every occasion those elements of social disorder which he regarded as the negation of the principles of the French Revolution. Yet, while the romantic, even sentimental, spirit of M. Clemenceau was coquetting with Socialism, the sturdy but open-minded traditionalism of M. Deschanel seemed to many to be leading him to adopt a method of political tactics which exposed him at times to the suspicion of trimming between parties in order to avoid being compromised. In his book on Gambetta, M. Deschanel cites with approval that statesman's phrase: 'Il faut pour gouverner la France des paroles violentes et des actes modérés. Be always clear to the limit of radicalism, but let your acts be measured and conservative, and France will recognise you as her own.'

A man of great talent whom party limits cannot hold, but who is also ambitious and not afraid of moral responsibility, so only he be sure that he is right; a man in whom education and training have engendered a certain aristocratic aloofness making him something altogether other than the hail-fellow-well-met type of the 'Republic of Comrades,' can hardly avoid the charge of dilettantism, even of lack of character. M. Paul Imbert, the editor of one of the volumes of M. Deschanel's political speeches, 'L'Organisation de la Démocratie,' was already aware of this in 1910, and he rebuts the charge in language which I can heartily endorse:

'Backed by the Conservatives and consequently called reactionary when he combated the errors of the Collectivists and revolutionary excesses, approved by the Republicans when he pointed out the need for reforms, he has been

accused, just because of these alternatives, by heedless or malicious persons, now of irresolution and now of not knowing his own mind. We consider, on the contrary, that it is just this independence which does him credit. . . . To support all reforms, and thereby dissatisfy those who want none; to hold his own against every form of violence, and thereby incur the hostility of those who provoke violence, or truckle to it—such has been the noble difficulty of his life. Whether this policy be approved or blamed, it certainly lacks neither originality nor courage, nor can any one contest either its persevering unity or its disinterestedness. Such a verdict is the highest recompense that can befall a good citizen.'

When M. Deschanel's parliamentary colleagues lifted him to the Presidency, they testified their approval of his courageous and independent conduct in public affairs, and they recognised the 'persevering unity and disinterestedness' of his career. But it was not merely to his attitude and method in matters touching on the social and economic problems of France that they gave their approval. It was not merely that they found singularly opportune the presence at the Elysée of a statesman with such a past just at the moment when Leninism was stalking on the horizon, and when, within France herself, civil servants were preparing to organise, in conspiracy with the General Federation of Labour, a State within the State. But, as regards French foreign policy, M. Deschanel's position was equally well defined; that position had been equally original and courageous; and it was the certainty and security that the Congress felt in regard to this preoccupation that definitely fixed the choice of its members.

The President of the United States has recently been so ill-advised as to accuse France and the French Government of militarism. Only a few days earlier, he had telegraphed to M. Deschanel, congratulating him on his accession to the Presidency. 'Victorious in the greatest struggle known in the world's history, France,' said Mr Wilson, 'finds herself facing a grand and glorious future; and you, Mr President, as Chief Executive of a people whose highest ambition is to maintain Right and Justice, will be a powerful factor in achieving these happy ends.' Now, Mr Wilson sent this telegram *after* the brief

extemporaneous speech at Versailles in which M. Deschanel, thanking the Congress, had inaugurated his septennate with the ominous remark: "Our hopes of 1918 have not been fully realised."

That utterance was the echo of the sub-conscious anguish that, as I have pointed out, is now being stoically stifled in all French hearts. It was the deep undertone of the courageous and patriotic resolve dictating the painful choice between a Clemenceau and a Deschanel. In the same firm spirit of 'sacred union' in which they rallied to the flag when the Germans ran amuck on Aug. 2, 1914, they are again to-day looking the facts in the face. It was in order to keep untarnished the glory and the honour of their 'Père la Victoire,' as well as to begin the methodic mending of a ruined world, that they have turned to one of the most respected public men of our time, to a Republican politically speaking of aristocratic lineage but a great bourgeois of France, to a statesman whose ideas are clear, national and sane, a man of incomparable political experience and of wide and cultivated intellectual curiosity—the safest arbiter, in a word, whom at the present moment France had to offer.

Now, it was to this man, in spite of his reproachful cry, 'Our hopes of 1918 have not been fully realised,' that Mr Wilson addressed his cordial telegram of congratulation. M. Deschanel replied with a message containing these suggestive words: 'Despite the deep wounds and the immense sacrifices which Victory has cost, France remains in Peace, as she was in War, attached to that Right which she willed to see restored and to that Justice which calls for reparation!' This exchange of telegrams took place in the last week of February. Some ten days later, Mr Wilson made the singular charge to which I have referred. 'Throughout the sessions of the Peace Conference in Paris,' said he, 'it was evident that the militarist party was vanquished, but it is to-day in control.' It is M. Millerand who is 'in control' now—M. Millerand, a forward-looking radical of socialist tradition. M. Deschanel is indeed President of the Republic, and M. Deschanel's predecessor, M. Poincaré, is President of the Commission of Reparations; and both M. Poincaré and M. Deschanel are resolved on

defending the interests of France—which are to-day the interests of the world—in the spirit of the words and of the act of the speech delivered by M. Deschanel on March 1 in the historic theatre of Bordeaux at the meeting to commemorate the protest of March 1, 1871, against the seizure by Germany of Alsace and Lorraine. It is important that his words should be kept in view.

‘The other day (he said), at the French Academy, my illustrious predecessor and friend, M. Raymond Poincaré, received Marshal Foch in the following terms, “It was your business to make war; it was no longer your business to make peace. You had, nevertheless, the right to say what in your opinion peace ought to be, the better to prevent a renewal of the war. The notes which you drew up from the very beginning of November, in order to explain your conception of the military guarantees which you considered indispensable, bear the stamp of your patriotism and of your experience. Let us hope that the world may never have to repent having so inadequately listened to your counsel.” Gentlemen, whatever doubt there may be as regards the past which is still under discussion, the question henceforth for us is security for the future, and our duty is certain. To this tribune which has echoed down the ages the protest of 1871 we bring to-day the oath of 1920:

‘By our one million five-hundred thousand dead, by our ten departments in ruins, face to face with Alsace and Lorraine, in presence of our ancestors and in presence of our children, we swear not to die without having given France that full security which her heroism and her genius deserve.’

The *Serment de 1920*, ‘the Oath of Bordeaux,’ so solemnly sworn before the world, as the first public act of the President of the French Republic, is an event which will find its place in the chronicles of Europe. If this be ‘militarism,’ it is not only the militarism of Gambetta and of Clemenceau, but it is also the militarism of Washington and Lincoln. If M. Deschanel felt it useful and perhaps necessary to inaugurate his term of office with so vivid a gesture, it was because, as he had said, ‘French hopes of 1918 have not been fully realised.’ Not a Frenchman but knew the reason why. And the point is this: though the Anglo-Saxon world may have been somewhat surprised by these and similar initiatives, discretion lies in realising that they are the profoundly

conscious acts of a statesman, and exactly of the sort that had been expected of him. They were involved in the mandate that raised M. Deschanel to the Presidency. 'For Germany every treaty is a mere truce, a simple halt; every boundary only a provisional frontier; every annexation a preliminary to others.' Who says this? It is M. Paul Deschanel in his book, 'Gambetta,' written during the War, and published in the late autumn of 1919. It is the same Deschanel who, inheriting a violent hatred of the Second Empire, inherited as well a profound distrust of the nationalistic policy of Napoleon III.

Above all, the French Congress knew that M. Deschanel had learned, with its members, the healing virtue of the verity so perfectly formulated, for instance, by Mr Hyndman in his 'Clemenceau and His Times': 'to anticipate fraternity in a world of conflict is to help the aggressor and to court disaster.' They recalled that in March 1915, M. Deschanel, then President of the Chamber of Deputies, delivered an address before the Teachers' League on 'France and the Public Schools during the War and after the War,' in which he said:

'We must destroy in the mind of the French democracy—and we must begin to do it at an early age—certain deadly sophistries, for instance: that to anticipate war is to want war or to provoke it; and that, because war is detestable, one should destroy the army.'

The 'militarist party,' says Mr Wilson, 'is in control now in the counsels of France.' In the language of Pacifism, commonsense axioms such as those of Mr Hyndman and M. Deschanel are technically known as 'imperialistic' or 'militarist.' In 1920, in a world reeking with the miasmatic gases rising from rotting illusions, a world to which Germany is still an obvious menace, these axioms are merely, and idiomatically, French. The world will not be 'safe for democracy,' nor for much else, until they become, as well, idiomatically English and American.

WM. MORTON FULLERTON.



